




Sharia Supervisory Board in Islamic Banks: A Critical Analysis 
of the Current Framework 
 
 
Saleh Abdulrahman Al Amer 
 
Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) 
 
The University of Leeds 
  










The candidate confirms that the work submitted is his own and that 






This copy has been supplied on the understanding that it is copyright material 


















All praise be to Allah for giving me the ability, patience, and blessing to accomplish this 
thesis. 
I am also grateful to a number of people who have been standing behind this 
achievement. 
Special thanks go to my incredible supervisors, Professor Andrew Campbell and 
Professor Andrew Keay. I am deeply grateful for all the support and guidance I received 
from them in both personal and professional levels. 
I would like to extend my gratitude to my family in Saudi Arabia for their support and 
encouragement. Special appreciation goes to my mother who always sacrifices, 
supports, and prays for my success. 
I am much obliged to the people who accompanied me, very patiently, on this long 
journey. My warmest thanks go to my wife, Noorah, and my daughter, Sarah, who 















Sharia Supervisory Boards (SSBs) are established within the structure of Islamic 
financial institutions (IFIs) to ensure the credibility of sharia-compliance. In sharia 
governance, the SSB is the main tool which IFIs apply to be presumed as sharia-
compliant. However, the insertion of this body into the internal structure of the 
corporation can prove challenging, as this body, with its powerful authority, is unknown 
to the structure of the corporation. The role of sharia supervision performed by SSBs 
requires a high level of independence, which is significantly compromised in its current 
structure.  
While many researchers have identified conflict of interests surrounding the structure 
of SSBs and proposed suggestions, this thesis rethinks the entire structure of SSBs to 
make them more consistent with the well-known corporate governance mechanisms. 
The thesis examines the nature of SSBs’ roles and concludes that these are more 
closely aligned gatekeeping. More specifically, their roles are similar to those of external 
auditors, and so the SSBs should be structured as such. This requires a separation of 
the SSB’s roles to be reassigned to different institutions. 
Regarding the sharia standard-setting role, the thesis suggests establishing a 
national Sharia Standard-setting Board to be the exclusive authority for issuing sharia 
standards for the Islamic finance industry. This body should overcome the limitations 
existing within similar bodies in certain jurisdictions where SSBs are granted wide 
legislative authority. To assess the auditing roles of SSBs, the thesis analyses the 
accountability framework of sharia governance. It argues that sharia firms provide a 
better alternative for conducting independent external sharia auditing. Also, a regulatory 
authority needs to be implemented for more effective accountability and to serve the 
unique stakeholders of sharia-compliance. The thesis concludes by proposing an SSB-
free model which promotes sharia supervision as a profession and so, in turn, the whole 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1 Background and Importance of the Research 
The opposition within Islamic law to interest-based loans has led Muslims to find 
alternatives to modern financial services. As a result, Islamic banking has emerged to 
provide financial alternatives based on sharia principles which have been used to 
develop its own modes of finance to substitute for interest-based loans. Consequently, 
the sharia governance concept has evolved as a mechanism parallel to corporate 
governance to ensure sharia-compliance in Islamic financial institutions (IFIs). This has 
resulted in the incorporation of sharia principles within the objectives of corporations. 
Such incorporation, however, is unfamiliar to corporation theory and has driven many 
discussions about the theory of corporations in the case of IFIs and sharia governance. 
As a new concept to corporations, sharia governance, which requires some unique 
mechanisms and bodies, faces challenges regarding to accommodating its framework 
within corporate governance. One of the biggest challenges is how the sharia 
supervisory board (SSB) fits into the corporate governance structure, which is the focus 
of this thesis. 
Islamic banking commenced in the middle of the last century and received little 
attention until the end of that century. Since then, the Islamic financial market has 
expanded both horizontally, as more IFIs have been established, and, vertically, as 
more Islamic financial products have been invented. The interest of Islamic finance is 
not limited to Muslims but it also attracts non-Muslims too. Luxemburg has emerged as 
one of the most important centres for Islamic finance in the world.1 Recently, the UK 
announced that it would become the western centre for Islamic finance.2 The industry is 
                                            
1 Deloitte, 'Islamic Finance at Deloitte: No Interest but Plenty of Attention' (2016) at 3 













now growing and developing considerably to become an important element of the world 
economy. In 2017, the industry’s assets exceeded USD 2 trillion, marking an 8.3% 
growth in the previous year.3 This is estimated to surpass USD 3 trillion by 2020 and to 
be doubled by 2025.4 Although this is a modest figure compared to the world’s total 
financial industry, Islamic finance is continuing to gain systematic importance within 
several jurisdictions. Islamic financial assets to total financial assets in the regions of the 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC),5 Middle East and North Africa (MENA), excluding 
GCC, and Asia are 42%, 29.1% and 24.4% respectively.6 In these regions, the future of 
the Islamic financial market appears promising. Between 2010 and 2014, the sharia-
compliant assets in these regions experienced a strong growth rate of 16%.7  
However, the development of the market has attracted insufficient legal attention, 
and the market requires essential legal improvements. It has been suggested that the 
lack of a clear and consistent legal framework obstructs the development of the 
market.8 The problem includes sharia supervision, which is a unique mechanism that 
Islamic banks use to ensure that their products are sharia-compliant. This is usually 
implemented by a Sharia Supervisory Board (SSB), a special board or committee that is 
supposed to wield superior power to the board of directors with regard to sharia-
compliance issues. While this mechanism provides solutions for the prohibited financial 
products provided by conventional banks, its structure, in practice, creates problematic 
legal issues, as this body is unfamiliar to the way that governance in corporations is 
structured. This research aims to highlight the legal problems associated with the 
current practice of sharia supervision and to propose a more appropriate framework that 
overcomes these problems.  
In addition to the growing interest of the market globally and nationally, the 
significance of this study is due to the need of the market for more legal academic work 
to promote the development of the Islamic banking industry. While this industry has 
                                            
3 Islamic Financial Services Board, 'Islamic Financial Services Industry Stability Report 2018' (2018) at 9 
4 Abid Shakeel, Islamic Megabank: The Redeemer? (Deloitte 2016) at 21 
5 GCC comprises of six countries: Bahrain, Emirates, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and Saudi Arabia. 
6 Islamic Financial Services Board, Islamic Financial Services Industry Stability Report 2018 (n 3) at 9; 
Hatim El Tahir, Thought Leadership: The Neglected Essence of Islamic Finance (Deloitte 2010) at 8 
7 EY, 'World Islamic Banking Competitiveness Report 2016' (2017) at 10 




received considerable economic and financial academic attention, the legal academic 
research in this area remains limited. More specifically, sharia supervision provides the 
research with special significance. The legal reform of sharia supervision is, arguably, 
the first important step that should be taken in developing Islamic finance. Sharia 
supervision is the source of trust for stakeholders of sharia-compliance who rely on their 
belief in the independence and objectivity of the decisions of sharia supervision. Thus, 
this trust should be maintained and sharia supervision should not, at least from the 
stakeholders’ perspectives, be influenced by any non-sharia matters, such as the 
profitability of the bank. For sharia supervision to be independent and effective, a strong 
sharia governance mechanism is required. Restructuring the SSB to achieve these 
objectives more effectively would provide the Islamic financial market with a new, 
stronger legal framework, and also enhance the professionalism of the practice of 
sharia supervision instead of being perceived as more of a religious practice. Such a 
legal reform provides the basis for preparing the market to produce more reliable and 
creative financial products.  
1.2 Aims and Objectives 
This research aims to undertake a critical analysis of the SSB frameworks and 
practices and to explore the factors which affect its independence as well as the 
effectiveness of its decisions. It substantially analyses its roles and responsibility, power 
and authority, and the accountability framework that is established for it. The research 
examines the deficiencies within the current structure and the governing rules of sharia 
supervision. The research also compares the SSB with similar bodies and committees 
within corporate governance, by way of an analogy in order to suggest what could be 
applied to the practice of sharia supervision. This assists the production of an optimal 
model that is consistent with the objectives of Islamic banks through importing the 
internationally-accepted governance standards and professional practices.   
The primary aim of this research is to answer this main question: how should the 
SSB be restructured to be more effective, independent and impartial for the 




More specifically, to address this main question, the following secondary questions 
will be answered: 
• Why do IFIs and sharia governance require greater legal consideration?  
• What is the nature of the SSBs’ roles? And how do these roles fit into the 
corporate governance structure? 
• What are the factors that affect the impartiality and independence of the current 
model of SSBs? 
• Why must, and how might, sharia rulings in the industry be more effectively 
standardised?  
• What is the nature of sharia interest and how is it satisfied? How may an 
appropriate accountability framework for it be developed? And who is 
accountable, for what, and to whom? 
• How might the proposed model of sharia governance improve both the 
professional practice of sharia supervision and the industry as a whole? 
1.3 Research Context 
The issues discussed in this thesis are generally theoretical in nature, concerning 
the concept of sharia governance and sharia supervision in IFIs. To different extents, 
these issues are common in the industry, which could apply to all jurisdictions. The 
research, however, addresses Saudi Arabia as a focus jurisdiction to provide clearer 
specification and be the main reference for the cases and examples discussed and 
analysed in the research. Nevertheless, comparisons will be drawn, to some extent, 
with some of the leading jurisdictions in the industry to highlight the various applications 
and approaches of sharia supervision and governance. This analysis and comparison 
are extended to the sharia governance standards set by international organisations, 
such as the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions 
(AAOIFI) and the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB). 
The jurisdiction of Saudi Arabia represents an important case in the Islamic banking 
industry. The country is considered one of the key driving forces in the Islamic financial 




domestic banking sector and accounted for 20.4% of the whole global Islamic assets in 
the first half of 2017.9 It is estimated that the country will experience a significant growth 
in the industry and that its sharia-compliant assets will increase, both domestically and 
globally. From USD 343 billion in 2015, sharia-compliant assets might reach USD 766 
by 2020.10 This growth is motivated by the strong demand by customers, both retail and 
corporate, which may increase the sharia-compliant assets in the country to 70% of the 
domestic assets within the banking industry by 2019.11   
In addition to the economic size of its market, the Saudi jurisdiction constitutes an 
important legal case as a reference. The legal system in the country is passive in regard 
to Islamic financial services, including sharia supervision. Its attitude toward the legal 
recognition of the industry represents an example of extreme legal negligence. This 
provides a good case for analysing the effect of legal negligence on this growing 
industry within an important jurisdiction.    
Another factor to consider in the context of this research is its scope within the 
Islamic finance industry. While many of the issues discussed apply to different sectors 
of IFIs, such as Islamic banking, Islamic insurance, takaful, the capital market, and other 
financial institutions, this research focuses mainly on Islamic banking. The banking 
industry was chosen for more specification and to provide clear examples in the 
discussion, since it is the most dominant and important sector of the Islamic finance 
industry. This is not to suggest that the outcome of the research does not apply to the 
other sectors, as the same sharia supervision framework tends to apply in all of these. 
However, some issues might require further analysis to ensure the framework’s 
accurate application in these other sectors.  
1.4 Originality 
As stated above, the legal aspect of Islamic finance needs more academic research 
to help the industry to identify an appropriate legal framework for itself. The legal 
structure of sharia supervision has been discussed to some extent so far, but not in 
                                            
9 Ibid at 11 
10 EY, World Islamic Banking Competitiveness Report 2016 (n 7) at 18, 48 




sufficient depth. More specifically, the issue of independence is discussed in literature 
as a problem facing SSBs. The literature highlights the conflict of interests surrounding 
the SSB body and suggests improvements regarding its structure. This research, 
however, constitutes an attempt to rethink the entire practice of sharia supervision and 
restructure it more effectively and independently, regardless of the current structure of 
SSBs. In an endeavour to propose a new legal framework, the nature of the roles of 
SSBs will be assessed in depth, under corporate governance principles. The practice of 
auditing, which is a professional task that is very close in nature to sharia supervision, 
will be analogically compared in order to import the standards and structural 
components that may make it possible for sharia supervision to be accommodated more 
logically within the corporate governance structure and so achieve its objectives more 
effectively and independently. While several limited comparisons have been drawn 
between sharia supervision and auditing, these are not comprehensive and, more 
importantly, do not relate to the context of restructuring the practice of sharia 
supervision. This research is unprecedented in comprehensively analysing the nature of 
SSBs’ roles and how they fit within its structure in order to propose an alternative 
framework for SSBs that matches their objectives. 
Furthermore, the research analyses in depth the concept of accountability within 
sharia governance, presenting original perspectives about the elements and players of 
accountability within sharia governance. Based on this discussion, the research 
proposes a new framework for sharia supervision that replaces SSBs. 
Additionally, the focus jurisdiction, Saudi Arabia, lacks academic research that 
analyses and highlights the legal status of its Islamic banking field. In this context, the 
research discusses several issues that have been largely neglected to date in the 
academic field and highlights some important problems associated with Islamic banking 
and sharia supervision. 
1.5 Methodology 
A proper methodology that is consistent with the problem identified in the research is 




relationships between the existing approaches and their relevant and contextual 
theories are examined.12 As mentioned before, this research is concerned with the 
current framework of sharia supervision within Islamic banking. This relatively new 
concept needs more theoretical research to improve its model and practice. Its 
framework must be smoothly adopted within the corporation structure. Therefore, the 
research is, primarily, desk-based to examine and critically analyse the existing 
framework of sharia supervision in order to propose a more appropriate one. 
Within this theoretical research, different methodologies are followed to analyse the 
framework for sharia supervision. Parts of the research may be categorised as doctrinal 
research, which is defined by the Pearce Committee as “research which provides a 
systematic exposition of the rules governing a particular legal category, analyses the 
relationship between rules, explains areas of difficulty, and, perhaps, predicts future 
developments”.13 The doctrinal aspect of the research encompasses discussions that 
explore the regulations governing Islamic banking and SSBs in certain jurisdictions, 
mainly Saudi Arabia.  
Structural analysis is a comparative method employed in this research. One of its 
basic applications is to identify a common structural core between different legal 
systems.14 In the analysis of SSBs, the research identifies several common 
characteristics within the SSB structures in the industry for the critical analysis. Also, the 
research compares the structure of auditing with sharia supervision to identify the 
common characteristics of both. In this comparison, an analytical method is also 
employed. This involves a deep examination of certain concepts in different contexts, 
which might appear similar or different, to distinguish whether these differences and 
commonalities between the legal systems are genuine.15 This research entails an in-
depth analysis of SSBs within the sharia governance framework to examine some of the 
                                            
12 Sanne Taekema, 'Theoretical and Normative Frameworks for Legal Research: Putting Theory into 
Practice' (2018) Law and Method 1 at 1 
13 Terry Hutchinson and Nigel Duncan, 'Defining and Describing What We Do: Doctrinal Legal Research' 
(2012) 17 Deakin Law Review 83 at 101 
14 Mark Van Hoecke, 'Methodology of Comparative Legal Research' (2015) Law and Method 1 at 13 




differences and commonalities between this phenomenon and corporate governance, 
which might not appear as such.  
In comparing sharia supervision and auditing, an analogical comparison is applied in 
the analysis. This is when two different objects, structures or forms, which do not 
descend from a common ancestor, are compared in order to identify any similarities 
between them.16 This comparison intellectually involves “comparing the relations and 
aspects between the objects and not the objects themselves”.17  This research 
compares the practices of auditing, as a well-established phenomenon which shares 
many of the objectives of sharia supervision, and sharia supervision, as a pre-mature 
practice. The aim of this comparison is to determine whether or not sufficient similarity 
exists to restructure the practice of sharia supervision to make it more similar to the 
structure of auditing. This analysis could also be categorised as normative or evaluative 
in nature. That is to explore whether a legal framework is effective or not; in other 
words, whether or not a specific structure is legally designed to achieve its objectives.18 
This evaluative analysis requires an internal framework which is derived from the legal 
system subject to evaluation and an external framework, which refer to the optimal 
theoretical frameworks that should be applied.19 Here, the framework of sharia 
supervision would be evaluated with the governance principles generally accepted 
globally within corporations. Evaluative research tends to produce recommendations for 
improvement and corrections to the evaluative framework.20 To propose such 
recommendations, inductive reasoning is applied during the analysis. This is described 
as reasoning from specific cases to a general rule which is applied to help to fill the gap 
                                            
16 Dawn Watkins and Mandy Burton, Research Methods in Law (Routledge 2013) at 106 
17 Ibid at 106 
18 Taekema, 'Theoretical and Normative Frameworks for Legal Research: Putting Theory into Practice' (n 
12) at 6-7 
19 Lina Kestemont, 'A Meta-methodological Study of Dutch and Belgian PhDs in Social Security Law: 
Devising a Typology of Research Objectives as a Supporting Tool' (2015) 17 European Journal of Social 
Security 361 at 373-374 
20 Taekema, 'Theoretical and Normative Frameworks for Legal Research: Putting Theory into Practice' (n 




in the law and propose a general framework where a factual situation lacks legal 
recognition.21  
Since the research aims to identify a more appropriate method for sharia supervision 
to be practised, it could be categorised within the theme of reform-oriented research. 
According to the Pearce Committee,22 this type of research is one “which intensively 
evaluates the adequacy of existing rules and which recommends changes to any rules 
found wanting”.23 Reform-oriented research is concerned with problems within existing 
rules and what changes are required.  
1.6 Structure of the Thesis  
This research contains this chapter as a preliminary one which introduces the 
research by providing its background, importance, originality, methodologies, and aims 
and objectives. It also describes the main research idea. The remainder of the research 
is structured as follows: 
Chapter Two follows the introduction and offers a theoretical and historical 
background to Islamic banking and its mode of finance. The chapter explains Islamic 
law’s position regarding the financial contracts provided by conventional banks and 
describes the sharia-compliant solutions to finance. The chapter tracks the history and 
development stages of the idea of Islamic banks. It also introduces the term “sharia 
governance” and presents a theoretical discussion about how it is adopted within 
corporation theory. 
Chapter Three argues for the importance of having a separate, comprehensive 
regulation of Islamic banks. For illustration, the Islamic banks’ situation within the Saudi 
banking system is discussed. The chapter provides a historical background of the 
banking system in the country and sheds light on the paradox the country faces due to 
adopting an Islamic-based legal system and a conventional banking system. In this 
                                            
21 Paul Chynoweth, 'Legal Research' in Les Ruddock Andrew Knight (ed), Avanced Research Methods in 
the Built Environment (Avanced Research Methods in the Built Environment, Wiley Blackwell 2008) at 33 
22 After law became a well-established academic discipline in Australia, the committee reviewed the law 
research conducted in the Australian law schools in order to put law research in categories. Hutchinson 
and Duncan, 'Defining and Describing What We Do: Doctrinal Legal Research' (n 13) at 101 




respect, the chapter highlights the challenges that both Islamic and conventional banks 
face in Saudi Arabia. 
Chapter Four analyses the roles of the SSB as an important body within the sharia 
governance system. It examines and analyses the nature of these roles in order to 
compare them with corporate governance principles. It also compares SSBs with certain 
bodies that exercise similar functions to SSBs.  
Chapter Five discusses the consistency of sharia rulings and the need for the 
standardisation of Islamic financial products and decisions. It describes the effect of 
standardisation on both sharia governance and the market, and analyses the problem of 
assigning the SSB the role of setting sharia standards for its relevant institutions. Also, it 
explores the level of standardisation needed to ensure more impartial, trustworthy 
decisions. 
Chapter Six examines the SSB’s accountability and how it affects its independence. 
It highlights the factors that might cause the SSB members to experience conflict of 
interests. In light of the nature of sharia interest, the chapter explores how the 
accountability of sharia supervision should be addressed. It identifies and analyses the 
various players and elements of accountability within sharia supervision which need to 
be considered. Then, it proposes how accountability should be conducted. 
Chapter Seven builds on the previous discussions and analysis to propose an SSB-
free model of sharia supervision that overcomes its current defects. The chapter 
explains the roles of the various players within the model. It then moves on to describing 
the effect of the model on professionalising the practice and improving the industry. The 
chapter also discusses the applicability of the model and reviews the opportunities and 
challenges that the model may face.   




Chapter Two: Islamic Banking: Theological and Theoretical Background  
2.1 Introduction 
Islamic banking is a result of the integration of sharia principles into financial entities. 
This causes significant changes in the banking structures, requirements, and products 
offered. To produce sharia-compliant products and operations, Islamic rules have been 
introduced into banks. This has resulted in uniquely designed financial instruments and 
products which have been developed instantly to meet the financial needs. Associated 
with this, sharia governance has also been introduced in parallel to corporate 
governance in order to ensure the sustainability and credibility of the operation and 
products offered.    
It is the aim of this chapter to highlight the historical, theoretical and theological 
issues surrounding Islamic banking in order to describe the context of sharia 
supervision. These issues provide an explanation of the foundation of the Islamic 
banking system that helps to understand the justifications of the need for sharia 
governance as well as sharia supervision as developing concepts. This will also provide 
a better understanding of the special characteristics and requirements of Islamic 
finance, which the framework of sharia governance and supervision should 
acknowledge and address. 
2.2 Islamic Law and Interest 
2.2.1 What Is Islamic Law? 
Islamic law, or sharia, is a set of rules and principles that regulate all aspects of life, 
and to which Muslims must adhere. Muslims’ actions and behaviour are bound by the 
duties and practices of sharia. These duties include worship, prayers, manners and 
morals, marriage, inheritance, crime and commercial transactions.24 The rulings of 
Islamic law are derived from two main sources: the Qur’an and Sunnah. 
                                            




The first main source is the Qur’an, which is the holy book for Muslims. The Qur’an 
is defined as “the collection of the revelations to Prophet Mohammad”25 from Allah 
(God). However, it should be noted that the Qur’an is not a legal text. In fact, legal 
verses in Qur’an are scarce, considering the number of verses that it contains. It is 
estimated that only 500 of its orders can be characterised as legal rules, 20 of which are 
related to economic issues.26 Furthermore, the legal verses in the Qur’an tend to be 
general orders, without any detailed explanation. Verses like, “O you who believe! Fulfil 
your obligations”27 and “Allah (God) has permitted trading and forbidden riba (usury)”,28 
are examples of how general the legal verses are in the Qur’an. There are several 
exceptions, however, regarding certain issues related to, for example, marriage and 
inheritance.29  
For that reason, Sunnah provides an explanation and supplement of the Qur’an. 
Sunnah comprises the reported sayings and actions of the Prophet Mohammad, as well 
as the practices that he witnessed and approved of implicitly.30 Although Sunnah is 
more detailed and contains further legal explanations, it is, also, general in nature. 
Nevertheless, the general content of these two sources combined has strengthened 
their impact as sustainable legal sources that are sufficiently flexible to treat and deal 
with various new matters that have emerged over the centuries.  
The flexibility of the legal contents of these main sources means that most legal 
matters cannot be answered directly based on the text of the Qur’an or Sunnah. 
Therefore, qualified scholars of Islamic law, due to their responsibility for understanding 
the main sources, are required to make efforts to interpret the revealed texts, the Qur’an 
and Sunnah. Such an effort is called ijtihad, which means “striving”.31 The collective 
effort made by scholars has established a new science called fiqh, which literally means 
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“understanding”. Fiqh as a science is an intellectual and technical effort made by the 
scholars of Islamic law to develop a methodology for understanding the Qur’an and 
Sunnah (traditions of the Prophet) and to derive laws from them.32  
When applying sharia to a certain matter, scholars use different tools to decide the 
ruling of sharia on that particular case. Qiyas is one of these main tools. It is defined as 
analogical reasoning using past analogies with their decisions as precedents in each 
new situation.33 Scholars may reach different rulings on the same matter even when 
using the same tool, since logical reasoning can differ from one mind to another. The 
opinions of scholars, therefore, are uncertain and considered probable beliefs about 
God’s real judgment. Except for rulings that receive ijma, which means “consensus” and 
refers to the unanimous agreement of all qualified legal scholars of an age upon a legal 
ruling, there is a level of uncertainty about the opinions of Islamic law scholars.34    
A legal matter that is subject to ijtihad by a scholar is eventually categorised under 
one of the five rulings of Islamic law. The first ruling is prohibition. This ruling refers to 
an impermissible act that individuals must avoid or they will be punished. Obligatory is 
the second ruling in Islamic law. Disobeying the rulings under this category is punished. 
Punishment, however, in these two rulings does not have to be material or even in this 
life, as Muslims’ obedience is a moral and spiritual commitment to Islam. Actions which 
are recommended with no punishment if they are not performed are called 
recommendations. The fourth ruling is disapproved, which comprises actions that are 
considered wrong although no punishment will follow if they are conducted. The final 
ruling is neutral and involves the remaining actions that Muslims can freely choose to 
perform or not.35  
As indicated above, there is a space for different opinions within Islamic law. This 
started after the death of Prophet Mohammad (PBUH) when his companions and 
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scholars discussed different interpretations of the rules of the Qur’an and Sunnah.36  
Khan states that the different methodology of interpretation used by scholars, the use of 
various related disciplines such as logic, and the different circumstances faced by 
scholars are the three main reasons why differing opinions have developed since the 
death of Prophet Mohammad (PBUH).37 These differences rest upon the idea that no 
one can exclusively claim the divine truth and, therefore, the differences between 
scholars are welcomed in sharia provided that their opinions do not conflict with the 
obvious rulings of Islam. In fact, some prominent scholars have explicitly declared the 
right of others to adopt different opinions.38  
The divergence of opinions among scholars gradually developed into more 
organised schools, from which eventually grew four slightly different schools of thoughts 
in the Sunni Muslim world: Hanafi, Maliki, Shaf’i, and Hanbali.39 Most scholars follow 
one of these schools and their opinions, over the centuries, have been preserved and 
handed down. Different mechanisms are used by these schools to evaluate and 
balance their scholars’ views in order to identify which is the strongest. Through this 
process, schools have been developed to adopt a specific position on all matters 
pertaining to Islamic law.40   
2.2.2 Interest and the Prohibition of Riba under Islamic Law 
As part of Muslims’ adherence to Islamic law, their actions must not conflict with the 
rules of Islamic law regarding commercial and financial transactions. This means that 
they must avoid any contract that is prohibited or contains prohibited terms. The 
practice of modern conventional banking has caused some concern among Muslims, 
mainly because of the attitude of Islamic law towards the interest charged on loans or 
other credit provided, which is viewed as a practice of riba by most scholars of Islamic 
law. So, what is riba and how is interest related to it? 
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Riba is an Arabic word which literally means “increasing”. The prohibition against 
being involved in a transaction containing riba is definite in Islamic law and strongly 
addressed in both the Qur’an and Sunnah. However, what constitutes the practice of 
riba is debated by scholars. Although the term is commonly used for “interest” in the 
context of Islamic banking, the technical definition of riba is far more complicated due to 
the different interpretations regarding what it covers. The term, as generally agreed in 
Islamic law, may be defined as: 
“An unlawful gain derived from the quantitative inequality of the counter-values in 
any transaction purporting to affect the exchange of two or more species, which 
belong to the same genus and are governed by the same efficient cause (illa). 
Deferred completion of the exchange of such species, or even of species which 
belong to different genera but are governed by the same illa is also riba, whether 
or not the deferment is accompanied by an increase in any one of the exchanged 
counter-values”.41  
Based on this definition, two important points should be noted regarding the extent 
of riba. First, increase is only qualified as riba if the counter-values traded: 1) belong to 
the same genus, and 2) are governed by the same efficient cause (illa) which is defined 
as “the attribute of an event that entails a particular divine ruling in all cases possessing 
that attribute. It is the basis for applying analogy (qiyas) to the two cases”.42 The 
absence of either of these two conditions qualifies the trade as a lawful sale, as 
indicated in the Qur’an: “Allah (God) has permitted trading and forbidden riba (usury)”.43 
Second, riba prohibition is not exclusive to an increase, as the deferred exchange, even 
without increase, of different counter-values is riba if they are governed by the same 
efficient cause. Therefore, there are two different types of riba: riba al-fadl and riba al-
nasi’a.44 While the former concerns what qualifies the increase to be riba, whether the 
exchange of 100x for 110x is riba, the latter concerns what qualifies the deferred 
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exchange to be riba, whether the exchange of A for B at a later time is riba. In both 
types, the efficient cause (illa) plays an important role in concluding whether riba applies 
or not. In fact, determining the governing efficient cause (illa) has sparked a debate 
among scholars regarding to what riba applies. What is important in this context is 
whether or not interest is a classification of riba. 
The practice of interest in modern banking has sparked debate, although on a far 
smaller scale, between modernists and conservatives regarding whether or not riba 
extends to it. Modernists offer several justifications for arguing that the interest in 
modern banking is not subject to the prohibition of riba under Islamic law.45 However, 
this view has received strong criticism from conservatives, as it fails to “present a 
consistent theory of riba on the basis of the rationale of prohibition specified in the 
Qur’an”.46 The conservatives’ view has been adopted by the vast majority of scholars, 
as reflected in the decision of the Council of the Islamic Fiqh Academy which considers 
interest as a form of riba.47 Therefore, interest is usually viewed as riba regardless of 
the modernists’ point of view.  
Apart from economic objectives,48 morals play an important role as a reason for this 
prohibition compared to the free market, where capitalists have the freedom to use their 
capital as they see fit. Transactions law in Islam has a spiritual aspect, where the 
contracting parties look to satisfy God in addition to themselves which, in some cases, 
requires them to abandon certain transactions or terms that they think might be 
beneficial to them in order to please God.49 It has been inferred that one of the main 
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objectives and rationales behind the prohibition of riba is that interest has a nature 
which creates injustice and there is a need to protect weak people from exploitation.50 
Looking at the punishment for breaching, the morality aspect of banning interest is more 
obvious as there is no material punishment. The only punishment mentioned in relation 
to interest is that whoever deals with it will enter into a declared war with God and his 
messenger, which does not necessarily have to be in this lifetime.51 This suggests a 
level of morality on the ruling of interest, as there is no associated material punishment. 
2.3 Islamic Banking: History and Features  
2.3.1 The Emergence and Expansion of the Islamic Banks 
The strong opposition to interest existing within the modern banking system inspired 
the idea of Islamic banking to emerge as interest-free banks. It started as an idea in the 
mid-1940s when it was suggested that the banks should be re-structured in order to 
become profit-sharing based instead of interest-based.52 This idea was accompanied by 
unsuccessful experiments in Malaysia in the mid-1940s, and then in Pakistan in the 
late-1950s.53  
However, the Muslim Pilgrims Savings Corporation (later Tabung Haji) in Malaysia 
and Mit Ghamr in Egypt were two examples in the 1960s that marked the beginning of 
the practice of Islamic finance. The former was established to help Malaysians to 
perform pilgrimage by investing their savings in accordance with Islamic law. Although it 
was not a bank, its success promoted the idea of establishing Islamic banks in 
Malaysia.54 On the other hand, Mit Ghamr, due to political reasons, lasted fewer than 
four years.55 Nonetheless, it is regarded as “a pioneering experiment of putting the 
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Islamic principles governing financial dealings into practice”.56 The bank marked a 
successful attempt to integrate the German savings banks’ experience into rural 
Egyptian towns using Islamic financial principles, without projecting an Islamic image, 
for political reasons.57 
These successful experiences were very important as they were the first to move 
Islamic finance from theory into practice in the form of official financial institutions. In 
1971, Islamic finance was represented in the form of a bank for the first time when 
Nasser Social Bank was established by the Egyptian government58 for social objectives, 
such as providing interest-free loans for the poor, scholarships for students and micro-
credit for small projects on a profit-share basis.59 This step brought more formality and 
confidence to Islamic finance as it was provided by a bank and sponsored by a 
government which enhanced the experience of Islamic finance and gave it the support it 
needed at that time to develop. In fact, the 1970s experienced a remarkable 
development in the history of Islamic finance. In addition to Nasser Social Bank, two 
other banks were founded in the mid-1970s, which triggered the growth of the Islamic 
banking industry: the Islamic Development Bank (IDB), as an international bank for 
Islamic countries, and Dubai Islamic Bank, as the first commercial bank.60 IDB was 
established due to an agreement between the finance ministers of the Organisation of 
the Islamic Conference to finance necessary projects in poorer Muslim countries,61 and 
it contributed to the spread of the Islamic banking industry by subscribing to the capital 
of certain Islamic commercial banks within its member countries.62 The case of Dubai 
Islamic Bank was important since it brought Islamic finance to the private sector and 
created, for the first time, alternative banking services for customers seeking interest-
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free products, an advanced step which placed Islamic banking services on a par with 
conventional ones. Dubai Islamic Bank was followed by other commercial and 
investment banks in different countries besides the United Arab Emirates, such as 
Kuwait, Egypt, Sudan, Jordan, Bahrain, Switzerland and the Bahamas.63 In fact, Islamic 
banks experienced an important evolution after the development of the IDB and Dubai 
Islamic Bank. The period from 1975 to 1990 is described as the most important in the 
history of the development of Islamic financial history since it heralded vital 
developments.64 Islamic banking, after this period, became more respected and credible 
in the banking industry and continued to grow, with a network of supporting institutions, 
such as: 
1. The Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions 
(AAOIFI). 
2. The Islamic financial Services Board (IFSB). 
3. The International Islamic Financial Market (IIFM). 
4. The International Islamic Rating Agency (IIRA). 
5. The International Islamic Centre for Reconciliation and Commercial Arbitration 
(IICRA). 
6. The General Council of Islamic Banks and Financial Institutions (GCIBFI).65 
 
In the 1990s, Islamic banking successfully reached a wider range of customers and 
was adopted by the global banks. Warde highlights five phenomena that denote the 
development and expansion of the Islamic banking industry during this period: 
1. More conventional banks established Islamic subsidiaries and/or Islamic 
windows to provide sharia-compliant products. 
2. Global banks outside the Islamic world, such as HSBC and Citicorp, started 
offering Islamic banking services. 
3. Islamic banks offered their products to non-Muslim customers. 
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4. Many Islamic banks were established outside the Islamic world to serve the 
Islamic communities. 
5. Islamic finance was became an area of research interest to some global 
institutions, such as Harvard University, and a growing amount of research 
conducted by sharia scholars and advisors resulted from the cooperation 
between the Islamic and conventional institutions.66  
 
Three main factors led to the success of Islamic banking in the banking industry. 
First, the high demand for Islamic banking services contributed to their growth, as it 
provided solutions for strict adherents to the principles of Islamic law regarding riba. It 
also attracted other Muslims who were interested in sharia-compliant banking services 
as an alternative to the conventional ones. Second, Tabung Haji, Nasser Social Bank 
and IDB were established and funded by governments which play an essential role to 
spread Islamic banking services. One of the main reasons for the success of the first 
private Islamic bank, Dubai Islamic Bank, was the close relationship between its founder 
and the ruling family of Dubai.67 In fact, Islamic banks could not be successful when 
facing hostility from the government.68 The full Islamisation of the banking systems in 
Pakistan in 1979, and in Sudan and Iran in 1983, was a remarkable development in the 
history of Islamic finance.69 Third, the oil wealth of the Gulf States had a strong impact 
on the expansion of Islamic banks. Although the early experiments of the industry were 
unrelated to the oil wealth, the fast growth that followed these experiments tended to be 
funded by oil-rich countries.70  
During this century, Islamic banking has become more confident and respected 
within the financial industry. Regardless of the legal challenges that the Islamic banking 
industry faces today, which require more effort in order to be developed, it has a 
brighter future and stands on stronger ground, as it has been adopted by many 
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prominent financial institutions around the world in addition to the different types of 
support it receives from governments.  
2.3.2 Features and Principles of Islamic Banking and Finance 
While interest-based loans are the main tools of finance in conventional banks, 
Islamic banks are prohibited from involvement in any type of interest. Instead, they use 
a wide range of financial products which do not conflict with the rules of Islamic law. 
These products are derived from four general principles which constitute the main 
principles of Islamic banking and finance. In other words, these principles are the main 
differences and distinctions between Islamic banks and conventional ones. These 
principles are: 
Interest-free  
As explained above, there exists a semi-consensus regarding the prohibition of 
interest among scholars. In Islam, making money from money is not permitted since 
money is viewed as a tool of exchange instead of having a value in itself. Consequently, 
money provided for business or personal finance is regarded as a debt and therefore is 
not entitled to any return.71 Therefore, Islamic banks are not allowed to provide interest-
based loans, only interest-free financial products are offered. 
More risk  
Islam, however, encourages investment if it is related to a useful project. To gain 
legitimate profits, money should be paired with human effort in a productive venture 
whereby the risk is shared between the parties so that no one receives a predetermined 
return.72 In the Islamic banking environment, this means that banks, by providing 
capital, should be exposed to some level of risk by entering into a venture where the 
profits cannot be guaranteed. The products of Islamic banks should reflect this and will 
be highlighted in the next section. 
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Risk is not always welcomed in Islamic law. While profits must not be guaranteed 
between the contracting parties, the parties should possess perfect knowledge about 
the content of the contract. Otherwise, the contract might be invalid due to gharar 
(uncertainty). Gharar can be caused by ignorance of the object, price, number or 
conditions of the counter-values exchanged or the excessive uncertainty of the 
outcomes, as in the case of gambling.73 Gharar is the main reason for prohibiting most 
types of insurance, which led to the creation and development of cooperative-based 
insurance, Takaful.74 Islamic banks, in this regard, are restricted from making any 
financial contract that is subject to gharar. 
Financing only sharia-compliant projects75 
The restrictions on Islamic banks are not limited to the structure of the financial 
contracts but also extend to the projects that need to be financed as well. Finance in 
Islamic banks must not support prohibited projects, such as alcohol trading, gambling or 
prostitution. Accordingly, Islamic banks should review projects before financing them to 
ensure their compatibility with Islamic law principles.  
These principles are the main characteristics that differentiate Islamic banking from 
conventional banking. Remarkably, risk is an important factor in the structure of Islamic 
finance. Apart from the last principle, which concerns the validity of the project that 
requires financing, risk is critical to the other principles, which concern the structure of 
financial products. In this context, Islamic law aims to allow moderate risk where it is 
limited to the profitability of the project. Neither interest nor gharar are allowed under 
Islamic law, since the former is a risk-free contract where the lender is guaranteed a 
percentage of the capital provided while the latter, on the other hand, is an excessive 
risk contract where critical information about the content of the contract is missing.  
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In addition to these principles, several researchers add others, such as paying zakat, 
which is 2.5% in alms that is taken annually from capital, and having a sharia advisory 
board.76 While it is necessary for Islamic banks to pay the annual zakat,77 it is not a 
special feature of Islamic banking, since it is compulsory to pay this under Islamic law in 
relation to all individual and institutional capital. Zakat is a separate requirement that is 
unrelated to the financial aspect of banking. In other words, the compatibility of financial 
products with Islamic law is unaffected if the bank does not pay its annual zakat and, 
vice versa, conventional products do not become Islamic as a result of paying it. Zakat 
is simply a form of tax required by Islamic law78 and, therefore, customers seeking 
Islamic finance should be unaffected if the bank does not pay its annual zakat. Even 
investors can legalise their investments by paying zakat from their profits if the bank 
does not, just as they might do in other types of business. A sharia advisory board is 
also not an Islamic banking principle, as it is simply a mechanism for ensuring 
compatibility with sharia. Consequently, banks could still be Islamic even if they do not 
appoint a sharia board. In fact, early experiments with Islamic finance and banking did 
not establish sharia boards.79 This does not mean that a sharia board is unimportant but 
it is merely a way of reviewing and checking the compatibility of products, so Islamic 
banks could still provide sharia-compliant products if they have an acceptable 
alternative mechanism to ensure compatibility with sharia. Sharia boards apply the 
principles of Islamic finance but are not a principle themselves.  
2.4 Sharia-compliant Finance 
Since IFIs must avoid the traditional method of financing customers, which relies on 
interest-based loans, they have developed alternative sharia-compliant tools for 
conducting financial transactions. This was a result of the partnership between Islamic 
banks and sharia scholars.80 Warde classifies the contracts used by IFIs into three 
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categories: equity-based or profit-and-loss sharing (PLS) products, lease-based 
products, and sale-based products.81 These products will be highlighted since they are 
subject to the consideration of sharia review and supervision. 
2.4.1 Sale-based Products  
This type of product requires the bank to enter into two sale transactions: first as a 
buyer from a third party, then as a seller to the client. The most popular sale-products 
used by banks are murabaha, salam and istisna.  
Murabaha, mark-up or cost plus sale, is defined as “a sale contract wherein one 
party purchases an asset and then sells it to another party for an agreed mark-up on 
deferred payment terms”.82 To apply this in Islamic banks, the bank buys the specified 
asset from the vendor and the title is transferred to the bank, which then sells the asset 
immediately to the client at a mark-up price with deferred payment.83 It is important to 
note that the second sale contract, where the bank sells the asset to the client, must not 
be conducted before the asset has actually been transferred into the bank’s ownership 
and possession, in the sense that the asset becomes within its risk, since Islamic law 
considers selling the asset before it is owned by the seller as a void sale.84 Thus, what 
happens is that the bank and the client sign a promise, rather than an actual sale 
contract, that they will conduct the sale of the specified asset in the future on a 
murabaha basis.85 The enforceability of such a promise, however, is questionable under 
Islamic law and not free of restrictions in the view of the Islamic law scholars who 
accept it. Although there is a consensus among sharia scholars that fulfilling a promise 
is morally binding, they differ over the question of whether it is legally binding or not.86 
The Council of the Islamic Fiqh Academy adopts the view of scholars who regard a 
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promise as legally binding. However, the promise must, according to the academy, 
meet the following criteria: 
• It must be conditioned upon the fulfilment of an obligation. 
• The promisee must already have incurred expenses on the basis of the 
promise. 
• At least one party to the mutual promise should have the option and not be 
bound by the promise. This is to avoid the ordinary sale contract where the seller 
must have the possession of the commodity, subject to sale.87 
 
According to this resolution, only one party, which is usually the client, is legally 
bound by the promise. This view on promises has opened up and facilitated a great 
number of deals and products besides murabaha, which depends on the promise being 
legally enforced, as will be illustrated below. Murabaha, however, is the most popular 
product due to its convenience as a short-term investment mechanism; the flexibility of 
matching the fixed return in murabaha to the interest rate; and the advantage of 
avoiding more risk and management interference regarding other products.88 
Exempted from the Islamic law rule of sale, that requires the sold item to exist at the 
time of sale, istisna, commissioned manufacturing, and salam, forward sale, are popular 
contracts employed by Islamic banks.89 Istisna is defined as, “a contract of sale of 
specified items to be manufactured or constructed with an obligation on the part of 
manufacturer (contractor) to deliver them to the customer on completion”.90 Using an 
analogous structure to murabaha, Islamic banks in practice apply a structure that 
combines istisna and back-to-back istisna, or parallel istisna, to finance manufacturing 
or construction, where “under the first istisna the bank as seller accepts a long-term 
schedule of payments from its customer, while under the second istisna the bank as 
buyer pays the manufacturer over a shorter period with progress payments. The 
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difference between the present value of payments under the two contracts is the bank’s 
compensation for the finance”.91  Salam is a similar contract, which is defined as, “the 
forward purchase of generically described goods for full advance payment”.92 However, 
salam has more restrictions which make it less favoured by banks. For example, 
payment must be made in full in advance and the delivery time must be exactly 
determined in the salam contract, whereas there is more flexibility in the istisna 
contract.93 These restrictions, especially the necessity for full advanced payment, 
prevent banks from financing their customers using the same structure of istisna. Salam 
is used to finance different sectors, mainly those related to agriculture, by buying their 
expected commodities at a lower price so that the bank, after the delivery, can profit by 
selling the commodity at the market price.94 Also, the bank can combine murabaha with 
salam to finance its customers. Accordingly, the customer enters into a murabaha 
contract and promises the bank that he or she will buy a specified commodity on a 
specific date, after which the bank enters into a salam contract with a third party, usually 
a manufacturer or contractor.95      
Although sale-based products appear to be similar to interest-based loans, risk 
which justifies profits under Islamic law is not present in the latter. Theoretically, Islamic 
banks, by using sale-based products, are exposed to some level of risk associated with 
the ownership of commodities. The bank assumes certain risks during the process of 
acquiring the asset before selling it to the client, such as a sudden fall in price, defects 
or damage related to the commodity and the default of the client where no late fees can 
be imposed and the client is only liable for the agreed sale price.96 These elements of 
risk differentiate sale-based products from conventional loans. While it is true, however, 
that such products may be inconsistent with the values of Islam, since these products 
serve similar economic objectives to interest, they still, in the view of many sharia 
scholars, constitute a legitimate alternative to interest-based loans. According to 
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Chapra, the legitimacy of sale-based products rests upon two important points: avoiding 
a direct lending-borrowing relationship and depending on the price of the commodity or 
the service sold rather than interest.97 This legitimacy provides Islamic banks with a 
useful financial tool, especially in the jurisdictions that do not recognise Islamic banking 
services by special regulations. It is unfair to demand that Islamic banks abandon this 
tool while the whole financial and banking system is based on interest.  
The distinction between sale-based products and interest-based loans remains, to 
some extent, theoretical. In practice, many banks apply manipulative tools to reduce the 
risk, although minimised, to zero and open a back door to interest.98 It is argued that the 
mechanism used by some banks makes the risk related to sale-based products, 
especially murabaha, unreal and so disqualifies the bank from being a true seller due to 
the lack of risk that commonly exists in trade where a sale is not completely certain.99 
Saeed analyses the risk associated with murabaha in practice and identifies three types 
of risk: risk related to goods being lost or damaged; risk related to clients refusing to 
buy; and risk related to payment in the case of default. He argues that banks in practice 
avoid and eliminate these risks by applying different mechanisms which makes 
murabaha as it is practised no different, logically, from interest.100        
2.4.2 Equity-Based and PLS Products  
Under this category, the bank establishes a partnership with its entrepreneur 
customers in a joint venture. As Warde stated, “the bank provides finance, while the 
entrepreneur carries out the business venture whether trade, industry, or service, with 
the objective of earning profits. Profits are shared in a pre-determined ratio; losses are 
borne by the bank”.101  
Using partnership agreements, Islamic banks have developed two main types of 
products: musharaka and mudaraba. In musharaka contracts, the Islamic bank provides 
                                            
97 Muhamed Umer Chapra, 'The Case Against Interest: Is It Compelling?' (2007) 49 Thunderbird 
International Business Review 161 at 180 
98 Vogel and Hayes, Islamic Law and Finance: Religion, Risk, and Return (n 34) at 141 
99 Abdul Ghafar Ismail and Achmad Tohirin, 'Islamic Law and Finance' (2010) 26 Humanomics 178 at 191 
100 Saeed, Islamic Banking and Interest: A Study of the Prohibition of Riba and its Contemporary 
Interpretation (n 45) at 84-95 




the needed capital while the client provides the remaining capital for the project which 
both may manage, similar to a joint venture, and the profits are shared at a pre-agreed 
ratio while any losses are borne proportionately to the equity participation.102 While both 
the bank and the client provide the capital in musharaka contracts, only the bank does 
so in mudaraba and the client acts as an agent, providing the professional, managerial 
and technical work.103 As with musharaka, profits are based on a pre-arranged ratio 
and, since only the bank provides the capital in mudaraba, losses are borne only by it 
while the client loses his/her effort.104  
Islamic banks have developed relatively new products based on musharaka and 
mudaraba, which are diminishing musharaka and diminishing mudaraba. Under these 
contracts, the bank’s share is gradually liquidated in favour of the client who increases 
his/her own share gradually by buying that of the bank until the client becomes the sole 
owner of the project.105 The bank earns profits usually by renting its share to the 
client.106 Consequently, the bank’s profits under these contracts diminish, as does its 
share of the project.107 However, these contracts contain a future sale of the bank’s 
share to the client. A sale contract that is contingent on a future date or event is void 
under Islamic law.108 Accordingly, it is unlawful to sign the sale contract for the bank’s 
share at the same time as the diminishing musharaka or mudaraba contracts. To solve 
this, parties to the contract sign a promise that the client will buy the bank’s share in the 
future.109 The enforceability of this promise is restricted to the same conditions and 
requirements discussed above. Diminishing musharaka and mudaraba contracts help 
Islamic banks to minimise the risk by obtaining fixed returns on their leased shares in 
the financed projects. By decreasing their ownership of the projects, their duty as 
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owners would be, also, minimised until completely diminished when they sell their last 
shares to their clients.   
Islamic banks use the mudaraba mechanism not only to finance their customers but 
also, conversely, to provide capital for the banks. An investment account is a form of 
mudaraba, where customers, commonly called investment account holders (IAHs), 
deposit their money in the bank to be invested so the profits are shared at a pre-
arranged ratio with the bank.110 By using this type of account, Islamic banks provide an 
alternative to interest-bearing accounts.  
“Equity finance is considered the backbone of Islamic finance”.111 It requires 
involving in a real commercial project whose profits are not guaranteed so there would 
be potential risk. This is consistent with the principles of Islamic finance. However, 
Islamic banks may find it too risky to rely substantially on equity finance products, so 
these products are slightly limited in use. 
2.4.3 Lease-Based Products  
Under Islamic law, leasing is technically a sale contract but over the usufruct so the 
rules of sale are applied.112 This type of product is called ijara. Under ijara, the bank 
purchases the asset in order to lease it to the client for a fixed rent over a fixed period, 
similar to the conventional lease contract.113 Another mechanism of using ijara is ijara 
muntahiya bi-tamlik or a lease to own, which is similar to conventional hire purchase.114 
This product allows the client to purchase the asset at the end of the leasing period and 
its price is considered and included in the rent paid by the client (the lessee) to the bank 
(the lessor).115 
An Islamic hire purchase contract, however, is different in certain respects from a 
conventional one since it must avoid any speculation which may lead to gharar. These 
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differences usually work as limitations and restrictions on banks and expose them to 
risk. One of the primary limitations is that the client (the lessee) is not responsible for 
the full rent if the commodity is lost or destroyed unless this is caused by the negligence 
or default of the lessee.116 Where insurance could provide a solution for conventional 
hire purchase to minimise such risk, it might be questionable in this context, under 
Islamic law.117 Another limitation concerns the validity of the future sale of the 
commodity. As explained above, the sale of the commodity being conditioned to a future 
event, such as the end of the lease term, is unlawful under Islamic law. To avoid such 
an unlawful transaction, a sale promise is signed between the parties to conduct the 
sale contract after the lease ends.118 The enforceability of such a promise is a subject of 
concern under Islamic law and must meet the requirements discussed earlier. Another 
limitation is that the lease term under Islamic hire purchase starts on the day when the 
client actually receives the commodity as opposed to the date when the contract is 
signed, as under conventional hire purchase.119  
These limitations place Islamic banks in a riskier position which reflects the 
requirements of Islamic finance. Despite these limitations, leasing has been a popular 
tool under Islamic banking due to its efficiency as a well-established tool of finance, 
whose procedures and mechanisms are easy to standardise; useful to the economy; 
and flexible with regard to the terms and price of the sale.120 The similarity with 
conventional hire purchase, as a well-established tool of finance in conventional banks, 
also has an impact on the popularity of Islamic hire purchase. Islamic hire purchase can 
be applied by Islamic banks using similar procedures, mechanisms and rules to those 
used in conventional banks. Another advantage of the similarity is that Islamic hire 
purchase would be allowed under the same national regulations controlling conventional 
hire purchase if they are flexible enough to accommodate sharia requirements and 
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limitations. This would be very useful for Islamic banks in jurisdictions that do not have 
special rules for Islamic banks, which does not tend to be the case in practice.121  
2.4.4 Sukuk  
After many attempts to create sharia-compliant instruments to serve as an 
alternative to conventional bonds, sukuk was introduced at the beginning of this 
century.122 Although both sukuk and bonds are fully tradable123 and provide periodic 
returns, sukuk represents ownership of the asset rather than a debt obligation and its 
returns depend, rather than on interest, on the profits or usufructs generated by the 
asset.124 Sukuk, therefore, is an innovative type of sharia-compliant asset which gives 
its holders different rights and positions, since they are the owners of the asset.125 
Wilson asserts that sukuk should be described as Islamic investment certificates rather 
than Islamic bonds because of the substantial differences between bonds and sukuk.126 
The global market for sukuk is experiencing very rapid growth, and the annual issuance 
of sukuk rose from USD 60.7 billion in 2015 to USD 88.3 in 2016.127   
It should be noted that sukuk is not a separate classification from the previous types. 
In fact, sukuk could be structured as one type of the aforementioned general products. 
AAOIFI has identified 15 different structures of permissible sukuk.128 It usually involves 
issuing a special purpose vehicle (SPV) to purchase the underlying asset from the 
originator, using the money raised by issuing the sukuk.129 In ijara sukuk, one of the 
major types of sukuk, an SPV buys an asset to be leased back to the original owner and 
the sukuk holders receive their returns in the form of rent until the end of the sukuk 
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term, when the SPV is liquidated and the holders get their shares.130 Another popular 
type is musharaka sukuk, where the originator partially funds the SPV along with the 
sukuk holders as partners and the returns from sukuk are the profits generated by the 
SPV.131 Mudaraba sukuk is similar, apart from the fact that the SPV is fully owned by 
the sukuk holders and the originator adopts the management role.132 These are the 
most popular types of sukuk but murabaha, salam, istisna and other mechanisms can 
also be used in the sukuk structure. 
2.5 Corporate Governance and the Islamic Perspective 
2.5.1 Concept, Definition, and Principles 
The term ‘corporate governance’ became prominent in developed countries after the  
corporation failures in the US and UK in the early 1990s and it has become a major 
concern for academics and regulatory bodies since the beginning of this century 
following the collapse of heavyweight companies in the early 2000s133 and the financial 
crisis of 2007-08.134 Other factors, such as the growth of institutional investors and the 
increased globalisation of the markets, have contributed to the prominence of the term 
and attracted more attention.135 
There is no generally agreed definition of corporate governance. Due to different 
cultures and political and legal systems, countries vary regarding the assumption about 
what should be the main objective of the corporation, which is eventually reflected in the 
way in which corporate governance is defined.136 Also, the definitions vary narrowly or 
broadly depending on the different viewpoints of the policy-makers, practitioners, 
researchers or theorists.137 One way in which the definitions differ is in relation towards 
                                            
130 Warde, Islamic Finance in The Global Economy (n 63) at 150 
131 Hanif and Johansen, 'Sukuk’ (n 129) at 263 
132 Ibid at 263 
133 Such as Enron. 
134 Karim Ginena and Azhar Hamid, Foundations of Shari'ah Governance of Islamic Banks (Wiley 2015) 
at 57-58 
135 Zamir Iqbal and Abbas Mirakhor, 'Stakeholder Model of Governance In Islamic Economic System' 
(2004) 11 Islamic Economic Studies at 43-44 
136 Marc Goergen, International Corporate Governance (Pearson Education 2012) at 4 




which corporate governance theory the definition leans to most. Examples of definitions 
that represent different theories are: 
• The system by which companies are directed and controlled.138  
• The ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of 
gaining a return on their investment.139 
• The system of checks and balances, both internal and external to companies, 
which ensures that companies discharge their accountability to all their 
stakeholders and act in a socially responsible way in all areas of their business 
activity.140 
 
Through the different streams of definitions, Nordberg lists three common issues that 
are addressed under the concept of corporate governance: 
• How are corporations directed and monitored, and what mechanisms can we 
use to make them perform better? 
• What mechanisms can we put in place to ensure that corporations, their 
managers, and directors do not destroy the value that the corporation was meant 
to create, or destroy the value of others with whom it conducts its affairs? 
• How can we create value within the corporation itself?141 
 
Generally, corporate governance refers to the framework of the corporation which 
ensures efficient operation. Recently, the corporate governance framework has 
received more attention from regulators and policy-makers because of its impact on the 
economy. States regulate and supervise the framework of corporate governance, 
amongst other things, to prevent financial crises. It has been suggested that weak 
corporate governance was one of the main causes of the recent financial crises that led 
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to the collapse of several large companies.142 For that reason, the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) issued the principles of corporate 
governance, and amended on a couple of occasions, to promote more effective 
corporate governance frameworks. According to these principles, the framework of 
corporate governance should: 
• Promote transparent and fair markets. 
• Protect and facilitate the exercise of shareholders’ rights and ensure the 
equitable treatment of all shareholders, including minority and foreign 
shareholders. 
• Strengthen the stock markets and attract investment. 
• Recognise the rights of stakeholders established by law or through mutual 
agreements. 
• Ensure the timely and accurate disclosure of all material matters regarding the 
corporation.  
• Ensure the strategic guidance, effective monitoring and board accountability of 
the company.143  
 
The development of the relatively new concept of corporate governance has had an 
impact on the definition’s variations. As the concept matures, this development is likely 
to continue to evolve in the future passively, in response to events, and also actively, 
through the contributions of academics, policy-makers and practitioners.144 
2.5.2 Theories of Corporate Governance 
In this world, where political systems and social and human thinking differ, 
corporations have become a global concept. As a new concept, different approaches 
have been used to establish an ideal framework regarding how corporations should be 
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governed. As a result of these variations, many corporate governance theories have 
evolved. This section highlights the main ones.  
2.5.2.1 Agency Theory 
Agency theory views the relationship between shareholders and managers in a 
corporation as a principal-agent relationship, where the managers (the agent), should 
act and make decisions in the best interests of the shareholders (the principal), and 
maximise their wealth.145 The maximisation of the shareholders’ wealth is the focus of 
this view of the relationship, which led to the development of shareholder primacy 
theory, also known as shareholder value and shareholder wealth maximisation.146 
Directors, based on this theory, should manage the company for the benefit of 
shareholders and to maximise their wealth.147 
However, this relationship causes the agency problem, which is “the difficulties 
financiers have in assuring that their funds are not expropriated or wasted on 
unattractive projects”.148 The theory assumes that the powerful position that managers 
occupy may lead them, due to human nature, to engage in self-dealing and acting in 
their own interests instead of those of the owners.149 The problem of information 
asymmetry is also caused by this relationship, where the principal is in a disadvantaged 
position since the agent has access to far more information.150 
As a solution to this problem, some proponents of the theory focus on the board of 
directors. The board’s composition and structure should be built in such a way that they 
represent the shareholders’ voice; act as an intermediate agent of the shareholders; 
and create a buffer zone between the shareholders and managers to balance their 
demands and prevent any potential tension.151 Another approach to solving the agency 
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problem is to view the corporation as a “nexus of contracts”. Under this view, the 
interest of the principal is better served by adopting an incentive system for managers, 
which requires a complete contract containing a specification of their duties, rewards, 
and the rights of the shareholders to monitor their performance.152 This seeks to align 
the interests of the managers with those of the shareholders. Many proponents of this 
approach consider shareholder primacy and view the company as “a promise made by 
directors to shareholders that they will maximise the wealth of shareholders”.153  
2.5.2.2 Stakeholder Theory 
Under this theory, corporations are not only meant to maximise the wealth for their 
investors but also have a responsibility towards all of the people with whom the 
corporations have contracted or, in a broader view of the theory, towards the larger 
society with which the corporations directly or indirectly deal.154 In other words, 
corporations are accountable for a wider range of people, that includes, as well as 
shareholders, all stakeholders. Different views exist regarding what the term 
“stakeholders” includes. While shareholders, employees, suppliers, customers, creditors 
and local communities are most likely to be considered as falling under this term, some 
extend this to the general public, environment, animal species and even future 
generations.155 The rationale behind this theory is that, since stakeholders contribute 
critical resources to corporations, their interests should be taken into account and they 
should be valued and seen as ends and not means.156 Stakeholders, however, are not 
equal in the sense that they do not share the same level of importance in the view of 
many of the stakeholder theorists. Some value the primary stakeholders, such as 
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shareholders, creditors, customers, suppliers and employees, more than other 
secondary ones, who do not have a contractual relationship with the corporation.157 
While there is a wide range of stakeholders, different views exist regarding how a 
corporation should be managed according to this theory, which has resulted in the 
emergence of numerous theories associated with the theory of stakeholders. Freeman 
calls this theory “stakeholder theories”, since it could be unpacked into several related 
theories.158 For example, social corporate responsibility theory puts more stress on the 
importance of society. According to this theory, corporations have a moral obligation 
and managers should act in a socially responsible manner.159 Enlightened shareholder 
theory is, according to some, another stakeholder-oriented approach which recognises 
the interests of different stakeholders but prioritises the wealth of shareholders and puts 
their interests above all others.160 This theory is closer to the agency theory view of 
corporations and serves as a less extreme version.  
2.5.2.3 Stewardship Theory 
By providing an alternative assumption of managerial behaviour, stewardship theory 
challenges agency theory and the agency problem. It supposes that managers are far 
from being opportunistic and their behaviour and decisions are not derived from 
personal gain and self-dealing but essentially from wanting to do a good job and be 
good stewards for the corporation.161 Because of this assumption, the shareholder voice 
and representation on the board should not be a concern and, thus, the focus should be 
shifted towards building facilitative structures which “provide clear, consistent role 
expectations and authorise and empower senior management” to achieve high 
performance.162  
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2.5.3 Islamic Perspective on Corporate Governance Theories 
The link between corporate governance and Islamic values and principles has been 
a focus of much literature. Some have gone so far as to suggest a totally different model 
of corporate governance based on tawhid, the oneness of God, which states that all 
stakeholders involved in the corporation are accountable to God.163 However, the 
viability of such a view that strongly contrasts with the conventional governance system 
is challenged, since “Islamic thinking” could suitably fit within the corporate governance 
theories based on the stakeholder and social approaches.164  
Consistent with this, Iqbal and Mirakhor argue that the Islamic principles of 
ownership and contracts provide a strong basis for stakeholder theory and, therefore, 
the theory is strongly rooted in the view of Islam.165 This argument is based on two 
notions regarding ownership rights in Islam. The first is that God is the real and sole 
owner of property while individuals are merely trustees and custodians acting as 
stewards. The second is that ownership is a collective right whereby the possession of a 
property does not give individuals the absolute and exclusive right to use it but only a 
priority to enjoy its resources without conflicting with social interests and rights. 
Consequently, owners are not allowed to act in a way that involves wasting or 
squandering their own property nor can they use or change it in a way that would cause 
harm to their neighbours. Therefore, the definition of a stakeholder in Islam is “the one 
whose property rights are at stake or at risk due to voluntary or involuntary actions of 
the firm”. These two notions within the Islamic principles on ownership pay considerable 
attention to a wide range of stakeholders whose rights are preserved in order to 
promote social interests. Such a consideration justifies the role that the stakeholders 
should play in economic activities.  
Iqbal and Mirakhor, also, draw a general view of how the governance system in 
Islam should protect stakeholder rights. Presumably, managers ensure that sharia 
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principles are followed, including promoting the rights of the stakeholders. However, 
deviation from these principles might occur and, therefore, it is essential to have an 
institutional arrangement discouraging such deviation. Hence, a well-designed 
governance structure is one that provides that the fiduciary duties of the managers 
owed to stakeholders is necessary in order to preserve stakeholder rights.  
Generally, Islamic values focus on a wide range of stakeholders rather than 
investors, which make them more in line with stakeholder theory.166 However, other 
assessments have been made to find parallels between Islamic values and other 
conventional corporate governance theories. Some views do not vary much from the 
stakeholder approach but link it, more specifically, to the theory of corporate social 
responsibility.167 Firms under this theory are driven by moral and social obligations 
which are intensively considered in Islamic values and principles, the main driver of 
Islamic corporate governance. Stewardship theory is considered by some researchers 
as being more consistent with Islamic corporate governance since managers in 
corporations in Islam are viewed as stewards who should perform their duties according 
to Islamic beliefs.168 The agency theory’s assumption of self-dealing is not disregarded 
either. From the agency theory perspective, adherence to Islamic values and principles 
could add other elements to the agency problem, especially in IFIs. Many of the 
investors in these institutions are driven not only by financial returns but, also, by their 
investments being sharia-compliant.169 “Thus, while the agency problem in conventional 
companies arises when managers deviate from their duty to maximise the shareholders’ 
wealth, any divergence by the managers of IFIs from placing all of the supplied funds 
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into sharia-compliant investments creates an additional source of agency problems”.170 
Moreover, agency problems arise in IFIs as a result of separating the cash flow and 
control rights in the case of savings accounts, the alternative to interest-based 
accounts, provided by Islamic banks.171 Depositors and IAHs have no right of control, 
despite the risk to which they are exposed as a result of their investments.   
Providing a separate theory for Islamic corporate governance is an extreme view 
since Islamic corporate governance cannot be divorced or isolated from the 
conventional type. Islam only provides values and principles that, arguably, lean more 
towards the stakeholder approach but are sufficiently general to be applied even in 
different approaches of the corporate governance theories, such as agency theory, in 
order to add more ethical standards. In Islam, there is no detailed set of governance 
standards that stand apart from the theories and governance mechanisms of modern 
corporations. Therefore, combining Islamic values with corporate governance might 
result in an ideal structure, whereby corruption could be reduced by both the Islamic 
moral and ethical values as well as the conventional well-structured governance 
mechanisms developed in modern corporations.172 
2.6 Sharia Governance 
2.6.1 The Concept 
In the Islamic world, conformity with sharia has been a concern, given the rise of 
sharia non-compliant financial transactions introduced by the modern banking system. 
Therefore, research has focused on how to incorporate conformity with sharia into the 
modern governance system, which has resulted in the introduction of the concept of 
sharia governance. Basically, sharia governance is the Islamic version of corporate 
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governance.173 Sharia governance, however, does not replace corporate governance 
but adds extra governance standards to ensure compliance with sharia. 
A common definition of sharia governance is that defined by IFSB, which is:  
“The set of institutional and organisational arrangements through which an IIFS 
(Institutions offering Islamic financial services) ensures that there is effective 
independent oversight of shariah compliance over each of the following 
structures and processes:  
1. Issuance of relevant shariah pronouncements/resolutions… 
2. Dissemination of information on such shariah pronouncements/resolutions to 
the operative personnel of the IIFS who monitor the day-to-day compliance… 
3. An internal shariah compliance review/audit for verifying that shariah 
compliance has been satisfied…  
4. An annual shariah compliance review/audit for verifying that the internal 
shairah compliance review/audit has been appropriately carried out and its 
findings have been duly noted by the shariah board…”.174 
 
This lengthy definition, although preferred by some researchers,175 is criticised for 
being inaccurate and not comprehensive, since it ignores the external arrangements of 
sharia governance.176 Furthermore, defining sharia governance by listing and explaining 
certain tools and arrangements is not the best way to explain the concept. These 
arrangements, besides being incomprehensive, are merely instruments for achieving 
the objective of sharia governance and thus could be replaced if other instruments 
better serve this objective. Therefore, it is more accurate to employ a more general 
definition. In fact, IFSB, before setting its own definition, refers to another, arguably 
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more accurate,177 definition that is used by the Islamic financial industry, which is the, 
“structures and processes adopted by stakeholders in the IFSI (Islamic financial 
services industry), from financial regulators to market players, to ensure compliance 
with shariah rules and principles”.178 It is important that this definition considers the 
arrangements adopted by stakeholders other than the institution itself, such as those 
required by the regulators. This consideration is ignored by the Central Bank of Oman in 
its Islamic Banking Regulatory Framework, one of the most recent and comprehensive 
official sharia governance frameworks, which defines sharia governance as “a system 
whereby an Islamic financial institution attempts to comply with shari’a in all its 
activities”.179 One of the most comprehensive definitions of sharia governance that 
explains the concept well is that offered by Ginena: “The overall system that manages 
the conformity of the activities of Islamic banks and financial institutions to the precepts 
of shariah pertaining to transactions”.180 
The SSB does not represent the whole of sharia governance or even sharia 
supervision. In fact, sharia governance includes two main processes.181 The first is the 
internal, ex-ante, where fatwas (pronouncements) regarding specific transactions are 
issued by the SSB and thereafter monitored and supervised by internal sharia review 
departments in terms of their day-to-day applications. The external process, ex-post, 
involves internal sharia auditing conducted by internal sharia audit departments to verify 
sharia compliance and report any misconduct to the SSB. It also involves external 
sharia audit which may be conducted by the SSB or external sharia firms. According to 
Minhas, a comprehensive sharia governance structure is based on four pillars: the 
management and board of directors; an independent, qualified SSB; effective sharia 
review and audit; and transparency and disclosure.182  
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2.6.2 Hisba and Sharia Governance 
The concept of hisba, as practised in the early Islamic era, could be a source of 
some useful principles for the Islamic governance system and provide an inspiring 
theoretical basis for sharia governance. Hisba is generally defined by Al-Mawardi (D. 
1058) as “commanding good if it appears to be abandoned and inhibiting evil when it is 
publicly performed”.183 According to this definition, hisba generally covers all aspects of 
life, including commercial and financial activities, which are the activities most closely 
related to sharia governance. Since the practice of hisba aims to establish a firm’s 
socioeconomic environment, in which people are encouraged to act in a moral and 
ethical manner, the protection of rights, especially those of consumers, is a priority.184 
The most closely related aspect of hisba to modern sharia governance is its application 
in the market, which is concerned with preventing corruption and ensuring equal 
transactions by maintaining fairness, transparency and accountability.185 Hisba in the 
market was carried out in the early Islamic era and received attention from the Prophet 
Mohammed (pbuh) and his successors, who either practised or officially delegated the 
authority of hisba to others.186 During the early Abaasid era (750 onwards), the practice 
of hisba was institutionalised into a more sophisticated system to ensure a more sharia-
compliant market.187 As an institution, hisba aims to apply “a divine code of approved 
social behaviour in a community”.188 Generally, the duty of hisba in the market includes 
the following: 
• To ensure fair trading and transactions by checking the measures and weights 
used in business dealings 
• To check and report business fraud 
• To audit non-sharia compliant transactions 
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• To keep the market free and prevent any activity that might negatively affect the 
competition 
• To ensure fair value trading by enforcing the sale of necessary goods when 
needed and preventing the hoarding of such goods if it leads to negative effects 
on the market.189 
 
The establishment of such an institution is a responsibility of either the state or the 
community.190 Nowadays, most of hisba’s objectives are achieved by different 
governance systems and executed by different tools and governmental institutions, 
such as ministries, the central banks, supervisory bodies and regulations.191 However, 
this modern arrangement of hisba fails to effectively cover the issue of sharia-
compliance in IFIs. This highlights the importance of sharia governance and the need 
for its official recognition in the Islamic world. 
2.6.3 Importance of Sharia Governance  
While corporate governance aims to protect different interests which vary, and 
depend on the nature of the relationship between the different types of stakeholders and 
the company, financial interests lie at the centre of these interests. Since non-financial 
interests are not dominant, they could be preserved by having some special governance 
requirements without affecting the whole structure of the corporate governance. In the 
case of Islamic banks and other IFIs, stakeholders have another big concern: 
compliance with sharia. For some stakeholders, compliance with sharia might be more 
important than, or at least equally important to, the financial considerations.192 Hence, it 
is essential to have a parallel governance structure concerned with conformity with 
sharia.  
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A good sharia governance structure should have proper arrangements in place for 
ensuring sharia-compliance, set out the guidance and duties for the different levels of 
management related to sharia matters and outline the functions of the different levels of 
sharia supervision and sharia risk management.193 The importance of a strong sharia 
governance structure may be summarised by the following points: 
• Increasing the stakeholders’ trust and confidence, which in turn positively 
affects the institution’s stability, capacity as a financial intermediary and 
performance. 
• Improving the disclosure mechanism regarding sharia compliance. Such an 
improvement would, first, increase the stakeholders’ knowledge of the sharia 
laws pertaining to transactions so that they can compare the extent of sharia 
compliance with other institutions and make informed decisions about whether or 
not to invest. Secondly, disclosure would decrease the amount of information 
asymmetry between the stakeholders and managers, increase the competition 
and enhance the market discipline. 
•  Improve the standardisation of practice which would restrict opportunistic 
practice and increase trust.194  
2.6.4 Regulatory Approaches to Sharia Governance  
Despite its importance, sharia governance has not been very well regulated in the 
jurisdictions in which the Islamic banks operate. These jurisdictions significantly vary in 
terms of their level of engagement with sharia governance, ranging from complete 
ignorance to full commitment.  
To classify the different regulatory approaches of sharia governance between 
jurisdictions, Ahmed identifies four characteristics.195 Ginena adds two further to 
categorise the jurisdictions, based on these six characteristics, into five categories, from 
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those jurisdictions which tend to be hands-off and those that are committed.196 The first 
characteristic is the general presence of regulations considering the uniqueness of the 
IFIs. The second is having the minimum requirements for internal sharia governance, 
such as an internal department for sharia auditing. The third is whether the regulator 
requires the SSB in the Islamic financial institution. Having a centralized SSB board at 
the regulatory level is the fourth characteristic. The fifth is the requirement to conduct an 
external sharia audit by a licensed firm. The final one is whether the external sharia 
audit could be conducted by the regulator itself. Based on these characteristics, the 
approaches to regulating sharia governance are as follows (see Table 2.1 below): 
1. Hands-off: none of these factors is required. UK and Saudi Arabia are 
examples of this. 
2. Nominal: only the first factor is required. Iran is an example of this. 
3. Engaged: The first three factors are required. Sometimes, the SSB at the 
regulatory level is present but in a passive way and it does not have the same 
authority as the next category. Qatar is an examples of this category. 
4. Proactive: All of the factors are required apart from the last two. Malaysia is a 
prominent example of this. 
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Table 2.1: categories and characteristics of sharia governance approaches 
Factor or Characteristic Hands-
off 
Nominal Engaged Proactive Committed 
General Islamic banking 
laws and regulations 
     
Internal sharia audit      
SSB at the institutional 
level 
     
Centralized SSB   Semi-non-
existence 
  
External sharia audit      
Regulatory sharia audit      
Source: Ginena and Hamid, Foundations of Shari’ah Governance of Islamic Banks (n 134) at 121 
This shows that sharia governance has not reached a standard framework yet that is 
widely acceptable. The legal recognition of the industry is still at a minimum in many 
jurisdictions, some of which are significant for the industry, such as Saudi Arabia. 
However, there is a tendancy in the new regulations towards a more committed sharia 
governance model. Moreover, Oman, Bahrain, the UAE, and Pakistan have adopted 
some degree of legal reform in this direction, which will be referred to later in the  
thesis.198  
2.7 Conclusion 
The new method of finance which has been introduced as a result of the prohibition 
of Interest in Islam provides certain challenges, in the view of corporation theory. These 
challenges arose when incorporating sharia governance into the corporation structure to 
satisfy the sharia-compliance requirements. The concept of sharia governance is a new, 
developing framework where there is a variation among jurisdictions on how it should be 
                                            




legally recognised. The chapter presents these issues as fundamental in order to 
provide a context for further discussion about the structure of sharia supervision within 
the governance framework. The variation in the sharia governance approaches 
indicates that the sharia governance structure is incomplete and needs to be developed 
into a more robust, reliable one in order to provide blueprints for the legal systems 
wishing to adopt sharia governance. Before discussing how this development should 
take place, it is important to justify the need for the legal recognition of Islamic banking 
and sharia governance. As shown in the sharia governance approaches, some 
jurisdictions completely ignore sharia governance or recognise it only in a minimal way. 
The next chapter provides an example of an important jurisdiction of islamic finance 
where a hands-off approach is applied and the effect of such a legal evironment on 














Chapter Three: Islamic Banks and the Need for Legal Recognition: The Case of 
Saudi Arabia  
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the importance of and rationales for having special 
regulations for the Islamic banking industry that are different from those of conventional 
banks. This should provide the general legal basis of sharia supervision and its 
governance structure. For illustration, the case of Saudi Arabia is used as a main 
reference in the discussions in this and the following chapters. Beside its size of the 
market and the economic volume which was outlined before, it represents extreme legal 
negligence or a hands-off attitude toward sharia governance, which provides a clearer 
ground for the discussion about the need for and the extent of the legal recognition of 
the practice.  
Saudi Arabia is also an interesting case as Islamic law is a major component of the 
society in that country. Saudis are closely tied to Islamic principles and orders. The legal 
system in the country is, also, strongly influenced by Islamic law. According to the Basic 
Law of Governance, the highest law in the country, no law should contradict the sources 
of Islam.199 Many regulated activities are stated to be applied in a way that does not 
conflict with sharia rules and standards. When it comes to practice, however, Islamic 
law and the Saudi legal system, sometimes, fail to coincide. The obvious example of 
this is the banking system in that country. In its endeavour to modernise as a big oil 
producer, the country has adopted its banking system, within which, like most of the 
world’s other banking systems, interest is the cornerstone. This has created a 
problematic situation where both the Islamic and conventional banks suffer. Peter 
Wilson describes this problem as follows: 
“The Saudi banking system has been beset by two problems that have 
relentlessly threatened its existence. One is the question of interest. The second 
is the country’s legal system”.200 
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In light of these two problems, the chapter discusses the issue of recognising Islamic 
banks within a conventional banking system in a country whose law is based on sharia. 
The chapter, also, highlights the other half of the picture where the conventional banks 
in the country suffer to enforce their interest-based loans in the judiciary system, which 
is based on sharia. 
3.2 Why Should Islamic Banking be Regulated? 
Countries tend to regulate the banking industry with special laws and regulations 
that differ from those related to normal companies.201 Banks are usually subject to 
different systems of prudential regulations, structural requirements, and minimum 
capital ratio requirements.202 This is because of the unique features and charactristics of 
the financial industry, that demand different laws and regulations in order to make the 
national economy stronger as well as safer. Consequently, a separate regulator is 
usually established to supervise the banking sector.203 This section highlights the key 
reasons and justifications for enacting special laws and regulations for banks and 
assesses whether Islamic banks share the same rationales. Furthermore, it argues that 
Islamic banks need their own legal system that differs from the one governing 
conventional banks. 
3.2.1 Rationales for Regulating the Banking Industry 
The process associated with regulating the banking industry is not inexpensive as it 
may cost billions in modern economies to create a sound banking legal system. This 
costly process is not only borne by the states, which have to fund the regulation and 
supervisory tasks, but it is also costly for banks to comply with the rules and regulations 
imposed by the regulators of the industry. Additionally, the banks’ customers share 
some of this expense, as it is likely that the banks pass on to their clients some of their 
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costs.204 Despite these expenses, the banking industry is being heavily regulated. 
Below are the key rationales for regulating the industry. 
Market Imperfection  
One of the most important reasons that led to bank regulation is that the 
environment in which the financial services are conducted is not perfect. This 
imperfection is due to several elements which characterise the industry and prevent the 
market from being fully competitve in nature. The information problem associated with 
the financial market is one of the most obvious elements of market imperfection. 
Uncertainty is an unavoidable feature in the financial market.205 In this market, 
consumers face a lack of, as well as, asymmetric information, which may lead to the 
agency problem and, therefore, regulation is needed to stabilise the market.206 
Confidence and Stability  
Banks are the cornerstone of any financial system, so the stability of the banks 
means a more solid and confident financial system. Thus, states regulate the banking 
industry properly in a way that creates more confidence in the market. The significance 
of a stable, confident financial market rests on two critical features of the market. The 
first is the uncertainty associated with the market, as explained above. Although this 
uncertainty pervades all aspects of the modern economy, contracts, guarded and 
supported by the legal system, can provide the essential security needed for the 
economy to develop. However, states, as they produce their own money, might view 
contracts as inadequate for maintaining confidence and stability regarding the value of 
their money, which is better achieved by a special regulation and supervisory system 
which supports the evolution of the banking industry.207 Secondly, the banking industry 
is vulnerable because of the issue of externality.208 A bank is not made safe merely 
through performing well but is susceptible to fail if others do, which is called contagion 
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risk. When there is a bank run, depositors lose confidence in the system and withdraw 
their money from other banks. Hence, regulations are imposed to ensure that the 
degree of contagion risk is minimised.209 An important objective in regulating banks is to 
set minimum standards in the industry to make the market trustworthy.210 
Cost 
Despite its cost, the regulation of banks can save a lot of money, time and effort. In a 
free banking environment, banks are inadequately monitored so consumers have to pay 
the cost of investigating financial services carefully. Such a cost would be substantial, 
considering that all consumers must experience the same process which leads to an 
enormous consumption of time and resources, a situation that justifies establishing 
establishing regulator agencies to monitor the banks and lower the cost of contracts for 
consumers.211 
3.2.2 Do Islamic Banks Need their Own Regulations?  
In spite of the differences between Islamic and conventional banks, they share the 
same rationales for regulation. Islamic banks provide banking services and operate in 
the same financial environment where the market is imperfect and needs to be stable in 
order to increase customers’ confidence. In fact, many conventional products could be 
redrafted to comply with sharia.212 The main feature that distinguishes Islamic banks 
from conventional ones is that the former complies with sharia, which requires them to 
apply the Islamic finance principles, explained earlier, in the products provided. Despite 
this, Islamic banks are recognised as banks and have the same rationales that justify 
the different regulations for banks. Islamic and conventional banks serve the same 
economic objective: to act as administrators of the economy’s payments system and as 
financial intermediaries.213 Since Islamic banks are classified as banks and provide 
what banking laws are characterised as banking services, they should be regulated as 
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well. The important question is whether the differences and requirements in Islamic 
banks rationalise special regulations that differ from the conventional banking 
regulatinos. 
To answer this question, we need to consider whether the objectives of regulating 
banks could be achieved by applying the same banking regulations to the Islamic ones. 
Islamic banks must operate under a slightly different structure and adopt different 
financial contracts which must comply with sharia law. The principles of Islamic finance 
may be deemed inconsistent with the legal structure applicable to the financial sector. 
Therefore, there is a call that Islamic banking should have a separate legal system or, at 
least, apply some exceptions for its operations.214 The framework and functionality of 
the contracts need to be well understood by the supervisory authority. The absence of 
special regulations for Islamic banks usually results in tension between the supervisory 
authorities and Islamic banks due to the lack of understanding of the transactions and 
structures of Islamic banks, which therefore discourages the authorities from providing 
the proper support for Islamic banks when needed.215 Thus, the objectives of the 
banking regulations are better served by having a special supervisory system for Islamic 
banks. Furthermore, some Islamic financial products require special actions which might 
be prohibited or restricted under the banking regulations in certain jurisdictions. As 
explained earlier, some financial transactions require Islamic banks to be partnered by 
commercial enterprises or to acquire some assets to sell or lease. Such actions are 
either prohibited or restricted under most banking laws.216 As described below, this is 
the case in Saudi Arabia. Therefore, these actions need to be recognised by special 
regulations that not only authorise and legitimise this type of contracts but also give the 
supervisory authorities the necessary control to ensure the safe applications of these 
contracts. 
Another justification of the special regulations for Islamic banks is the further risk to 
which Islamic banks are exposed. The nature of the contracts used by Islamic banks 
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places them at a higher degree of risk than conventional ones. For example, PLS 
contracts are common in Islamic banks, where they make profits by engaging in real 
economic activities that expose them to the risk of loss.217 Wilson lists three types of 
additional risk to which Islamic banks are exposed as a result of providing sharia-
compliant products.218 The first is sharia risk, which is the reputational risk due to the 
level of compliance with sharia law. The second is the ownership risk, which is 
associated with possessing property as required by some of these contracts, such as 
murabaha and ijara. The third is the market risk, which is the risk that banks bear as a 
result of participating in business, as required in musharaka contracts. He argues that 
these types of risk are challenging for the central banks to manage, since these 
contracts need special skills to understand and he suggests that special legal 
consideration would assist the supervision of Islamic banks. He further argues that 
innovation in the Islamic banking industry could be discouraged and inhibited in an 
environment where both Islamic and conventional banks are supervised by the same 
rules, a situation that would force Islamic banks to comply with the rules by imitating 
conventional products. 
It is important that the types of risk that Wilson highlights are considered by the 
banking regulators, as they could all lead to runs on banks and negatively affect the 
economy. Regarding ownership and market risks, this effect is direct. Banks may lose 
their funds as a result of buying commodities or participating in commercial projects if, 
for example, these commodities are damaged or the projects fail. Such risk could be 
alleviated if well recognised by the regulators. On the other hand, the economic effect is 
indirect in sharia risk, since it is mainly an ethical concern. Islamic banks are morally 
obligated to comply with sharia and customers are morally motivated to choose Islamic 
banks. However, the improper application of sharia-compliant products may cause the 
loss of the bank’s reputation and affect its credibility which, in turn, will cause the bank 
to lose funds. In this regard, a strong sharia governance is essential to ensure authentic 
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sharia-compliant products and prevent superficial ones that apply manipulative 
mechanisms which open a back-door to interest. 
Investment deposits in Islamic banks, which is based on mudaraba contracts, are 
another area that regulators need to consider. Unlike deposits in conventional banks, 
Islamic banks cannot guarantee a fixed rate of return on their investment accounts. 
Depositors in Islamic banks are considered investors and share profits proportionate to 
their deposits but bear the risk of possible erosion of their capital in the case of loss.219 
Although this type of contract contains the risk explained above, it needs special 
attention from the regulators since it raises an important legal issue regarding the rights 
of depositors. Unlike shareholders, depositors are unrepresented in the board of 
directors nor do they have voting or monitoring rights in spite of their investment and 
therefore do not receive the necessary protection.220 
Also, the prudential standards applicable to conventional banking might not fit the 
different functionality of IFIs, which adds another reason to consider a separate 
regulation for Islamic banking. There has been a call to set up a sharia-compliant 
macro-prudential framework that includes the establishment of a sharia-compliant 
lender of last resort and deposit insurance schemes to promote the resilience and 
stability of the Islamic financial system.221 Also, it is necessary to consider the different 
ratio of liquidity between conventional banks and Islamic banks, mainly due to the fact 
that the latter do not pay interest to their depositors.222 Hussain et al. argue that liquidity 
risk management and the financial safety net are two major challenges to the financial 
stability of IFIs.223 They suggest a special legal guidance for the Islamic financial market 
in order to comply with Basel III regulations and cater for the specificities of IFIs, such 
as capital adequacy ratios that take into account the profit-sharing feature of investment 
accounts with Islamic banks. 
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Under the conventional prudential standards, Islamic banks might find it difficult to 
compete with other banks. For example, most of the Islamic banks in the UK fail to join 
the reserve scheme partially because they do not meet the required minimum threshold 
to be subject to the cash ratio deposit regime, a situation that has placed Islamic banks 
in a less favourable situation to compete with conventional banking in an open market 
and also prevented them from using the central bank’s facilities.224 This is in addition to 
the religious restriction which affects the ability of Islamic banks to compete. While 
conventional banks have the freedom to consider countless ideas in the process of 
launching products, Islamic banks are constrained to only offer SSB approved 
products.225 This unfair competition environment could also be positive for Islamic 
banks. Conventional banks in some jurisdictions complain about the “special privileges” 
enjoyed by Islamic banks.226 As explained below, Islamic banks in Saudi Arabia may, 
exceptionally, be authorised to conduct certain illegal actions. This authorisation might 
be considered discriminatory by their conventional counterparts. As a result, having 
Islamic banks compete with conventional ones would lead to discrimination, whether 
positive or negative, for Islamic banks, a situation that requires special treatment that 
recognises their special status.227      
While the previous justifications for different regulations for Islamic banks focus on 
their special financial and operational aspects, the governance framework of the 
required sharia review process needs also to be considered in regulating Islamic banks. 
In the absence of such regulation, different standards and mechanisms might be 
applied to ensure sharia-compliance by different banks rather than constituting uniform 
rules for this important practice, which may lead the Islamic banking industry into chaos. 
Having non-standardised sharia supervision practice might lead to confusion and, 
consequently, customers would lose confidence in this market. The need for regulators 
to ensure the proper application and mechanism of sharia governance, including the 
practice of the SSB, is as essential as the need to ensure that the board of directors and 
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senior management are fulfilling their duties and responsibilities.228 The fact that each 
Islamic bank creates its own non-standardised SSB is a clear example of this. This 
board, with its exceptional power that sometimes overrides the power of the board of 
directors, has created a unique body in the structure of Islamic banks that differs from 
the regular structure of a company. In the absence of a regulation under which this 
board works, the board will be a source of annoyance and confusion for the banking 
market, as there are no guidelines regulating this important body. Unless regulated 
carefully, the existence of this body may conflict with some of the modern corporate 
governance standards and principles; a situation which makes applying Islamic banking 
principles even more challenging. There are many deficiencies regarding the current 
practice of the SSB due to the failure to regulate such an important practice and, 
indeed, this is the focus of this research which will be explored throughout the thesis. 
The remainder of this chapter explores the legal status of Islamic banks in Saudi Arabia. 
3.3 History of the Saudi Banking System 
Banks and the banking system in Saudi Arabia have developed in accordance with 
the development of the country. Prior to its unification in 1932, there was no banking 
system but some banking services were introduced by foreign countries to serve their 
citizens in the region. Since unification, the banking system has taken various steps 
towards development before it gained its current shape. Four different stages can 
summarise the development track of the Saudi banking system: prior to 1932, when 
there was no political or banking system; from 1932 to 1952, when the current political 
system was established but no banking governing system existed; from 1952 to 1966, 
after the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) was established; and, finally, after 
1966, when the Banking Control Law was issued.  
1st Stage: Prior to 1932 
During this period, the country had not yet been founded. There was no stable 
political system, and people lived a very primitive life. Apart from some parts, Saudi 
Arabia was never colonised since it was too poor and uninhabitable to attract the 
                                            




interest of colonial powers. This situation and the fact that Islamic law prohibits interest 
in banking transactions were referred to as the reasons why modern banking arrived 
relatively late compared to its emergence in the rest of the world.229 
Due to the absence of a firm political system, no banking system existed at that time. 
However, it is recorded that some banking services were provided. The British 
Company, Gellatly, Hankey & Co., was the first known entity in the region to provide 
banking services, such as currency transfers and exchange. It entered Jeddah, in the 
west of the country, in 1885, to serve the small European community there.230 In 1889, 
the company was appointed as Lloyds Agent and continued to work until the Arabian 
Establishment for Trade and Shipping Ltd. (AET) took over its remaining activities, 
following its foundation in 1963.231 Although Gellatly, Hankey & Co. was the first 
recorded banking provider in the region, it has been inferred that some existing but 
unrecorded banking activities were being conducted by non-European groups who had 
businesses in the west of the region. The presence of several Indian and Jewish 
merchants, who may have engaged in banking functions at the ports of the Red Sea, 
indicates that some banking activities were carried out there.232 Some Indian and 
Egyptian companies have been recorded as providing banking activities, such as 
financing foreign trade.233 
Still, banking activities were not provided by official banks. It was not until 1911 that 
the Imperial Ottoman Bank entered the region to serve the Turkish troops as the first 
bank. However, it was closed as soon as the troops left.234 Nevertheless, other banks 
and banking services were operating prior to the unification of the country in 1932. Two 
banks were formed in Hejaz, the western region of the Arabian Peninsula, for political 
reasons to serve the Hejazi Government at that time and, therefore, they closed after 
the political system changed, when King Abdulaziz, the founder of Saudi Arabia, began 
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to dominate Hejaz.235 The only bank which survived to the next stage was the Bank of 
Nederlands Handel-Maatchappij (NHM), which was founded in 1926 and still operates 
under the name “Alawwal Bank”,236 which makes it the first bank in the region with a 
continuous presence.237 In fact, this bank played an important role in the next stage until 
the country developed its banking system. 
2nd Stage: 1932-1952 
The unification of the country in 1932 brought safety and stability to the region. This 
is a very important feature for a healthy banking environment. Prior to this, the insecurity 
and political instability caused the banks to terminate their services in the region. It was 
safer for banks to operate in the country during this period. Another important feature of 
this period was the discovery of oil in 1938.238 This marked the beginning of the oil 
boom in Saudi Arabia, which transformed it into one of the leading countries in the world 
for oil production. Thus, Saudi Arabia might have been expected to become a more 
attractive environment for banks to invest.  
Despite this political and economic change, the banking system did not develop in a 
way that reflects this improvement. Initially, the government was unenthusiastic about 
hosting and regulating banking institutions because of the implication of accepting 
interest, which is prohibited under Islamic law. On the other hand, foreign banks were 
uninterested in operating in the country before civilization as the economy was too small 
for them.239 Thus, there was no governing banking law or central bank in the country at 
this stage. However, a large number of traditional money exchangers were providing 
basic banking activities, leaving the more complex ones to the few foreign banks which 
existed at that time.240  
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NHM was the most prominent bank during this period as, for several years, it was 
the only bank in operation.241 Some of the activities of the bank resembled the role of 
the central bank: assisting the country to issue its first independent currency in 1928; 
preserving the gold stock of the country; and receiving the oil payments.242 This was the 
case until SAMA was founded in 1952 to serve as the central bank of Saudi Arabia. 
3rd Stage: 1952-1966 
The need for a central bank in the country was obvious to the officials, especially 
after the increase in the country’s oil revenues and expenditure of the government due 
to the civilization. Thus, the government in 1951, with the help of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), entered into a reform programme to develop a modern monetary 
system which led to the establishment of SAMA in 1952.243 This was a very important 
step in improving the banking system since a central bank is one of the most important 
elements of modern countries’ economies. 
SAMA played a very important role in improving the currency of the country. After 
the silver coins, issued in 1928, the government issued the country’s first gold coins in 
1952, after the establishment of SAMA. Although SAMA was not authorised to issue 
official paper money until 1959, it started to issue pilgrim receipts in 1953. As the two 
holy cities in Saudi Arabia, Makkah and Madinah, received hundreds of thousands of 
pilgrims and visitors each year, pilgrim receipts were issued for their convenience and to 
relieve them of carrying heavy coins. Pilgrim receipts resembled travellers’ cheques 
where customers bought them in their home country and then sold them in Saudi Arabia 
to banks, money exchangers, or traders. However, pilgrim receipts were not exclusive 
to pilgrims but available to the general public and so local businesses benefited from the 
convenience of those receipts since paper money did not exist at that time.244      
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This stage also experienced the establishment of official local banks for the first 
time, to work and compete with the existing foreign banks. In 1953, the National 
Commercial Bank (NCB) was founded as the first official Saudi Bank.245 NCB was 
followed by the establishment of Riyad Bank and Al Watany Bank, in 1957 and 1958, 
respectively. The latter, however, was forced into liquidation by SAMA, in 1960, due to 
insolvency and its assets were transferred to the former.246  
A new SAMA Law was issued in 1957, which is the current SAMA Law. The new law 
was issued due to the financial crisis that the country faced at that time to reform the 
previous one and give SAMA the independence and powers it needed to achieve its 
objectives.247 
4th Stage: 1966 to the Present 
The Banking Control Law was passed in 1966 to regulate banks’ activities and 
strengthen the power of SAMA to license and supervise all banks operating in Saudi 
Arabia. The issuance of this law was the last step towards building a banking system 
that was consistent with the needs of a modern country.  
SAMA exercised the power bestowed on it by banning foreign banks from any 
further growth in their branches, thereby providing an opportunity for the two existing 
Saudi banks at that time, NCB and Riyad Bank, to grow rapidly.248 This situation 
continued until SAMA, in 1976, forced foreign banks wishing to work in the country 
either to operate through a local licensed agency bank or to incorporate locally and 
relinquish at least 60% of its ownership to a Saudi partner.249 These restrictions were 
recently mitigated by the government as part of its successful endeavour to join the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2005, after 12 years of negotiations. One of the 
government’s commitments upon its successful accession to the WTO was to reform its 
banking system to allow the direct branches of foreign banks to operate in the country 
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and to increase foreign ownership of banks from 40% to 60%.250 As listed on the SAMA 
website, there are currently 12 local banks, and 15 foreign banks have licensed 
branches to operate in the country.251 
It can be noted from this overview of the banking system in Saudi Arabia that several 
factors promoted the development of the system. The presence of foreign banks when 
the country was unified was a basic foundation for the banking system that the country 
needed at that time. The government did not find it necessary to intervene in the 
banking sector and establish its own system, as the foreign banks, notably NHM, were 
meeting the needs of the country, ranging from basic banking activities to acting as the 
central bank of the government. Another factor was the growing wealth of the country 
after the discovery of oil. The country’s revenues and expenditure increased 
dramatically, so it was driven to establish its own central bank. This heralded the 
beginning of the building of a new modern system with the necessary regulations for a 
healthy banking environment. Moreover, the oil boom made the country very attractive 
for banks that wished to finance a lot of ongoing projects that the government initiated to 
enhance the country. This situation, combined with the fact that most Saudis, for 
religious reasons, preferred to have non-interest bearing accounts, made the country 
among the most profitable banking environments in the world.252 Finally, pilgrims were 
another important factor in developing the banking system in the country. The presence 
of NHM in the region was initially designed to serve pilgrims arriving from Indonesia, 
which was a Dutch colony at that time.253 Pilgrims, also, were a motivating factor in 
accelerating the improvement in the banking system of the country. They were the 
reason why the banks were allowed to use paper notes when coins were the only sort of 
payment.  
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3.4 Banking Laws in Saudi Arabia 
The banking industry in Saudi Arabia is currently supervised by SAMA, which is the 
supervisory authority of banking licences and activities. There are two main laws 
governing this industry: the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency Law, and the Banking 
Control Law. While the former is concerned with SAMA regulations, duties, and 
objectives, the latter regulates banking licences and activities. This section provides an 
overview of these laws. 
3.4.1 SAMA Law  
The current SAMA Law was issued by Royal Decree No.23 in 1957 and consists of 
14 articles. The law includes the structure of SAMA and the authorities and duties of 
both its board of directors and governor. It, also, lists the three objectives for which 
SAMA was established. The first is to issue, support, and protect the national currency 
both inside and outside the country. The second is to act as the bank of the 
government, so SAMA is responsible for the governmental revenues and expenditure 
as well as the governmental investment in foreign currency. For this purpose, the law 
requires SAMA to establish a research centre to collect and analyse the necessary data 
that help to draw up the governmental economic and monetary policies. Finally, SAMA 
acts as a supervisory authority for the commercial banks working within the country. In 
this regard, the law draws on the general guidelines and duties of SAMA to monitor the 
commercial banks.      
SAMA Law lists some of the practices that the agency is prohibited from 
undertaking. It is worth noting that the law requires SAMA to comply with Islamic law 
principles and to avoid committing any activity prohibited under Islamic law, including 
the paying or receiving of interest.254 These restrictions should preclude SAMA from 
actions involving interest, such as repo and reverse repo, or acting as a lender of last 
resort.255 However, SAMA does conduct these actions. Repo and reverse repo are 
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regulated.256 Also, it acted as a lender of last resort to save several local banks from 
failing by placing or directing the placement of free or low cost deposits.257 These are 
examples of situations where the practice conflicts with the sharia commitment in the 
country. 
3.4.2 Banking Control Law  
In 1966, Royal Decree No.M/5 approved the issuance of the Banking Control Law, 
which contains 26 articles for regulating the banking services in the country. The law 
can be divided into three main parts. The first part describes the conditions and 
requirements for obtaining a banking licence, the restrictions related to the practice of 
banking activities, and the exclusivity of using the term “bank”. The second part is 
concerned with banking activities and management. It sets up the required statutory 
deposits that must be kept at SAMA as well as the capital adequacy ratio for banks; lists 
the prohibited actions and restrictions imposed on certain banking activities; and 
regulates some of the management and operational requirements imposed on banks. 
The final part gives SAMA the power to supervise the industry. SAMA is authorised to 
impose general rules for regulating the industry and inspecting all of the records it 
needs to for supervisory purposes. In this part, the law describes the procedures and 
penalties that SAMA may impose in cases of violation.  
3.5 The Legal Recognition of Islamic Banks under the Banking System in Saudi 
Arabia 
Islamic law plays a very important role in Saudi Arabia. It is stated in the Basic Law 
of Governance, which is considered the constitution of Saudi Arabia, that:  
“The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a fully sovereign Islamic State. Its religion shall 
be Islam and its constitution shall be the book of God and the Sunnah 
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(Traditions) of His Messenger, May God’s blessings and peace be upon him 
(PBUH)”.258   
This article announces clearly that the Qura’n and Sunnah, the main sources of 
Islamic law, comprise the constitution of Saudi Arabia. More importantly, Article Seven 
of the same law declares that all laws in Saudi Arabia shall be governed by these two 
sources. However, in practice, some laws raise a very sensitive question in the 
community: do these laws conflict with any of the Islamic law principles? As important 
as this question is, since it is related to a constitutional issue, there is no legal 
mechanism such as a constitutional court to resolve it. The status of Islamic banks in 
Saudi Arabia is an example of the situation whereby the principles of Islamic finance are 
not recognised by the legal system. Unlike other countries, such as Malaysia, the 
banking system in Saudi Arabia is not dual, where Islamic banks are recognised by a 
special legal system that is different from the one regulating conventional banks. This 
section highlights the legal recognition of Islamic banks and its special financial 
transactions under the current laws.  
3.5.1 Licensing Islamic Banking in Saudi Arabia: A Historical Preview 
As stated before, SAMA Law requires the agency to adhere to Islamic principles and 
prohibits the agency from any involvement with interest. However, commercial banks 
are not required to do so. In fact, Islamic banks are the ones that struggled for years to 
obtain a banking licence.  
The banking system in Saudi Arabia does not treat Islamic banking activities any 
differently from those of other banks. There is no special banking licence for Islamic 
financial activities so Islamic banks must meet the general banking requirements in 
order to obtain a licence. However, SAMA, for a period of time, disliked using the word 
“Islamic” because it implied that the other banks operating in the country, whose 
constitution was based on Islamic principles, were “non-Islamic”. This political reason 
                                            




led some authors on Islamic banking to categorise Saudi Arabia among those countries 
with a discouraging environment for Islamic banks.259  
Al Rajhi Bank is considered to have been the first Islamic bank to obtain a banking 
licence in the country. Although it was founded in 1957 as a money exchanger and 
provided some banking activities, it was not until 1988 that it received its banking 
licence.260 To achieve this, Al Rajhi had to fight SAMA for more than five years because 
it was reluctant to give a banking licence to an Islamic bank.261 The banking licence that 
Al Rajhi received was on condition that they would not use the word “Islamic” in the title 
of the bank.262 
Other banks failed to obtain a licence, however. Examples are Dar Al Maal Al Islami 
and Albaraka Group, which were both founded in the 1980s to conduct Islamic 
investment and provide Islamic banking services. However, both banks continued to 
operate unofficially but successfully, without any difficulty, despite lacking a licence.263 
Although the Banking Control Law does not allow the practising of any banking activities 
without a licence, SAMA ignored this situation and so created an extra-legal system for 
these Islamic banks, and allowed Al Rajhi Bank, before it obtained a licence, to operate 
outside the law.  
Subsequent to licensing Al Rajhi, the bank became the most profitable bank in the 
country and the world’s largest Islamic commercial institution.264 Its success may have 
been what changed SAMA’s position towards licensing Islamic banks. Although there 
was no legal change in the banking law, SAMA allowed Islamic banking services to be 
provided. Albilad and Alinma banks are fully Islamic banks, established in 2005 and 
2008, respectively. They are the most recent local banks to have been established in 
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the country. However, licensing these two banks followed a series of tolerant reactions 
by SAMA towards the Islamic banking services provided by the conventional banks. The 
high demand for Islamic banking services motivated the conventional banks to provide 
these activities for their customers. Conversion to Islamic banking services became a 
phenomenon after the first Islamic branch of NCB in 1990 enjoyed huge success, so the 
bank launched more Islamic branches which led other conventional banks to follow it.265 
Bank Aljazira, founded in 1975, decided in 1998 to start converting into a fully Islamic 
Bank. In 2007 the bank declared itself a fully Islamic institution.266 NCB gradually began 
to convert its branches after its success in 1990. In 2005, its board of directors decided 
to convert all of the remaining non-Islamic branches into Islamic ones by the end of the 
year.267 NCB and Aljazira are the most prominent examples of the conversion 
phenomenon but not the only ones. Other conventional banks were intrigued by the 
success of those two banks so they started to open either Islamic branches or Islamic 
windows for Islamic banking services. At present, all conventional banks provide and 
offer Islamic banking and financial services to their customers. 
Any discussion of SAMA’s attitude, which is a governmental institution, towards 
Islamic banks cannot ignore the Saudi Government’s ownership of those banks. 
Interestingly, the government, through its investment institutions, owns significant 
shares in the big Islamic financial services providers in the country. The records of the 
Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul) show that the governmental institutions’ shares in Al 
Rajhi Bank, Alinma bank and NCB268 are more than 10%, 25% and 64%, 
respectively.269 Not only does the government have this significant investment in these 
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banks, but it also takes important decisions to support and enhance the Islamic banking 
industry. Alinma Bank, the newest bank in Saudi Arabia, was founded by the 
government as an Islamic bank. Moreover, the government, collectively through its 
institutions, owned the majority of NCB shares when the decision to convert into fully 
Islamic branches was taken in 2005, which indicated the role of the government in that 
decision.270 Moreover, the government is seen as a major supporter of Islamic finance 
by hosting and sponsoring IDB. 
The attitude towards Islamic banks of both the government and SAMA has been 
described as paradoxical.271 While SAMA has been more cautious about Islamic banks, 
the government has been more supportive and has viewed this industry as a promising 
one in which to invest. However, some programmes that SAMA sponsors indicate a 
more tolerant attitude towards Islamic banking. One of the main programmes provided 
by the Institute of Finance (IOF),272 established by SAMA, is the Professional 
Qualification in Sharia-Compliant Finance which leads trainees to become Certified 
Islamic Finance Analysts (CIFA). The programme description reads:  
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“The CIFA qualification consists of different modules that progress through three 
levels Developed by an experienced team of Islamic finance experts with the 
vision to produce and nurture Islamic finance leaders in the industry around the 
globe… CIFA holders will have a clear grasp of how to contrast Islamic tools with 
traditional banking and finance, thereby competing effectively. CIFA is 
recognised and widely accepted by Islamic financial institutions as the modules 
build and integrate skills relating to the marketing, accounting, risk management, 
and practical application of Islamic finance”.273    
It is clear from this description that Islamic banking has become highly respected by 
SAMA, and this is due to offering this type of competitive programme. It is important to 
note that IOF also offers other single courses for Islamic banking employees.  
Islamic banks no longer face the difficulty of being licensed in the country but are 
required to comply with the general requirements of banks without any special 
consideration of their Islamic services. Although SAMA has become more objective 
regarding licensing Islamic banks in the country, the special requirements of Islamic 
banks are not considered in the Banking Control Law, which supervises banking 
activities. The next section examines this issue. 
3.5.2 Islamic Banks and the Banking Control Law  
The Banking Control Law was issued in 1966 by the Saudi government to regulate 
all Saudi banks. Despite the fact that some Islamic banking activities, such as Al Rajhi 
Money exchange, founded in 1957, were provided at that time, the law failed to 
recognise Islamic banking services. This negligence would not be problematic if the 
Islamic banking continued at this limited scale. This was not the case as, subsequent to 
the passing of this legislation, Saudi banks become more interested in providing Islamic 
banking services as a response to the citizens’ demands. The Banking Control Law, 
however, failed to recognise the uniqueness and difference of Islamic financial services.  
                                            





A specific example of this is Article Ten of the Banking Control Law. It lists the 
impermissible actions for banks. According to this article, no Saudi bank can be a 
partner in a commercial, industrial, agricultural or any other project apart from owning 
less than 10% shares of a company, and the bank’s investment shall not exceed 20% of 
its capital.274 Nevertheless, equity-based products, as previously described, require the 
bank to partner with its customer in the project that needs to be financed. This action 
obviously violates the law, as the bank becomes a partner in the project.  
Moreover, the same article states that a bank is not allowed to own or rent real 
estate unless it is directly related to the operation of that bank or for the purpose of 
providing accommodation for its employees. As an exception to this prohibited action, a 
bank, under justified special circumstances, may own real estate after obtaining the 
approval of SAMA, provided that this real estate does not exceed 20% of the bank’s 
capital. The 20% condition seems reasonable to save banks from excessive risk. 
However, this clause restricts all three types of sharia-compliant finance: equity-based, 
sales-based, and lease-based products. In order to finance real estate, Islamic banks 
have to involve in owning real estate using one of these three types. To provide these 
financing services, Islamic banks, according to the article, need SAMA approval, which 
is offered only under justified special circumstances. Consequently, many of Islamic 
banks’ services would be provided under a special condition and the law still does not 
clearly recognise this necessary action for Islamic banks.  
The previous restriction on real estate was eased after the issuing of the Real Estate 
Finance Law in 2012. It allows banks, as an exception to Article Ten of Banking Control 
Law, to own “dwellings for finance purposes”.275 The exemption grants permission to 
use Islamic finance tools, especially murabaha, to finance housing and makes this type 
of finance legal. While this is a positive step towards Islamic banking’s recognition, the 
restrictions in Article Ten still apply to the use of other tools of Islamic finance. 
Consequently, some necessary actions that stamp Islamic banks as Islamic are either 
explicitly banned by Article Ten or require special approval.  
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The analysis above shows that the law explicitly prohibits some fundamental actions 
that are necessary to provide Islamic financial products and some of these actions may 
be authorised under “justified special circumstances”. Consequently, Islamic banks are 
placed in a situation where they are compelled either to break the law or work under 
special circumstances. Nevertheless, SAMA seems to condone that some of Islamic 
banking activities lie outside the law. As a result, an extra-legal system has been 
created by the government itself.  
Equally important is the issue of sharia governance, especially the SSB. The legal 
recognition of sharia governance and the SSB is as essential to the Islamic banking 
industry as the recognition of the tools of Islamic finance. The SSB is completely 
ignored by the legal system and only mentioned in the Financial Companies Control 
Law.276 However, it only requires financial companies, other than banks, to form their 
own sharia committees to ensure sharia-compliant financial contracts. The law does not 
explain any further details about the structure and requirements of the sharia 
committees or how they should operate.  
3.6 The Dilemma of Banking Disputes in Saudi Arabia 
This section highlights the issue of banking disputes in the country. It aims to 
address the other half of the picture where the banking system and Islamic law face a 
challenging relationship. On the one hand, the Basic Law of Governance states clearly 
that Islamic law is the governing law in Saudi Arabia and the law that the courts apply in 
all cases alongside the other regulations that do not conflict with Islamic law.277 On the 
other hand, interest, which is clearly prohibited under Islamic law, is a critical feature of 
the banking services and is commonly used in banking activities in Saudi Arabia. A 
problem arises when the bank and its customer disagree about the interest loan and the 
case goes to court. The outcome of this case is the dismissal of any claim for interest, 
as this is strictly prohibited. This situation has proved a nightmare for banks for many 
years and they were suffering due to bad loans. The government had taken several 
steps to try to solve the problem. This section provides a historical background to the 
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development of the jurisdiction over banking disputes in the country and the associated 
legal challenges that sometimes threatened the industry and required the government to 
intervene.  
3.6.1 Quasi-judicial Committees and the Judicial System in Saudi Arabia 
Disputes in Saudi Arabia should be heard before one of these three judicial bodies: 
the judicial or sharia courts, the Board of Grievances, or quasi-judicial committees 
established to deal with special disputes. According to the Basic Law of Governance 
and the Law of the Judiciary, Sharia courts have general jurisdiction over all cases 
unless they are given exclusively to the Board of Grievances.278 The Board of 
Grievances was originally founded in 1954 as a division of the Council of Ministers 
before it became a separate body in the following year. It was recognised as an 
independent administrative judicial body, reporting directly to the king in 1982, and its 
jurisdiction relates to administrative cases.279   
Other places where disputes in the country can be settled are the quasi-judicial 
committees. Many quasi-judicial committees existed prior to the judiciary reform of 
2007, when their number was reduced dramatically. Each committee had its specific 
jurisdiction over specific cases upon which the other courts would not decide either 
because they fell beyond their jurisdiction, e.g. the Board of Grievances, or the judges 
were not qualified to decide these cases. These committees were not planned to fall 
outside the judiciary system but the circumstances led to the number of committees 
increasing.280 This began after the sharia courts failed to deal with certain maritime 
cases properly, so the government felt it necessary to establish a specialised 
commercial panel.281 Al-Ghdyan describes these circumstances which resulted in these 
committees being established: 
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“These committees were established as a result of the sharia courts judges’ 
unwillingness to apply government regulations, fearing that they may contain 
provisions that are not in strict compliance with the sharia law. Therefore, 
wherever a new regulation is issued as a response to the requirement of the 
country’s social and economic development, it provides for the establishment of a 
committee whose task is to implement its provisions”.282 
The situation whereby some committees had judicial authority raised concerns about 
the judiciary in the country. The existence of these committees could threaten justice 
and question the legality and independence of the judicial system in the country.283 
However, some of these committees can be regarded as administrative bodies, since 
their decisions can be appealed before the Board of Grievances, so their decisions are 
viewed as administrative rather than judicial.284 The problem with other committees, 
whose decisions are final and cannot be appealed, was the government’s consideration 
during the judiciary system reform. With the new laws issued for both sharia courts and 
the Board of Grievances in 2007, a manual was issued to arrange and guide the reform 
procedures. It transferred quasi-judicial committees to sharia courts, apart from five 
committees, including the Banking Dispute Committee, which were excluded 
temporarily until further studies could be carried out by the Supreme Council of Justice 
about the status of these committees in relation to the judiciary system.285 This shows 
that there is a real intention by the government to bring these committees under the 
judiciary system and to limit any further growth associated with having judicial authority 
outside the judicial system. So far, banking disputes still go before a special committee. 
In fact, banking disputes have encountered many legal challenges for a long time, 
mainly due to the conflict between conventional loans and sharia, which is an annoying 
situation about which the banks in the country have complained repeatedly.       
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3.6.2 Jurisdiction over Banking Disputes Prior to the Establishment of the 
Banking Disputes Committee (BDC) 
Several factors led banking disputes be settled outside sharia courts. First and 
foremost, the judges in the sharia courts were not tolerant about contracts that included 
any type of interest and would declare illegal and deductible from the loan any interest 
agreed upon in that contract. The Supreme Judicial Council declared that both sharia 
courts and notaries were prohibited from validating mortgage loans that included 
interest, as this is strictly prohibited under sharia law.286 Banks lost all cases that went 
to sharia courts.287 Another reason was that the sharia courts were unprepared to hear 
complicated cases, such as banking disputes. While the country experienced economic 
development in the 1960s, sharia courts continued to operate in their traditional way 
and the complexity and lengthiness of the court procedures made it too expensive for 
the banks to undertake litigations.288  
The position of the banks deteriorated during the financial crisis in the country in the 
1980s. Following the oil boom of the 1970s and early 1980s, many large governmental 
projects were financed by the banks. Banks became very attracted to financing such 
projects and some of the major international banks wanted to join in in order to benefit 
from this huge profitable opportunity, even though the banking system in the country 
was not a safe investment. This unusual movement in such an environment created a 
sense of danger. When the oil price started to drop in 1982, the government cut its 
spending dramatically, which had a serious effect on the governmental contractors. In 
turn, the contractors were unable to repay their loans, which then became bad loans for 
the banks. Suing the contractors was no solution, since interest would be eliminated by 
going to a sharia court. Instead, several contractors decided to sue the banks, claiming 
that the previous payments of interest to the banks were illegal, which the courts 
confirmed.289 Banks were in serious trouble and some of them went bankrupt.290 These 
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problems made it necessary to find alternative ways to settle banking disputes which led 
to the establishment of the Banking Dispute Committee (BDC), previously known as the 
Settlement of Banking Disputes. 
Before the establishment of the BDC in 1987, three different judiciary systems 
possessed jurisdiction over banking disputes: sharia courts as the general jurisdiction, 
the Commission for the Settlement of Commercial Disputes (CSCD) when no negotiable 
instruments were disputed and the Commercial Paper Committee (CPC) when the 
disputes include negotiable instruments.291 However, banking disputes made no 
progress and the situation became even more complicated. These committees, too, 
refused to enforce any interest on loans, as they applied Islamic law principles and, 
also, did not help to expedite the case procedures since they tended to operate as part-
time panels so some cases took years to settle.292 Moreover, the fact that CSCD and 
CPC were not the exclusive jurisdiction placed banks in a desperate position. They 
found themselves in cases involving three different courts and, even if the banks were 
successful in CSCD or CPC, debtors could still submit claims to the sharia court, 
refusing to recognise the jurisdiction of these committees.293  
In an attempt to solve the problem, the Ministry of Commerce, in its Resolution 
No.822 on December 1985, declared that all banking disputes should be referred to the 
Legal Committee within the ministry, which is the appellate committee for CPC.294 
However, the legality of this committee was questionable. Since it was established by a 
ministry resolution, some lawyers stressed that this resolution could not overtake the 
jurisdiction granted to CSCD and CPC by the Council of Ministers’ resolution, which is a 
higher authority.295 Nevertheless, the committee did not get a chance to work because 
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the government, shortly after this resolution, decided to solve the problem by creating a 
new body exclusively for settling banking disputes. 
3.6.3 The Establishment of Banking Disputes: Did it Solve the Problem? 
In its endeavour to stop the bad loans dilemma that had such a serious effect on the 
economy, the Council of Ministers issued Resolution No.729/8 in March 1987 to 
establish the Settlement of Banking Disputes Committee within SAMA, with exclusive 
jurisdiction over banking disputes.296 The resolution made it clear that the sharia courts 
and other committees must stop hearing banking disputes and transfer their current 
cases to the new committee in an attempt to solve the issue of the multitude of 
jurisdictions over this kind of disputes. Additionally, a circular was issued by the Minister 
of Justice demanding that all banking disputes that were pending in the sharia courts 
were transferred to the new committee.297 Other problems linked with banking disputes 
prior to the resolution was the enforcement of interest and judges’ expertise. These 
problems were considered by this committee. According to the resolution, the panel 
comprised three experts in the field of banking, who should solve the problem in 
“accordance with their signed agreements”, a phrase which implies that interest is 
enforceable. This was an attempt by the government to resolve the issue by avoiding 
the direct use of the word “interest”. However, the committee is not free of legal 
deficiencies, that raised concerns about the enforceability of its decision and even the 
exclusivity of its jurisdiction.  
It has been questioned whether this committee is an administrative or a  judicial 
body.298 The wording of the resolution fueled this argument. The committee, on the one 
hand, as established by the resolution, lacked a judicial character. Its name raised a 
question, as a “settlement” committee aimed to “settle” between parties rather than 
issue juidicially imposed decisions.299 According to the resolution, complaints should be 
sent to the Presidency of the Council of Ministers to obtain permission for the committee 
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to hear the case. Also, the resolution states that, if no settlement has been reached 
between the parties, the committee should send the case to the proper court, which 
would be either the Board of Grievances or the shaira court. The Committee’s 
Regulation, which was issued later, supported this view by indicating that the committee 
is not actually a court, like sharia courts or Board of Grievances.300 On the other hand, 
the resolution gave the committee the judicial power to decide against litigants, freeze 
their bank accounts, ban travel, or seize their assets as well as request the government 
agencies and banks to stop dealing with particular litigants. This was supported by the 
Ministry of the Interior, who requested that all of the governors of the Saudi provinces 
and all of their agencies should help to enforce the committee’s decisions.301 It was also 
argued that the settlement was not intended as understood since the committee had the 
power to enforce the decisions it took and, in practice, “imposed a solution even if it was 
refused by one of the parties or sometimes both of them”.302  
These arguments remained theoretical and did not threaten the banking industry, as 
banks could now pursue their customers to collect loans more confidently until some 
banking cases found their way to the Board of Grievances, which agreed to look at 
them. The Board of Grievances viewed the Settlement of Banking Disputes as an 
administrative body and built on that when deciding its cases. The board justified its 
view in some of the cases brought by banks’ customers and listed the reasons why the 
committee should not be regarded as a judicial body.303 First, the members of the 
committee are not judges since their appointment and employment hierarchy differ from 
those of judges. Second, unlike the judicial body, there is no appeal mechanism in this 
committee but a petition for the same committee to re-examine the case, a process that 
resembles the one related to administrative decisions, nor are there any known 
procedures or rules for litigation. Third, the committee is not independent but supervised 
by SAMA, which operates under the Ministry of Finance. Fourth, the resolution 
establishing the committee does not intend to establish a judicial body since the wording 
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of “Resolution” that establishes it does not give it its judicial status. Some of the phrases 
and words in the resolution that support this are “committee”, “settle the disputes”, “find 
the proper solutions”, and “satisfaction of the parties”, as well as stating that the case 
should be referred to the proper court if the committee cannot reach a satisfactory 
decision for one of the parties. Finally, even foreign jurisdictions viewed this body as an 
administrative one when the Egyptian Appalleate Court refused to enforce a 
committee’s decision, as it regarded this as an administrative one.  
Such decisions by the Board of Grievances ended the controversy about the status 
of the committee but, on the other hand, raised again the concern about the 
enforceability of interest loans. This time, the government acted more quickly, in order 
to escape any future crises. 
3.6.4 Banking Disputes Committee: The Re-Establishment 
Following the decisions of the Board of Grievances, that regarded the Settlement of 
Banking Disputes an administrative body, officials feared that the committee might fail to 
achieve the objectives for which it had been established because of the legal 
deficiencies that had been highlighted by the Board. Before these decisions became 
precedents, that might have ruined all of the efforts to enforce banking loans, the 
committee was re-established by a new Royal Resolution,304 that considers most of the 
legal deficiencies identified by the Board of Grievances. The new resolution aimed to 
reform the committee to become explicitly a judicial body so that neither sahria courts 
nor the Board of Grievances can intervene in banking disputes. The word “settlement” 
was removed from the name of the committee, which thereby became BDC, to avoid 
any misunderstanding regarding the status of the decisions it makes. The resolution 
also considers the appointment issue, making the members of the committee appointed 
by a royal order, like other judges. Finally, the resolution establishes an appellate body 
for the committee and allows all committee decisions to be appealed within 30 days. 
It is clear that the resolution was issued to address the same points that the Board of 
Grievances had listed as the reasons depriving the committee of its judicial status. The 
                                            




committee, after the new resolution, has become more eligilble to issue judicial 
decisions. However, the independence of this committee remains an issue, as it is still 
operating outside the two main judicial bodies in the country: the shaira courts and the 
Board of Grievances. In fact, it is implied in the resolution that BDC is supervised by the 
Ministry of Finance, as the resolution states that the committee should send its internal 
rules and regulations via the Minister of Finance to the king in order to be issued 
officially. Although the members of BDC are now appointed by a royal order issued by 
the king instead of SAMA, the new resolution does not give the committee full 
independence and so it remains subbordinate to the Ministry of Finance. Nonetheless, it 
is expected that the judicial system will, in some sense, adopt BDC in the future as 
officials have admitted that the fact that the quasi-judicial committees, including BDC, lie 
outside the judicial system is exceptional. As stated above, the government requested a 
comprehensive study to find solutions for those committees operating outside the 
judicial system in the country. 
While the Islamic banks struggled to be recognised by the banking laws in the 
country, it seems that the conventional banks also had difficulties with the judicial 
system regarding the enforcement of interest loans. This issue has faced various legal 
challenges within the Islamic judicial system in the country. The attitude of Islamic law 
towards interest cannot be changed so the government took various actions, in an 
attempt to ensure that banking disputes can be adopted under the judicial system 
without obstacles, which eventually resulted in BDC. Yet, this is only a reconciliation 
effort by the government to enforce interest, which sharia courts refuse to recognise. 
Banking disputes have not been fully adopted within the judicial system and so 
challenges to BDC might arise in the future.  
3.7 Conclusion 
Referring to the case of Islamic banking in Saudi Arabia, this chapter argues for the 
need for a different regulatory system to control the Islamic banking industry. This need 
rests on the special transactions that Islamic banks use which require different 
prudential requirements, have greater risk, and involve actions that are not always 




compliance with sharia place more emphasis on regulating and controlling this 
important practice since the absence of such regulation harms the Islamic banking 
industry. This provides a ground for discussing the need to restructure the SSB and the 
framework of sharia supervision in the following chapters.  
Examining the case of Saudi Arabia, whose banking system developed only 
relatively recently due to the absence of a resilient political system in the region, the 
endeavour of banking regulation was challenging for the government. On the one hand, 
the entire banking system worldwide is based on interest-based loans. On the other 
hand, Islamic law, which strictly prohibits interest, is the country’s main legal source. To 
thrive economically and benefit from its oil resources, the country required a strong 
banking system, which led it to adopt a similar banking system to the rest of the world, a 
situation that made conflict with Islamic law inevitable and created a paradox. First, 
Islamic banks and their special services and requirements lack legal recognition and, 
secondly, the enforcing of interest-based loans by the conventional banks poses a 
challenge. The latter problem is solved by either a judicial reform that adopts the 
enforcment of conventional loans or by converting the entire banking system into an 










Chapter Four: The Roles of the Sharia Supervisory Board and the Corporate 
Governance Structure  
4.1 Introduction 
While the SSB is seen as an important tool in the context of sharia governance, its 
framework is still unique to corporate governance. Unlike certain other mechanisms of 
sharia governance, the SSB, so far, has not been easily adopted within the corporate 
governance structure. For example, the internal sharia department fits perfectly, as 
AAOIFI suggests, within either the internal audit department or as a separate unit with 
an equivalent authority and accountability framework to that of the internal audit 
department.305 Therefore, an internal sharia audit department can be smoothly inserted 
into a company without shaking its governance structure. This is not the case for the 
SSB, whose current structure, arguably, could not be matched by any corporate 
governance mechanism. Therefore, it does not have, to date, a standardised model in 
the industry and is not legally well-recognised, although it performs a vital role in sharia 
governance. As a result, the SSB is peculiar to the corporate governance framework, so 
it is important to identify the functions of the SSB in order to analyse how they could fit 
as governance tools. In this regard, it is helpful to conduct analogical comparisons with 
the roles of other well-structured corporate governance mechanisms whose objectives 
are similar to those of SSBs. This chapter compares the functions of the SSB with both 
the board of directors and gatekeepers, especially the external auditors. This 
comparison will form a basis for addressing other issues in the following chapters that 
will help the SSB to be recognised in the modern corporate governance structure and 
increase the efficiency of the sharia supervision practice.   
4.2 The SSB: The Emergence of the Concept 
Due to the prohibition of interest in Islam and restriction being placed on Islamic 
banks from using the traditional method of financing ventures, they utilise sharia 
principles to innovate, develop and improve sharia compliant products. This approach of 
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finance requires banks to recruit and consider sharia as a new skill for dealing with the 
requirements and principles of the Islamic law of transactions. Therefore, sharia experts 
are recruited at different levels of banks to undertake the supervision, management and 
auditing of transactions in order to ensure compliance with sharia. The SSB is the most 
important mechanism used by the bank in this regard.  
However, the idea of the SSB did not emerge simultaneously with the advent of 
Islamic banks. Early Islamic banks, such as Mit Ghamr and Nasser Social Bank, in the 
1960s and 1970s, did not have SSBs or any formal sharia counselling.306 Similarly, IDB 
and Dubai Islamic Bank were established initially without SSBs. The banks themselves 
applied the principles of sharia to their transactions without forming an official 
relationship with sharia scholars. Later, a relationship with sharia scholars was 
developed by inviting them to act as consultants regarding their activities and 
transactions as well as seeking fatwas on specific issues.307 This marked the beginning 
of this new relationship between sharia scholars and the financial institutions, which 
later resulted in the first formal SSB in 1976, in the Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt, which 
set a trend for the other Islamic banks that followed.308  
During this period of a lack of, or limited, relationship between Islamic banks and 
sharia scholars, there was no record of sharia violations.309 This should not lead us to 
downplay the role of SSBs in Islamic banks nowadays. Instead, it shows the simplicity 
of the transactions that the Islamic banks were engaged in at that time, which was later 
developed from financing modest, basic agricultural projects to complex commercial 
ones. At some point, the banks realised that the basic analysis of sharia principles by 
non-experts would be insufficient, so they sought more advice from sharia scholars to 
ensure sharia compliance. Then, sharia consultants developed into their current form as 
a board. 
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The effort to institutionalise the SSB was led by three leading financial institutions: 
Dar Al-Maal Al-Islami in Geneva, Switzerland; Kuwait Finance House in Kuwait; and 
Dallah Al Baraka Group in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. These banks developed the notion of 
the SSB as we know it today.310 It should be noted that IFIs use different names and 
titles for SSBs, which include: 
• Sharia supervisory committee 
• Sharia council 
• Sharia board 
• Fatwa and sharia supervisory board 
• Sharia control committee 
• Religious board 
• Sharia committee 
• Sharia advisory council 
 
SSB, however, is the most common title employed in the Islamic finance industry 
and has been adopted by the most prominent Islamic financial organisations, such as 
AAOIFI and IFSB.311 
The definitions of the SSB can be categorised into two types. While some tend to 
describe the body and its entrusted roles and procedures that it actually fulfils in 
practice, others prefer definitions that disregard its structure and they focus on sharia 
supervision as the objective of SSBs.312 The first approach is the most common. It is 
adopted in the literature and by organisations like AAOIFI and IFSB. AAOIFI defines the 
SSB as “an independent body of specialised jurists in fiqh al-mua’malat (Islamic 
commercial jurisprudence)…entrusted with the duty of directing, reviewing and 
supervising the activities of the Islamic financial institution in order to ensure that they 
                                            
310 Yahia Abdul-Rahman, The Art of RF (Riba-Free) Islamic Banking and Finance: Tools and Techniques 
for Community-Based Banking (John Wiley & Sons Inc 2014) at 90-91  
311 Ginena and Hamid, Foundations of Shari'ah Governance of Islamic Banks (n 134) at 252-253 
312 Riyadh Al-Khalifi, 'The General Theory of Sharia Boards' (2003) (Third Annual Conference of AAOIFI 




are in compliance with Shari’a Rules and Principles”.313 This definition is widely adopted 
in much of the recent literature.314 Garas and Pierce adopt a similar approach, defining 
the SSB as “a panel of shari’a scholars and experts of Islamic finance industry that 
starts with the IFI’s inception and continues with the IFI to ensure that all the 
incorporation documents, internal policy and activities are in compliance with shair’a”.315 
While these definitions focus on the role of the body, IFSB’s definition, adopted by some 
of the literature,316 describes the body more generally as “a panel of sharia scholars 
acting as special advisers to the institutions”.317 
The other approach focuses on the objective of the body; namely, sharia 
supervision. Based on this, sharia supervision may be defined as “the preventive, 
remedial and complementary process of control, review and analysis of all the IFI’s 
activities, products, contracts and transactions starting from the incorporation of the IFI 
onwards to ensure compliance with Islamic shari’a for the purpose of generating 
legitimate profits (halal) and improving in the IFI’s performance”.318 A more specific 
definition of sharia supervision is provided by DeLorenzo, who defines it as “the process 
of ensuring that a financial product or service complies with Islamic legal precepts and 
principles either by its conforming, to one degree or another, to a recognised Islamic 
legal norm or by its not violating the same”.319 Although sharia supervision is not 
exclusive to SSBs because of the other mechanisms of sharia governance which share 
the same objective, the SSB is considered the cornerstone and sometimes the ultimate 
source and authority of sharia supervision, since all other arrangements of this 
phenomenon, in one way or another, are linked or referred to it.  
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Defining the SSB by describing its objective, sharia supervision, and how it should 
be practised is more consistent with, and better serves, the aims and purpose of this 
research. Instead of looking at the SSB as an inevitable body that each Islamic bank 
must have in order to ensure sharia compliance, the research focuses on its objectives 
and whether these could be more effectively achieved through other arrangements. The 
SSB itself is merely a tool for sharia supervision, which could be undertaken by other 
mechanisms if these are deemed more effective. This includes a central SSB and 
sharia firms which should receive more attention as potential alternatives to the SSB. 
4.3 Importance of the SSB 
The SSB is a main pillar of sharia governance. It has been seen as a main factor in 
determining whether a bank is Islamic or not,320 and is a prerequisite for admission into 
the International Association of Islamic Banks (IAIB).321 Therefore, the importance of the 
SSB is built on sharia governance’s importance and has the same justifications for its 
significance. More specifically, the SSB gains its importance from different perspectives. 
Sharia expertise is an obvious aspect of SSB’s importance. Managers have neither 
the sharia knowledge nor the time to acquire it so they need sharia experts to decide on 
sharia-compliance matters, especially given that financial products are developing 
quickly and require continuous sharia consultation.322 They have become more complex 
and require dedicated experts to decide on sharia-compliance matters, which resembles 
the need for lawyers in the finance industry.323 The objective of Islamic banks could not 
be achieved without the committed involvement of sharia scholars in the sector.324 
Economically, the SSB plays a significant role. It is highly feasible for Islamic banks 
to have SSBs. First and foremost, the interest of the stakeholders in having sharia-
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compliant investment products is well preserved by having an SSB.325 It is the most 
important tool for ensuring sharia compliance and a source of confidence and trust for 
stakeholders in this regard. “The integrity of IFIs greatly depends on the status of 
shari’ah compliance, its impact of products, professional competence, and behavior 
towards, and observance of, shari’ah norms. The shari’ah board thus plays a 
fundamental role in ensuring and enhancing the credibility of IFIs”.326  
Moreover, the SSB, despite its associated cost, can save the institution the 
significant expenses that may occur as a result of violating sharia.327 Sharia risk is a big 
concern for IFIs and can threaten their financial status. An effective, high-performing 
SSB can significantly reduce the sharia-compliance risk and is, to date, the best way 
that IFIs have found to deal with it.328 In fact, a well-performing SSB can facilitate and 
increase the profits.329 In addition to the previous benefits, which contribute 
considerably to the financial reports of IFIs, SSBs play an important indirect role in 
marketing. The members of SSBs have a strong social power which, itself, fuels 
confidence and attracts more investors and clients.330 Also, the members can 
participate in various events and justify why the products they have designed or 
approved are compliant.331 
Furthermore, the SSB brings an additional benefit to the economy by creating and 
inventing new financial models and products which enrich and empower the financial 
industry.332 
The SSB is seen as an effective tool for promoting ethics. One of the impacts of the 
SSB on banks is that sharia is emphasised in their systems and policies, which would 
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promote the moral behaviour of these banks and their employees.333 This strong 
adherence to the Islamic moral code can counterbalance the incentive problems arising 
from asymmetric information and moral hazard.334 Moreover, the SSB maintains and 
promotes corporate social responsibility (CSR), which is reinforced by the nature of its 
roles, and researchers have found a positive relationship between the existence and 
size of the SSB and CSR.335  This is because Islamic banks would be under pressure 
from SSBs to be involved in and disclose more social and charitable activities. “The 
nature of compliance with Islamic laws and principles from an Islamic point of view 
entails not only assurance of compliance through issuing the Shari’ah report, but also 
greater involvement in CSR activities including CSR disclosures”.336 Additionally, the 
paying of zakat by corporations to eligible people or projects is a responsibility of SSBs, 
to ensure that they fulfil a significant requirement of the social responsibility of these 
corporations.337 From the Islamic point of view, CSR is also enhanced by banning 
certain activities that are harmful to society. The duty of the SSB in ensuring that the 
institution does not invest in or facilitate investments or businesses related to gambling, 
alcohol or tobacco supports this view.338 
The final perspective of SSB’s importance is related to the concept of wisdom which 
is a recent notion in the business field that combines knowledge with morality, ethics, 
soundness of judgment, social and environmental considerations, and right and wrong 
perspectives.339 “Managerial wisdom” is an important aspect of management, which 
managers should consider, as many corporate failures have been caused by unwise 
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decisions.340 A wise corporation is the one that is committed to promoting ethical 
behaviour, trust, loyalty, transparency and respect for stakeholders by having wise 
management at all levels, especially its board of directors, which establishes wise 
strategies implemented by wise leaders.341 In light of this concept, the SSB brings to the 
institution much value which is the reason why many customers and investors choose 
the institution. These include: transparency, trust, ethical behaviour, credibility, as well 
as the philosophy, values and beliefs underlying Islam, ethics and morality.342 The SSB 
not only transfers the knowledge but also the Islamic wisdom that drives the operations 
and actions of the bank and, more importantly, increases the stakeholders’ trust in the 
institution.343 
4.4 The Nature of the SSB Roles 
The main objective for the SSB is to establish a satisfactory level of confidence 
among the stakeholders that the institution is acting in compliance with sharia principles 
in its contracts, services provided and other transactions. To achieve this objective, the 
SSB has various roles and responsibilities which cover a wide area, including: contracts 
and transactions, policies, internal rules and ethical standards and codes.344 For 
example, AAOIFI assigns the SSB the duty of “directing, reviewing and supervising the 
activities of Islamic financial institutions”.345 These duties are very broad and involve a 
wide range of different activities.  
IFSB classifies these duties in chronological order as ex-ante and ex-post, where the 
former takes place at the product design and development stage which includes the 
issuance of fatwa or sharia standards and the compliance check before it is introduced 
to the customers and the latter takes place after products have been offered to 
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customers, which includes a sharia review and sharia reporting.346 Some of the 
literature adds an in-between or intermediate range of the SSB roles, which covers their 
responsibilities during the product offering stage.347 This includes addressing the issues 
arising from the implementation of sharia as well as sharia consultations in unforeseen 
situations due to regulatory requirements or customer needs.348  
Instead of the chronological category, some of the literature classifies the SSB roles 
based on their nature which are divided into either advisory, also known as consultation, 
and supervisory,349 or into advisory, compliance, sometimes known as certification, and 
audit.350 Addressing the nature of SSBs’ roles is consistent with the aim of this chapter, 
which is to provide an analysis of how efficiently these different SSB duties are being 
assigned. While the exact SSB roles vary, depending on the jurisdiction, the three main 
roles that the SSB is often responsible for are legislation, consultation and auditing. It is 
important to note that jurisdictions vary regarding the extent to which SSBs perform 
these roles. While SSBs in Saudi Arabia are exclusively responsible for these duties, 
other arrangements, such as national, or centralised, SSBs, have been established in 
certain jurisdictions to remove, to differing extents, some of these responsibilities. Such 
arrangements will be further analysed but, first, the roles of the SSB will be explained.   
The SSB plays a very important role regarding legislation for IFIs, which includes the 
issuance of fatwas and sharia policy standards. In this context, the term “legislation” is 
used to refer to sharia rule-making and this term is used because the SSB, in setting 
sharia standards, acts as a legislative authority. In the absence of a detailed code of 
Islamic financial contracts, the SSB is entrusted with the interpretation of sharia and, 
therefore, it is the duty of the SSB to issue fatwas or religious decisions that legislate 
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the IFIs’ transactions before they are provided.351 These decisions are set up as the 
sharia standards for the bank and cover sharia matters with regard to all of its 
transactions, services and procedures.352 Through being the ultimate source of sharia, 
some SSBs play an arbitrator role in resolving any disputes that may arise between the 
bank and its clients regarding contracts, a role which sometimes is clearly assigned by 
the bank to its SSB.353 In addition, some SSBs are entrusted with educating the public 
about sharia matters regarding Islamic finance.354 This is similar to the role of the 
regulatory authorities in educating the public on the matters subject to their regulation. 
The advisory or consultation task is a big component of the SSBs’ role. This type of 
duty includes all of the SSB tasks related to assisting the management to comply with 
the sharia policy and standards that are established nationally, if any, and/or by the SSB 
itself. SSBs are responsible for approving products, contracts and services before they 
are offered.355 This is to verify compliance with the sharia standards. The SSB 
scrutinises the proposals of these transactions to provide a sharia decision and make 
any necessary amendments.356 This task is advisory because the management in this 
process basically consults the SSB on whether these are compliant with the sharia 
standards or not. It resembles the advisory task for lawyers regarding whether a specific 
transaction is legal or not. It is also similar to the non-audit services provided by audit 
firms to assist corporations to comply with accounting and auditing standards. The 
SSBs’ advisory role includes engaging in discussions with product developers to issue 
guidelines and opinions and suggest ways and methods for modelling a sharia-based 
product to help to mitigate the sharia risk.357 This includes consultation on contract 
forms, a procedural manual for transactions, services and the innovation of new 
products.358 The SSB is also consulted by the management during the implementation 
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stage in the case of ambiguity regarding some aspect of sharia.359 Advice is also sought 
from SSBs regarding the calculation of zakat, together with the disposal of non-sharia 
investments and distribution between the shareholders and IAHs.360 The SSB has the 
responsibility for training and guiding the management on how to apply sharia standards 
to daily transactions.361 This includes conducting and structuring training programs, 
seminars and symposia to inform the management, staff and stakeholders about sharia 
rulings directly related to their work.362    
The auditing role takes place after the products have been offered to test their level 
of compliance with the sharia standards. It aims to ensure that all of the services offered 
by the institutions comply with the requirements laid down by the SSB.363 The SSB 
reviews and audits the procedures for implementing new products and the IFI’s financial 
statements to verify sharia compliance.364 Then, the SSB issues a report of sharia 
certification, which usually forms an integral part of the institution’s annual report.365 
According to AAOIFI, “shari’a review is an examination of the extent of an IFI’s 
compliance, in all its activities, with the shari’a. This examination includes contracts, 
agreements, policies, products, transactions, memorandum and articles of association, 
financial statements, reports (especially internal audit and central bank inspection), 
circulars, etc”.366 In addition to the areas mentioned in the definition, sharia audit 
extends also to the information technology application system to support the banking 
operations, the organisational structure, and the marketing initiatives undertaken by 
IFIs.367 To ensure further compliance with sharia, the SSB should have a high level of 
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authority. Although the general rule is that the SSB has no executive role or authority, 
intervention may occur if decisions taken by the directors could breach sharia and 
jeopardise the Islamic character of the bank.368 This executive authority may include the 
authority to request board of directors’ meetings and non-regular general assembly 
meetings (shareholder meetings) and suspend or cancel any non-compliant actions.369 
A question arises here regarding the type of audit for which the SSB is responsible - 
internal or external. Normally, IFIs establish internal review/audit departments to 
perform the task of internal auditing to assess compliance with the SSB rules and 
standards as well as assisting the SSB to perform its research, training program and 
auditing duties.370 AOOIFI recommends that this task should be carried out by either the 
internal audit department within the IFI or a separate sharia unit but, above all, that it 
should be independent and report directly to the board of directors.371 Nevertheless, this 
unit is limited to an internal review and audit role while the ultimate source of this task is 
usually supervised by the SSBs.372 In addition, SSBs are presumed to carry out the role 
of external auditor.373 
Generally, the roles listed above are the main ones with which SSBs are entrusted. 
In fact, institutions need these roles to be carried out in order to promote themselves as 
Islamic. There is a need for a legislative authority to act as the legal and ultimate source 
of sharia rules, assist with the continuous and accurate implementation of these rules 
and, finally, obtain a report verifying compliance with them. The SSB is a tool that was 
established to satisfy all of these requirements and assure the stakeholders of sharia-
compliance. Therefore, the establishment of an SSB as a legitimate control body is 
perceived as vital for IFIs.374 However, this body might be an unsuitable tool for the 
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nature of the roles it performs which might be better served by more effective ones, an 
issue that is analysed throughout the remainder of the thesis.    
4.5 The Enforceability of the SSB’s Decisions 
An issue related to the nature of the SSBs’ roles is whether their decisions are 
advisory or binding on the board of directors. The nature of religious decisions, or 
fatwas, as non-binding decisions, as will be explained, could have an impact on this 
issue. The consequence of fatwas being non-binding is that people, or institutions, 
should not be forced to adhere to them. Considering this fact, the SSB’s decisions, as 
merely fatwas, would be unenforceable so other mechanisms of compliance should be 
applied more strictly to offset this disadvantage.375 
Muneeza and Hassan argue strongly for the necessity of the SSB’s decisions to be 
binding in order for a real difference to exist between Islamic and conventional banks.376 
Otherwise, an SSB would be both a waste of time and a deceptive tool in relation to the 
IFIs’ stakeholders, who think that the board of directors honours the SSBs’ decisions. 
An SSB’s decisions are enforced either by a regulatory authority and law or through 
self-enforcement by the IFI itself.377 Some even argue that an SSB’s decision should be 
considered as equally binding as a judicial one.378 On the other hand, some support the 
non-binding nature of SSBs’ decisions and suggest that SSBs should only highlight 
different ways and alternatives to solving situations where there is a lack of compliance 
with sharia, and the final decision should be left to the board of directors.379 
These contradictory views on the nature of the SSB’s roles have a strong effect on 
the SSB’s authority within the bank. By making binding decisions, the SSB would have 
an influence on the management decisions which could be overturned if the SSB 
believes that those decisions contradict sharia. On these occasions, the authority given 
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to the SSB overcomes the authority of the board of directors. While this high level of 
authority is seen as a sharia governance tool for ensuring sharia compliance, it might be 
legally challenged in some jurisdictions, which makes any interference with the role of 
the management illegal. For example, the regulations of the Financial Conduct Authority 
in the UK (FCA) suggest that the SSB roles may not interfere with the management of 
the firm and, therefore, should be purely advisory in nature.380 Therefore, the advisory 
nature of an SSB’s decisions is sometimes adopted as a legal requirement. This means 
that the SSB can only provide instructions and consultations in sharia-compliance 
matters but its decisions are not enforceable when it comes to the management of the 
bank. Alternatively, SSBs may provide different sharia-compliance options from which 
the management may choose. However, the absence of other sharia governance 
mechanisms may raise a compliance concern as well as a question regarding whether 
the management can reject the SSB’s decision and proceed with transactions that are 
viewed as sharia non-compliant.   
In fact, the argument about the enforceability of an SSB’s decisions is a result of 
combining roles with different natures, some of which need an enforcement power, such 
as legislation, and some of which do not, such as advisory. Assigning these duties to a 
single body, the SSB, has resulted in ambiguity and confusion regarding how to 
categorise and regard its decisions. As inferred from the name, the advisory role is not 
binding. Thus, to ensure sharia-compliance, the SSB should supply different sharia-
compliant alternatives to the management which can then make a final selection from 
among these. Those who place stress on the enforceability of an SSB’s decisions look 
only at the legislative and auditing aspects of its roles. Surely it is necessary to force 
IFIs to comply with sharia rules and standards or, otherwise, all sharia governance 
mechanisms would be pointless. However, it might be difficult for corporate governance 
to adopt the structure of an SSB as an internal body with such enforcement authority. 
The regulatory frameworks have so far been unsuccessful in establishing a clear 
structure of sharia supervision and removing this confusion about the authority of SSBs. 
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4.6 The SSB Roles and the Need for a Clear Governance Framework  
The three types of roles performed by SSBs are essential for the Islamic finance 
industry. Regulators of the industry should take into account that these roles, especially 
legislation and auditing, require a high volume of independence and objectivity which 
should be crucial elements to consider. Otherwise, the industry will be susceptible to 
failure due to the lack of confidence that a product is sharia-compliant.381 A lack of 
independence has been identified as a challenge that may constrain the ability of SSBs 
effectively to fulfil their responsibilities.382 Economically, the profitability of IFIs depends 
on the public trust regarding their compliance with sharia, which mainly rests upon their 
confidence regarding SSBs’ independence.383 Therefore, the governance structure 
should consider the level of independence and the issue of conflict of interests among 
SSB members.384 Yet, the legal recognition of SSBs does not reflect this importance. 
The frameworks of SSBs are insufficiently developed to establish a standardised 
practice of sharia supervision with clear roles for SSBs, and the industry lacks 
standards that clearly define how SSBs should perform their tasks. SSB members have 
different scopes of work and duties in different institutions. This ambiguity regarding the 
duties and scope related to SSBs’ tasks is a bad governance practice which has a 
negative effect on sharia-compliance.385 The absence of a widely-agreed professional 
code, which includes standards and procedures regarding how SSBs should perform 
their roles, negatively affects their performance.386 Adopting a clear definition of the 
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roles and responsibilities of SSBs would improve the practice of sharia supervision by 
enhancing its credibility and independence.387  
The current legal recognition of the SSB varies across different jurisdictions. They 
adopt different sharia governance frameworks, a situation that adds ambiguity to its 
roles. While some jurisdictions have developed comprehensive sharia governance 
frameworks at both the national and institutional levels, others adopt sharia governance 
frameworks only at the institutional level. Some jurisdictions, however, prefer not to 
regulate the practice of sharia supervision and leave this instead to IFIs’ voluntary 
initiatives or market influence.388 More specifically, the SSB operates under four 
different sharia governance models.389 First, the SSB is required only at the IFIs’ level, 
where each IFI establishes its own SSB according to the national legal requirements to 
serve as the higher legal authority in regard to sharia matters. Second, some 
jurisdictions establish a central SSB within the central bank in addition to the required 
SSBs in IFIs. To different extents, the central SSB performs supervisory and regulatory 
roles over the internal SSBs whose legislative role is limited to interpreting the central 
SSB’s guidance. Similar to this framework, the third model has a central SSB in addition 
to internal SSBs but is not linked to the central bank. The fourth model is the market-
driven SSB, where there is no legal requirement to establish an SSB at any level but 
IFIs choose to do so due to the industry practices, norms, and market demands.  
This level of variations in the legal recognition contributes to the uncertainty 
regarding the roles of SSBs. The legal status of SSBs ranges from a legal requirement 
by a national law to merely a contract between the board of directors and SSB 
members.390 Therefore, the position and role of the SSB within the sharia governance 
framework has not yet been clarified and does not reflect the significant role that sharia 
supervision performs. While the roles are specified in the contracts or internal rules of 
IFIs in certain jurisdictions, the framework for these roles is identified by national 
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regulations in other jurisdictions. As a result, the SSB has different expectations 
regarding its roles, ranging from being the highest authority in sharia matters to being 
merely sharia advisors.  
In some of these models, the SSB may not be the only tool for sharia supervision as 
some jurisdictions might establish additional tools for sharia governance which serve 
similar objectives to the SSB. Where these tools, such as a central SSB and sharia 
firms, co-exist, they remove some of the SSB’s responsibilities. If they are standardised 
and regulated, these tools could be as valuable to a sharia governance framework as 
an SSB and may even replace it.391 Otherwise, the functions of these multiple tools of 
sharia supervision may overlap and increase the vagueness of the situation.  
Uncertainty about the SSB’s roles may exist even within the same model of 
governance. Although the second model of the SSB has become a common 
governance framework and a solution for jurisdictions seeking to advance their legal 
recognition of Islamic finance,392 there remain differences in the framework within the 
same model. The extent and scope of the central SSB supervision vary significantly and 
do not establish a well-standardised practice of sharia supervision.393 Moreover, while 
the SSB’s role of auditing is consistent with its objective of ensuring sharia-compliance, 
regulators appear reluctant to assign this role clearly to SSBs. Recently, some 
jurisdictions have required IFIs to appoint external sharia auditors. This requirement 
raises a question about how the SSB is viewed by the regulators. In fact, the variation in 
terms of requiring an external audit reflects a different perception of the real objective of 
SSBs and contributes to the confusion about their audit role.394  
Even the academic literature appears confused about the roles of SSBs. Different 
classifications of SSB’s roles have been identified by different researchers. In their 
survey, Garas and Pierce identify six different classifications of SSB’s roles.395 Although 
these different classifications do not necessarily indicate significant differences between 
                                            
391 These tools will be discussed in the following chapters. 
392 Recent regulations, such as Oman and UAE, tend to adopt this model which has been in effect in 
Malaysia, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Sudan. 
393 More about the role of standardisation in central SSBs will be discussed in the next chapter. 
394 The SSB and the audit role will be discussed in Chapter Six. 




the SSB’s duties, they show the different perceptions of the nature of these tasks which 
relate to the level of ambiguity and uncertainty surrounding these roles. 
The scope of the SSB’s role is also ambiguous. The different names for “SSB”, 
which refer to different meanings, prompt different expectations and perceptions of the 
nature of the SSB’s roles. Such a situation negatively affects the performance of SSBs 
and contributes to their lack of independence.396 In practice, it is indicated that the SSB 
is not, in some cases, an effective tool for sharia governance, due to certain limitations. 
Although its task should ensure compliance across all products and transactions of the 
institutions, its authority is restricted to several issues, presented to it by the 
management or board of directors.397 Put differently, the management can control the 
scope of the SSB’s task. While the SSB can intervene outside this scope if it discovers 
any sharia violation, this intervention is not well-governed to ensure sustainability.  
Alkhamees attributes the ambiguity of the SSB’s role to three factors.398 First, SSBs 
have experienced different phases of development in recent history, from being merely 
a marketing tool to promoting the ideology of Islamic finance through performing sharia 
supervision in a less formal way in a non-institutional style to becoming fully 
institutionalised. Second, the scope and extent of SSB supervision differ due to the 
existence of different levels of IFIs which range from a fully-fledged Islamic bank, 
gradually converting, or one that only provides Islamic products in limited windows or as 
additional services. Finally, sharia supervision is not recognised as an independent 
profession in many jurisdictions whereas the legal status of the SSBs’ roles in the few 
jurisdictions recognising the profession of sharia supervision is insufficient to resolve the 
ambiguity.  
Clarifying the roles and responsibilities of the SSB would help the global banking 
industry to understand the practice of sharia supervision. The governance structure of 
this practice is still new and largely unknown in the conventional banking industry. SSBs 
                                            
396 Elqari, 'The Independence of Sharia Boards' (n 383) at 12-13; Umar, 'SSB's Roles between Individual 
Advisory and institutional Profession' (n 386) at 11 
397 Ahmad Al-Saad, 'The Effect of Sharia Supervision on Islamic Finance' (2005) (Third International 
Conference on Islamic Economics) at 12, 22-23 
398 Alkhamees, 'The Impact of Shari’ah Governance Practices on Shari’ah Compliance in Contemporary 




may cut across the responsibilities of the board of directors and/or management in order 
to perform their job.399 The intervention of SSB members, as non-bankers, in banking-
type decisions is somewhat confusing and might be difficult for the regulators to 
understand.400 For this reason, the existence of an SSB in the governance structure 
might be unwelcome unless its roles and position within the governance structure are 
certain and clear. It is necessary to draw a line between the different responsibilities and 
prevent any potential overlapping duties with the management which might affect 
performance or create some intra-bank tension. Also, investors will become confused 
over these multiple frameworks that significantly vary, although they aim to achieve the 
same objectives. This reflects the immaturity in the practice of the SSB compared to 
other roles, such as auditors, lawyers and directors, which have high levels of 
consistency all over the world with few differences, which do not lead to the same 
confusion as associated with SSBs.  
While it is true that IFIs require additional governance mechanisms to ensure sharia 
supervision, the common response to this requirement, by basically creating SSBs, 
might not be ideal. Despite the importance of SSBs’ roles, squeezing a new body into 
the structure of the IFIs to carry out these additional roles may not be the best solution. 
Instead, these roles need to be smoothly injected into robust governance structures in 
order to achieve efficient sharia supervision. The objectives of the SSBs could be 
achieved through using other well-structured tools rather than creating a completely 
new one. To examine this possibility, the similarities and differences between the roles 
and objectives of SSBs and both the board of directors and gatekeepers should be 
analysed.   
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4.7 The SSB and the Board of Directors 
4.7.1 The Board of Directors under Corporate Governance 
The board of directors is critical to the framework of corporate governance. The 
theories focus on the structure, roles, representation and accountability of the board and 
the obvious reason for that is the importance it has as the highest layer of management 
and the heart of the company, whose performance substantially depends on it. Due to 
being a “control mechanism to monitor the powers exerted by the company’s 
managers”401, the board of directors requires an effective framework. This is considered 
as one of the main issues in corporate governance, as it deals with the most important 
mechanism of monitoring the company.  
Many issues regarding the board of directors are discussed in detail under corporate 
governance. The principles of corporate governance have an impact on the framework 
of the accountability, structure, composition, duties and authorities of the board. 
Nordberg categorises the issue of the board of directors discussed within the corporate 
governance into five types.402 First, there are issues within the board which include its 
roles, responsibilities and organisation. Second, there are issues that exist between the 
board and senior managers and which concern, mainly, the agency problem and how 
executives should be remunerated and monitored. Third, there are issues between the 
board and shareholders which highlight the rights of shareholders to monitor and 
nominate directors. The fourth type discusses the power and balances of the board to 
offer a fair representation of the different interests of the various owners. Finally, 
corporate governance explores the responsibility of the board, as a representative of the 
corporation, regarding the different types of stakeholders. 
In an effort to ensure high performance, different corporate governance frameworks 
adopt various approaches to these issues. One of the major differences between the 
board’s structure in different countries is the model of board adopted: unitary or dual. In 
the Anglo-Saxon style of corporate governance, it is common, and mostly required to 
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have a one-tier board which comprises both executive and non-executive directors 
appointed by shareholders and responsible for all aspects of the company’s activities. 
Adopted in countries such as Germany, China and Norway, the two-tier board system 
separates the management and control by having two distinct boards: supervisory and 
management. The supervisory board consists of only the equivalent of non-executive 
directors appointed by shareholders and sometimes the other stakeholder 
representatives, such as trade unions or employee representatives. Its responsibility is 
to supervise, monitor and oversee the management board and take strategic decisions. 
Consisting usually of executives appointed by the supervisory board and chaired by the 
CEO, the management board is responsible for operating and running the day-to-day 
business of the company.403  
As one of the main issues within corporate governance, the board of directors and 
its roles have been well-developed both theoretically and in practice. Its legal framework 
has been clearly defined in commercial regulations and corporate governance codes. 
Under this framework, non-executives’ representation on the board and the issue of 
independence are significantly considered to ensure that the body is able to represent 
the stakeholders’ interests objectively. From a governance perspective, the SSB might 
share similar objectives to the board of directors. While the board of directors aims to 
protect, principally, the economic interests of the stakeholders, the SSB reassures the 
religious concerns of the stakeholders. In addition, the board of directors and the SSB, 
in some practices, share similar characteristics in that they are appointed by 
shareholders. These similarities might raise the issue of the consideration of the SSB as 
a board of directors to help to adopt the body within the corporate structure. To examine 
this consideration, the link between the roles of both boards is analysed below. 
4.7.2 The SSB and the Roles of the Board of Directors  
Generally, the board of directors is responsible for determining the company’s aims, 
strategies, plans, and policies; monitoring the company’s progress in achieving those 
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aims as well as the board performance collectively and individually as members; and 
appointing the management.404 
OECD identifies the major roles of the board of directors, which include the 
following:  
• Reviewing and guiding the corporate strategy, plans, policies and procedures; 
setting performance objectives; monitoring implementation and corporate 
performance; and overseeing major expenditure. 
• Monitoring the effectiveness of the company’s governance practices. 
• Appointing and replacing the key executives of the company and their 
remunerations. 
• Setting a remuneration policy that guarantees the long term interest of the 
company and its shareholders. 
• Ensuring a formal and transparent board nomination and election process. 
• Managing potential conflict of interests among the management, board 
members and shareholders. 
• Ensuring the integrity of the corporation’s accounting and financial reporting 
systems. 
• Overseeing the process of disclosure and communications.405 
 
Johnson et al. classify the responsibilities of the board of directors into three types: 
control, service and resource dependence.406 The first role involves controlling the 
management, which includes hiring and dismissal, determining the executives’ pay, and 
ensuring that the management does not expropriate the stakeholders’ interests. The 
service role entails advising the top management as well as drawing up the 
corporation’s strategy. The final responsibility of the board of directors is providing 
resources critical to the corporation’s success. The resource dependence role is based 
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on Pfeffer’s view of the “board as an instrument for dealing with important external 
organisations, by putting representatives of these institutions on the board”.407 Under 
this view, directors serve effectively to reduce the uncertainty resulting from external 
dealings as well as provide valuable resources, such as information, skills, access to 
more key constituents and legitimacy.408 
While the service role involves, besides advising, setting the corporation’s goals and 
strategic directions, Nicholson and Kiel argue that the role of strategising should be a 
separate responsibility because it is usually perceived by the board itself or by the 
modern regulations to be one of the board’s substantial roles.409 In addition, they argue, 
that the strategic policies set up by the board have a considerable effect on the firm’s 
performance, which is one of the board’s responsibility. 
Similarities between the SSB and the board of directors have been noted by several 
researchers. In light of these categories, Nathan and Ribiere argue that, apart from the 
planning and strategising role, the SSB has the same roles as the board of directors but 
to a narrower extent.410 Based on their argument, the SSB executes a monitoring role 
by controlling the religious side of the institution, which involves reviewing and 
approving transactions, services, products and policies as well as appointing internal 
sharia auditors. The service role is equivalent to the advisory task of the SSB that 
involves proposing sharia-compliant financial transactions, replying to any sharia-related 
inquiries, and training the management on how to apply Islamic rules. The resource 
dependence role is assumed in SSB’s right to access all of the information needed to 
make decisions regarding compliance matters.   
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However, it is essential to compare the roles and objectives of both boards, 
regardless of their structure. Arguably, the current SSB’s structure as an internal board 
causes confusion and lead to the drawing of somewhat inaccurate similarities. Sharing 
similarities with the roles of the board of directors, to some extent, does not necessarily 
make the SSB a board of directors in the company. Similarities may exist as a result of 
having a similar structure. For example, the SSB suffers from an information asymmetry 
problem, as does the board of directors, especially its non-executive members. Both are 
susceptible to building decisions based on selective information received from the 
management. Also, the appointment of the SSB members and the board of directors are 
similar in cases where SSB members are appointed by shareholders. These similarities 
exist mainly because of the position that the SSB occupies within the company. The 
issue is whether the SSB fits into the roles and objectives of the board of directors or 
not. 
It is important in this context, therefore, to compare the objectives they serve. The 
board of directors is supposed to guide the company in the direction that satisfies the 
interests of the company and all of those interests that the company is set to serve, 
such as benefitting the shareholders. Since these interests vary in importance, 
depending on the consideration of different jurisdictions and companies, the board of 
directors acts as a balance between these interests. This balance is occasionally 
reflected in the different stakeholder representations on the board’s membership. Even 
under agency theory, where the financial interest of the investors is, usually, the only 
prominent interest that the board of directors should represent, the board acts as a 
balance between the interests of investors and, on the other side, those of the 
management.411 On the other hand, the SSB does not play such a balancing role. The 
only interest it considers is the religious one, regardless of all other interests, including 
the financial one. Although the religious interest forms a part of the interests of the 
corporation that should be considered by the board of directors of Islamic banks, this 
interest is not satisfied by merely being represented on the board as a vote and being 
part of its balancing power and composition. Unlike other interests, sharia-compliance is 
                                            




a pass-or-fail interest and so cannot be measured on a graduated scale, as can other 
interests. If a specific transaction violates sharia, it must not be conducted; otherwise, 
sharia interest is not delivered. There is no room for negotiation with other interests. 
Thus, the religious interest can only be satisfied by having a veto power on decisions 
violating sharia, regardless of other interests that these decisions may serve. This is not 
the case with the board of directors where the area of decisions is not simply white-or-
black but contains a considerable grey area that they may move within. This is an 
essential difference to be considered in this comparison. 
Analysing the similarities, as argued by Nathan and Ribiere, between the roles of 
both the SSB and the board of directors, the advisory role appears to be the most 
similar role that is performed by the two boards. The other roles of the board of directors 
do not fit within the SSB roles. The resource dependence role, assigned to the board of 
directors, cannot be assumed to fall under the SSB’s right to access all information 
since they are not alike. The right to access information aims to increase the board’s 
awareness of internal information in order to reduce the problem of information 
asymmetry. The resource dependence role, however, has nothing to do with this 
internal issue. Instead of dealing with internal information, the resource dependence 
role concerns the external resources that the directors contribute. Therefore, the 
resource dependence role is significantly different from the right to access information.  
The monitoring role performed by the SSB, if any, is significantly narrower in terms 
of its scope and subject. While the board of directors monitors all aspects of the 
business, the SSB is limited to sharia-related matters. Even in these matters, the SSB 
does not have the ultimate control right, as is the case with the board of directors. The 
SSB’s task does not extend beyond detecting sharia violations and suggesting 
alternatives to non-sharia compliant products. As long as all of the alternatives are 
sharia compliant, choosing which option to adopt is not a duty of SSB; it is a matter for 
the management and board of directors. Put differently, the SSB’s role in reviewing 
transactions and decisions is limited, as stated earlier, to a pass-or-fail test in order to 




the board of directors, there is always an opportunity to enhance the performance of the 
company, so the monitoring role of the board does not cease at a certain point.  
In fact, the SSB suffers from several significant limitations compared to the board of 
directors, which make the similarities drawn up between both boards inaccurate. If, 
supposedly, these similarities are assumed to be correct, how would the SSB fit within 
the structure of the company? Being represented as a part of the board of the directors’ 
roles would not satisfy sharia interest because, as discussed above, this interest needs 
to have a veto rather than voting power. This introduces into the discussion the 
hypothesis that the SSB is either another board in a two-tier board system or a sub-
committee of the board of directors.  
4.7.3 The SSB and the Two-tier Board System 
The roles of the SSB require a high level of independence, so the members must not 
be considered as bank personnel or to be working under the authority of the board of 
directors.412 This leads some researchers to consider the two-tier board system as 
incorporating the SSB body within the corporate governance structure.413 To apply this 
system in the case of Islamic banks, the SSB might be viewed as the supervisory 
board,414 so it is inferred that the regular board of directors takes responsibility for 
operating as the management board. However, this implementation of the SSB as a 
supervisory board is not considered in all of the banks’ operations but is limited solely to 
sharia-related matters.415 In other words, IFIs are considered to be two-tier board 
institutions only if the matters subject to discussion are sharia-related. Otherwise, the 
SSB has no effect on the structure and the regular board of directors is in charge. 
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Before examining the concept of Islamic banks as having a two-tier board, it is 
essential to examine the objectives of adopting this system within the corporate 
governance framework. The central underlying difference between the two board 
models relates to whether it is desirable to have independent monitors involved in 
decision-management. In other words, does having both executive and non-executive 
directors on the same board jeopardise that board’s ability to monitor the management 
and provide independent advice?416 It is argued that ambiguity exists regarding the role 
of the board in the unitary system, which assigns both supervisory and management 
roles to the same board.417 The two-tier board system, however, creates a clear 
separation between the management of the day-to-day affairs of the company, which is 
the management board’s responsibility, and the role of supervising and monitoring the 
company, which is the supervisory board’s responsibility,418 so the system draws a strict 
distinction between management and monitoring capacities to prevent conflict of 
interests and enhance the independent supervision of the corporation by not having 
executives being involved in a board with a supervisory role to play.419 The separation, 
also, aims to improve the ethical conduct of the corporation.420 Aste lists other 
advantages of having a two-tier board system, which include quicker decisions due to 
the smaller size of the boards; a wider diversification of directors as a result of opening 
up the directorship position to more non-traditional candidates; and the role of the two-
tier board system in generating good publicity and attracting foreign capital.421    
It is evident from the objective of the two-tier system that adding another board does 
not make a significant difference regarding the scope or nature of the roles. The aim of 
the two-tier board system is to enhance the independent behaviour of the directors, 
improve the monitoring and supervision, and manage the business more effectively. It is 
also an approach to reducing the number of situations where non-executives 
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experience conflict regarding their respective roles. As a result, this system has little to 
do with the SSB. Both boards in the two-tier system share a duty to manage the whole 
business for the benefit of the company and, unlike the SSB, which is limited to the 
sphere of sharia-compliance, there is no separation within the subject matter 
considered. Apart from several limitations that might be placed within the scope of the 
management board’s authority, which require approval from the supervisory board, its 
management authority is unlimited as far as the business is concerned.422 Therefore, 
the above discussion about the conceptual differences between the nature of the roles 
between the SSB and the board of directors applies here as well. Apart from that, the 
accountability framework in the two-tier system, where the management board is 
supervised by the supervisory board, is inconsistent with the position that the SSB 
occupies within the institution. The SSB does not exercise a similar supervision over the 
board to be regarded as a supervisory board in sharia-related matters. The practice 
suggests that the members of the SSB, which is presumed to be the supervisory board 
when it comes to sharia-related matters, are either appointed or nominated by the board 
of directors, which is presumed to be the management board in this case. This is 
inconsistent with the appointment of the boards in the two-tier system where the 
supervisory board appoints the management board and is, itself, appointed by 
stakeholders. 
From a regulatory point of view, considering the two-tier board system as an 
inherent element of Islamic banks is not free from legal challenges. The two-tier board 
system is mandatory in several countries, such as Germany and Austria, while other 
countries, such as France, have the freedom to choose between unitary or two-tier 
board systems.423 It is important for the SSB to work smoothly in different jurisdictions 
so its structure should be legally acceptable. Assuming that this view is free of 
challenges in the two-tier board jurisdictions, how can the SSB operate within the 
unitary board system jurisdictions?  
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Aldohni and Morrison argue that Islamic banks, as two-tier board institutions, can 
work in jurisdictions where a one-tier board is adopted, if there is no explicit obligation to 
adopt only one board, as is the case in the UK.424 It is, also, argued that, to some 
extent, SSB members perform a similar task to the non-executive directors in terms of 
monitoring and advice. While the practice of corporate governance suggests a wider 
separation between management and supervision, even on the same board, the SSB 
as a second board could make a positive contribution to enhance this separation.425 
However, this implementation is associated with several challenges. First, it contradicts 
the above FCA’s view of the SSB as an advisory body, not qualified for any directorship 
position and unable to interfere with management. Second, some competence 
requirements for director membership may disqualify many SSB members from serving 
as directors. The skills they bring to the business are merely religious in nature and 
unrelated to the business experience expected of directors. In the UK, for example, the 
“Fit and Proper test for Approved Persons” required to serve as a director of a financial 
institution includes the factor of competence and capabilities which requires relevant 
experience in order to serve as a director, which may not be satisfied by many SSB 
members.426 Third, the fact that, in practice, a lot of SSB members have too many multi-
memberships poses a legal challenge for them to be considered as directors, as 
jurisdictions tend to set a maximum limit on the number of directorships a person may 
hold.427 Finally, assuming that SSB members are qualified to be directors, they would 
probably fit as executives rather than non-executives in the view of FCA, as their roles 
involve active participation in the business.428 This contradicts the concept of the SSB 
as a supervisory board, which needs to be filled with only non-executives. These 
restrictions challenge the view of the SSB as a second board.  
In practice, the sharia governance frameworks in the two-tier system do not consider 
the SSB as a second board. For example, the governance framework of the board of 
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directors in Indonesia is based on two-tier boards: the commissioner board as a 
supervisory board and the board of directors as a management board.429 In the 
regulations of Bank Indonesia, the sharia governance framework does not treat the SSB 
as one of the boards of directors. A circular letter from the Bank Indonesia assigns the 
duties and responsibilities of the commissioner board, the board of directors and the 
SSB.430 This means that the governance framework of Islamic banks in Indonesia treats 
the SSB as a different body from either board.  
The SSB has fundamental differences that make its adoption within the two-tier 
system challenging. In fact, considering the SSB as a second board does not result in 
the two-tier board system as it is known in corporate governance but, instead, a totally 
new model is created. The SSB cannot fit within either board. It is not intended to be an 
equivalent body to the management board since it does not even manage the day-to-
day sharia-related matters, which are usually assigned to internal departments. 
Regarding the SSB as a supervisory board only on sharia-related matters alone would 
be both impractical and confusing. If the SSB is assumed to be the supervisory board 
on sharia-related matters, there would not be an equivalent body to the management 
board since the board of directors does not manage day-to-day sharia-related matters. 
In the unitary system, IFIs would end up having two boards with different jurisdictions, 
depending on the subject matter discussed. The management and supervisory authority 
would swing between the SSB, if a decision relates to sharia-compliance matters, and 
the normal board of directors, for other decisions. In the case of the two-tier system, 
there would be three boards rather than two. This would result in a newly established, 
impractical structure that creates confusion for the regulators and other stakeholders of 
IFIs as well.  
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4.7.4 The SSB as a Sub-committee of the Board of Directors  
Nathan and Ribiere claim that the SSB’s role of monitoring and appointing internal 
sharia audit is equivalent to the appointing of the top management by the board of 
directors. This brings into the comparison the consideration of the audit committee as a 
sub-committee of the board. Consisting of only independent non-executive directors, an 
audit committee reviews the efficiency and objectivity of the reports submitted by 
internal auditors.431 To satisfy the interests of the shareholders, the audit committee has 
a responsibility for ensuring that an objective external audit has been conducted and, 
due to this important role of acting as a bridge between both internal and external audits 
and the board, it has been argued that the audit committee is the most important of the 
board’s sub-committees.432  
The SSB could be argued to be a possible sub-committee, similar to an audit 
committee. The similarities between the internal audit and sharia audit departments 
could support this assumption as well as the composition of both the audit committee 
and the SSB by non-executives. While audit committees supervise the process and 
receive the internal audit reports, the relation between the SSB and internal sharia audit 
is unclear. IFSB and AAOIFI do not agree on some of the governance standards in this 
regard. IFSB assigns the role of appointing the head of the internal sharia department to 
the board of directors and the role of the SSB is purely advisory with regard to this 
appointment.433 It seems that the SSB is only given the right to express any concern or 
reservation about the candidates’ profiles and qualifications. AAOIFI, on the other hand, 
suggests that more power should be given to the SSB as it requires its prior approval in 
appointing internal sharia auditors.434 In terms of reporting, there is a clear difference 
between the two organisations as they differ with regard to which body the internal 
sharia audit should report. The accountability framework of the internal sharia 
department drawn up by AAOIFI recommends that it should report to the board of 
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directors and be monitored by it.435 This suggests that the SSB has no monitoring role 
over the internal audit. However, IFSB states clearly that internal sharia auditors shall 
report to the SSB.436 
Given these differences, the governance standards set by the two organisations 
cannot determine an obvious relationship between the SSB and internal sharia audit. It 
is necessary to analyse the SSB role itself and whether it should serve as a sub-
committee for sharia audit parallel to the audit committee. Before that, it is important to 
note that sub-committees form part of the board of directors and their members also 
tend to be members of the board.437 Consequently, in order for the SSB to qualify as a 
sub-committee, it should fit within the roles and objectives of the board, and their 
members should also be competent to serve as directors. Therefore, the previous 
arguments apply here as well and create, in addition to the following discussion, 
restrictions that legally challenge the idea that the SSB should be regarded as a sub-
committee. 
As highlighted above, the SSB performs legislation, advisory, and auditing tasks. 
The auditing role is presumed to be equivalent to external auditors and does not 
necessarily involve appointing or supervising internal auditors. In fact, this is 
inconsistent with the nature of the SSB’s roles and it threatens its objectivity in 
discharging one of its fundamental roles as an independent sharia auditor.438 The 
supervision of internal sharia audit should not be integrated within the SSB’s roles since 
it has a potentially negative effect on SSBs’ performance as independent external 
auditors. In contrast to the SSB, the monitory role over internal auditing is an integral 
part of the roles of the audit committee. While it acts as a bridge between internal and 
external auditors, the SSB, itself, performs the role of external sharia auditing. In fact, 
the duty of monitoring internal sharia audit should be assigned to an audit committee 
because it is the responsibility of the board of directors to monitor all aspects of the 
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institution, including sharia-related matters, since sharia-compliance is an essential 
factor in IFIs’ performance. It is perceived that the board of directors has the ultimate 
responsibility for how the business is conducted.439 As the ultimate body responsible for 
directing and monitoring all aspects that might affect the performance of the institution, 
the responsibility of monitoring sharia-related matters should fall within its duty rather 
than that of the SSB. More specifically, internal sharia audit should be the responsibility 
of the audit committee. The SSB is merely an instrument provided to check the 
institution’s dealings from a religious perspective on behalf of the board of directors and 
the stakeholders, so the SSB exists to assist the board of directors in executing part of 
its task.  
Despite the authority that the SSB holds which, sometimes, restricts the power of the 
board of directors, this does not justify considering the SSB as a sub-committee of the 
board of directors. In fact, if it were a sub-committee, it would be restricted by and 
subject to the board, a situation that may not satisfy sharia interest which requires a 
veto power. It also affects its independence since, as stated before, it must not be 
supervised by the board of directors. Other well-established mechanisms of corporate 
governance, such as lawyers and auditors, whose tasks are essential to performance, 
precipitate similar restrictions on the power of the board of directors. They, also, provide 
advice to assist the board in doing its job but are never considered as sub-committees. 
They are, instead, external to the institutions and provide services as gatekeepers. 
4.8 The SSB and Gatekeepers 
4.8.1 What are the Gatekeepers? 
In modern corporations, where ownership and control are separated, owners and 
other stakeholders need to be assured that the managers are acting in the interest of 
the corporation and not abusing the power they have been given. Although the board of 
directors is viewed as an intermediary between the investors and management in 
agency theory, a more independent certification is needed for all types of stakeholders 
to testify that the management is effectively performing its duty. From here, the concept 
                                            




of gatekeepers arises to refer to “some form of outside or independent watchdog or 
monitor who screens out flaws or defects or verifies compliance with standards or 
procedures”.440  
Coffee lists some of the advantages that gatekeepers bring to the corporation and 
how they enhance its governance structure.441 These advantages include, firstly, a more 
accurate valuation in the market. Unless corporations can distinguish themselves from 
others, investors will price them based on the average quality of all other corporations, 
despite their actual value.442 Therefore, trusted gatekeepers can signal more credit to 
the corporation to be valued above the average quality and lower its cost of capital by 
providing assurance to the investors that the corporation’s disclosure is accurate so the 
fear that their share value might be discounted will be reduced.443 Secondly, the board 
of directors cannot outperform the role of gatekeepers. Without independent 
gatekeepers, the board will be blind except for selective information provided by the 
corporation’s managers. Even independent boards were proved to be unable to detect 
or prevent financial misconduct, which led to the financial crises, such as the Enron 
crisis in the U.S. in 2001. Thirdly, gatekeepers play an important role in situations where 
ownership and control are separated. To reduce the information asymmetry, 
shareholders can rely on gatekeepers to become the trusted source of the flow of 
unbiased information to stakeholders and the public and help to detect and prevent 
problems before a crisis occurs. In addition, to ensure the accuracy and truthfulness of 
the statements that the company itself makes, gatekeepers could potentially present a 
critical view of the management or the board, to give a rounded picture of the company 
for investors.444 
The role of gatekeepers and who they are might differ slightly based on different 
perceptions about the concept. Some literature views the role of gatekeepers as 
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preventing or disrupting any misconduct by withholding the support necessary for the 
wrongdoing to succeed.445 Based on this view, it is defined as “parties who sell a 
product or provide a service that is necessary for clients wishing to enter a particular 
market or engage in certain activities”.446 In this view, gatekeepers are seen as a private 
police whose role is to prevent wrongdoing. The main characteristic of gatekeepers is 
the power they have to veto or block any transaction. For example, auditors are 
considered gatekeepers because they exercise such a veto by declining to deliver 
necessary opinions for the corporation when they discover a serious issue in the 
corporation’s financial statements. The power of veto, as the main attribute that defines 
gatekeepers, is wide enough to include the board of directors as gatekeepers since it 
can veto or withhold consent.447  
The other view focuses on the verification or certification role of gatekeepers as the 
providers of independent credibility and assurance to the company’s stakeholders. 
Coffee defines gatekeeper as “reputational intermediaries who provide verification and 
certification services to investors, doing essentially what investors cannot easily do for 
themselves”.448 This definition characterises gatekeepers as intermediaries whose job is 
necessary in enabling investors and the market to rely on the corporation’s own 
disclosure or assurance, where they otherwise might not. The power of gatekeepers 
arises from their reputation obtained by being a repeat player serving many clients over 
several years so corporations seek their positive evaluation which gives credibility to its 
disclosure or predictions.449 Based on this, the main role of gatekeepers as 
intermediaries is to rent their reputations to corporations.450 Therefore, gatekeepers 
include outsiders who risk their reputations by certifying the information released by the 
company. This includes auditors who verify the financial statements, rating agencies 
which evaluate the creditability of a company’s financial standing, securities analysts 
who provide assessment and prediction of the financial prospects of companies, 
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investment banks when delivering a fair opinion to appraise the fairness of a specific 
transaction, and lawyers, but only in the case of lending their reputations to a 
transaction rather than engineering it.451 
These two perspectives of gatekeepers overlap.452 They consider mostly the same 
types of gatekeepers but the reason for this consideration is slightly different. While 
auditors, for example, are considered gatekeepers in one view because they withhold 
necessary support, they are also so in the other because they lend their reputations 
when certifying the financial statements. The difference between these two perspectives 
of gatekeepers is reflected by whether to consider the board of directors as a 
gatekeeper because it has the veto power or not since the members, with certain 
exceptions, do not have the required reputational capital to lend to the institution.453 
Therefore, the latter perspective of gatekeepers is narrower as the board of directors is 
not qualified to be a gatekeeper, so it can be inferred that gatekeepers in most cases 
have both the veto power as well as the reputational capital. They exercise the veto 
power in a way that protects their reputations by withholding services that would support 
misconduct which might jeopardise their reputation.  
4.8.2 The Gatekeeping Role of the SSB 
For the purpose of this discussion, the broader view of gatekeepers as holding a 
veto power is adopted even though it is less common in the literature.454 Since sharia 
supervision is yet to become a profession, the SSB lacks the reputational capital 
required in the second view. Although there is some type of reputation among SSB 
members, it is different from the one required for gatekeepers. SSB members are 
respected as religious representatives more than being repeat players for many clients. 
Although this type of reputation is important for IFIs since it gives them the credibility 
they need to convince their stakeholders that the transactions are sharia-compliant, it is 
not the same reputation that characterises gatekeepers in general. The reputation of 
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gatekeepers is earned by the collective efforts of the individual professionals working in 
the firm. It is a result of being repeated players so it increases by practising more 
gatekeeping roles. In contrast, the reputation of the SSB is not collective and it is 
individual scholars who possess the reputation, so it is a personal respect rather than 
organisational or professional one. Also, this religious reputation is not necessarily a 
result of repeated conducts of sharia supervision but is mainly gained by being a 
scholar with sufficient knowledge of Islamic finance law who voluntarily educate the 
public in religious matters. Such a reputation may be gained without any previous 
experience of sharia supervision. SSB members may gain reputation by being 
experienced in sharia supervision but the religious reputation is their main capital as 
SSB members. Such a reputation would not be strongly affected if a transaction was 
discovered as sharia non-compliant after it had been approved as sharia-compliant 
since the religious reputation has been earned from sources other than being a 
repeated player in sharia supervision. In fact, being remunerated for religious services 
that is linked to a profitable business, as it is the case in the SSB, may damage the 
religious reputation as it contrasts with its non-profit nature. Therefore, the religious 
reputation is different from the professional reputation required for gatekeepers where it 
increases by more frequent business contracts with clients. In the absence of this 
reputational requirement in the SSB, verification, as the main characteristic of 
gatekeepers, should be used in this comparison. 
The SSB exercises the veto power very obviously. Its refusal to endorse a specific 
product would result in the bank withdrawing it.455 While its legislation and advisory 
roles might not always be associated with the verification services of gatekeepers, its 
audit role is highly relevant. It is conducted to ensure that transactions have been 
executed in a sharia-compliant manner which is similar to the duty of external auditors 
in investigating the compliance by financial statements to the adopted accounting 
standards. As one of the most common gatekeepers, it might be appropriate to look at 
the external audit and its similarities with sharia audit.  
                                            




By providing independent credibility and assurance to the company’s financial 
statements, external auditors have been considered an important subject in corporate 
governance. They are seen as a solution to the agency problem. Their examination of 
transactions and accounts which can extend to any necessary documents should 
provide an external independent view of whether they represent the accurate status of 
the corporation. Therefore, auditors act more as insurance for shareholders and 
investors that the disclosed corporation’s documents are accurate.456 In the banking 
sector, external auditors play a more significant role as a “supervisory gatekeeper” by 
assisting the financial regulator to form regulatory decisions.457 The SSB in sharia 
governance has a similar objective to external auditors in corporate governance. In fact, 
sharia scholars have been described as gatekeepers who have a responsibility to 
resolve issues of efficiency and credibility surrounding the Islamic finance industry.458 
The financial interest in Islamic banks is not the only interest of stakeholders. They also 
need to be assured of the religious interest as well by verifying that the banks’ 
transactions are sharia-compliant. The SSB provides such a certification to the 
stakeholders and the public that the institution complies with sharia roles and fatwas 
issued by its SSB as expected, which is a similar job to the external auditors.459  
As the main characteristic of gatekeepers, the power of veto can be found in 
external auditors who should withhold support if the accounting standards are violated 
to preserve the financial interests of the stakeholders. Likewise, the veto power is 
needed in the SSB’s roles to protect the religious interest. As explained earlier, the 
religious interest in IFIs should be a pass-fail test rather than being balanced with other 
interests. Similar to the external auditors, the SSB preserves the religious interest if 
there is sharia violation by refraining to provide its certification. While institutions need 
external auditors’ verification to add credibility to the financial statements, the credibility 
of the compliance with sharia in Islamic banks depends on the SSB verification. The 
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duty of auditing in the SSB should have no direct influence on the management or 
board’s decisions but should be limited to certifying conformity with sharia or 
highlighting different ways in which the management should comply.460 This is also the 
case with external auditors. 
In addition to the above, both audits share the same objective, which is to assure the 
stakeholders of the status of the institution. Whether financial or religious, they share a 
similar mechanism as they both require high standards to be applied as a reference 
when deciding on the compliance of the institution’s transactions. Therefore, the 
assurance of compliance is a similar job for both the SSB and the external auditors. The 
difference between these audits lies in what types of violation they investigate. External 
auditors concern compliance with accounting regulations and provide verification about 
the accuracy of the financial statements to reflect the financial position of the institution. 
The verification of the SSB, however, concerns the compliance of the institution’s 
transactions and operations with Islamic principles to ensure accurate compliance with 
sharia.461 In other words, auditors investigate financial compliance while the SSB 
investigates sharia-compliance. This difference reflects the nature of the standards each 
applies and does not disqualify the SSB from being regarded as a certifying gatekeeper.  
The similarities between the SSB and external auditors have been indicated in the 
literature. Abedl Karim concludes that both audits check the compliance status of the 
transactions undertaken by the institutions and publish a report for the owners to verify 
that the financial statements are a fair representation of the actual operations.462 Hijazy 
states that the role of external auditors in investigating, regularly checking the banks’ 
operations, and detecting any misconduct is similar to the job of the SSB.463 Elqari also 
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states that this similarity exists in which both look at the institution to give stakeholders 
an external independent opinion about the status of this institution.464 
Despite these similarities, considering the SSB as a gatekeeper might still be 
confusing, since the SSB performs its roles as a body within the institution it serves 
rather than as an independent outsider. Also, the SSB has various capacities, as 
legislator, advisor, and independent auditor. Looking to the wide picture of the audit 
profession, legislation and advisory roles are also performed but with different 
structures. While the advisory role may be provided internally or externally, legislation 
and audit are only provided externally. Legislation is performed by a national regulator 
and audit is provided by audit firms. The separation is strict to the extent that many 
jurisdictions prohibit the provision of audit and advisory services to the institution by the 
same firm.465 However, these roles are performed within the same body in sharia 
supervision. Combining these different roles together within an internal body creates 
confusion about the SSB’s roles which do not fit within and suit its structure. The current 
structure compromises independence, which is an important requirement for audit and 
for legislation as well.  
Regardless of its structure, the aim in establishing the SSB is to provide independent 
verification of sharia-compliance to the stakeholders, which is consistent with the role of 
the gatekeepers. The issue of structure, however, needs to be subject to regulation in 
order to reflect the nature of its role which is considered in the next section. 
4.9 Regulation between Audit and the SSB 
More regulatory attention needs to be paid to the role of the SSB in order for it to 
perform an effective gatekeeping role. Regulation is essential to clarify the ambiguity 
and vagueness surrounding the role of the SSB. It draws boundaries and a governance 
framework for SSB members and other practitioners under sharia supervision. As a 
regulated practice, it would be easier to be understood and adopted by the market.  
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The similarity between sharia audit and the role of external auditors draws attention 
to its regulatory framework. External auditing is a well-recognised profession worldwide 
and has received well-regulatory efforts to improve its practice as an independent 
gatekeeper. Its well-structured system has been suggested to be the ideal method of 
social auditing, which resembles sharia auditing in its non-financial objective.466 
Similarly, sharia supervision needs to be more independent and effective by following a 
similar framework that applies to external auditors.  
Before discussing how to regulate SSBs, it is necessary to identify the meaning of 
regulation and its application in the audit as a practice with a similar objective. In fact, 
regulation is a disputed concept for which the literature does not have an agreed 
definition. It is a political concept contested by different groups and ideologies that 
employ the concept in different ways depending on their political position.467 However, it 
is not the purpose of this discussion to approach the theoretical issues surrounding 
regulation. What is important in this context is to understand what regulation involves in 
order to explain how it should be employed in relation to sharia supervision.  
Baldwin et al. list three definitions for regulation, ranging from a narrow to a broad 
meaning.468 The first refers to the process of setting standards and the mechanisms for 
monitoring, enforcing and ensuring compliance with them, which is typically done by a 
public agency. This definition represents the “command and control” type of regulation 
and is the backbone of regulation. Similarly, Selznick identifies the central meaning of 
regulation as the “sustained and focused control exercised by a public agency over 
activities that are valued by a community”.469 The second meaning is wider and includes 
some alternative instruments of regulation. Governments may rely on incentive-based 
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methods as a less intervention-oriented form of regulation to mitigate the direct 
interference. Examples of this regulatory instrument are disclosure requirements, 
market rights, and other incentives that benefit from the competitive markets where 
consumers react to changes quickly.470 This includes, for example, taxes, government 
contracts rather than commands, and government ownership.471 The third meaning is 
even broader and does not require regulation necessarily in order to be a state-product 
or part of any institutional arrangement. Based on this meaning, regulation could even 
be unintentional. It includes, in addition to the meanings outlined above, all of the 
mechanisms of social control, such as social norms and behaviour that can modify and 
affect the market.  
The above meanings consider the tools and mechanisms used for regulation that 
include direct orders forms, incentive-based methods, and mechanisms of social 
control. These meanings provide a small degree of understanding about the 
components of regulation and what its process should involve. From another angle, 
regulation is defined by identifying the minimum components it must contain. 
Accordingly, regulation is performed by at least three capacities.472 The first is the 
capacity of setting standards which reflect the state’s preferred choice of rules. The 
second is the capacity of information-gathering or monitoring to obtain an updated 
status of the system. The third is the capacity for behaviour-modification to change the 
system that presently applies. The last capacity applies to regulated individuals and 
institutions. Regulating an activity or practice may be inadequate to protect relevant 
stakeholders but it needs to be comprehensive to control practitioners as well. 
Therefore, promoting and regulating the profession is also considered within the 
meaning of regulation.473 Regulatory agencies issue rules and standards to protect and 
promote professions as one of their objectives. 
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It can be said that regulation has a dual process. The first is ex-ante where rules and 
standards are passed and applied. This process represents the standard setting 
component of regulation. The other two components are performed in the ex-post 
process which ensures compliance with and the accurate application of the standards. 
Therefore, regulating an activity is not merely achieved by passing a law. Control is also 
an integral part of regulation, where protection of the activity must be ensured by 
monitoring and continuing assessment.474 The ex-post element provides a public 
accountability framework as part of the regulation. 
Within the definitions of regulation, public agency is stated to be an important tool of 
regulation for standard-setting, enforcement, and supervision. It is “a non-departmental 
public organisation mainly involved with role making, which may also be responsible for 
fact finding, monitoring adjudication, and enforcement” and has become a highly 
popular regulatory governance tool since the 1990s.475 Regulatory agencies have 
become a modern typical tool of governance and one of the most important indicators in 
the scope and depth of regulatory activities in modern societies.476  
In the audit and accounting profession, which involve a similar practice to sharia 
supervision, regulatory agencies play an important role in the governance of the 
practice. In the U.S., the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) acts as a 
legislative body for setting accounting standards which are recognised as authoritative 
by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) over public companies and also by 
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA).477 The latter is another 
regulatory agency in the auditing and accounting governance regime which represents 
the autonomy of the profession whose responsibility includes setting ethical standards 
for the profession, supervising exams, and promoting educational programmes for 
professionals. Moreover, it sets the auditing standards for non-public companies.478 
After Enron and other corporate collapses in 2001, the audit governance framework was 
reinforced by establishing the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), 
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which was among the reactions to the crisis introduced by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.479 
The board is established to set independent auditing standards and oversee audit 
compliance by public corporations.480 These three agencies (FASB, AICPA, and 
PCAOB) function as an integrated system in the U.S. to supervise the accounting and 
audit profession.481   
The accounting and auditing regulatory system in the UK has followed the unified 
regulatory model where the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) is the single independent 
regulator for the accounting and auditing profession.482 The main roles for the FRC in 
this regard include setting its own accounting standards as well as implementing the 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS); consulting on and implementing the 
International Standards on Auditing (ISA); setting ethical standards for auditors; 
ensuring discipline and compliance with the standards and regulations; and supervising 
the profession through its recognised professional bodies.483 Similarly, the Saudi 
Organization for Certified Public Accountants (SOCPA) is the regulatory body that 
develops and promotes the accounting and auditing profession. Its responsibilities 
include reviewing and developing accounting and auditing standards; supervising 
compliance with the standards and the law; and regulating the issues surrounding the 
profession.484 
The responsibilities that these agencies hold to govern the accounting and auditing 
profession fall, mainly, within three main categories. First, the agencies regulate and 
standardise the practice. They exercise power, ex-ante, by issuing accounting 
standards and other regulations governing the financial reporting for accountants to 
follow. Ex-ante regulation is also exercised in the issuing of the auditing standards and 
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other regulations concerning audit practice. The standards could be the products of the 
agencies, as is the case in the U.S., where FASB issues the accounting standards, and 
PCAOB and AICPA issue the auditing standards. In the UK, as mentioned above, the 
agency adopts IFRS and ISA standards as the main standards. Apart from the U.S., this 
is the case with most jurisdictions.485 These standards were widely accepted globally 
after the EU adoption of IFRS in 2005 and the reform of ISA after that.486 In Saudi 
Arabia, SOCPA set up a conversion programme for the international standards in 2012 
which ended at the beginning of 2018.487  
The second responsibility is overseeing and supervising compliance with the 
standards and regulations. The agencies set up disciplinary schemes to ensure that the 
accounting and auditing standards have been followed and play a policing role to deter 
any violation. Put differently, an accountability framework is established where 
accounting and auditing firms are accountable to these agencies which exercise a 
control power by investigating, obtaining reports, and taking disciplinary action against 
deviant firms.488 Third, agencies play a role in sponsoring the profession. This includes 
setting up ethical standards, membership requirements, exams, training programmes 
and other policies that promote the accounting and auditing practice and profession. 
While capital markets need to be regulated, it is important to regulate and control the 
practice of auditing as one of the main tools for governing the behaviour of capital 
markets. The regulatory agencies were established to enhance the role of external 
auditors as an important tool of corporate governance. They act as an additional and 
independent layer of governance to ensure accurate reporting in order to provide 
greater protection for stakeholders. In the case of the SSB, the analysis of its role 
shows that it has characteristics of regulation and acts as a semi-regulatory authority by 
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performing both ex-ante and ex-post of the regulation process. This means that each IFI 
has its own regulatory power. As argued, the SSB is a gatekeeper in the context of 
sharia governance, whose role is similar to the gatekeeping role of auditors. This 
analogy provides a grounding analysis of the feasibility of having a regulatory agency 
for sharia supervision to regulate and control the practice. More specifically, this 
analysis should highlight the possible role of such an agency in standardisation, 
supervision and control, as well as promoting sharia supervision as a professional 
practice, which will be discussed after this chapter.      
4.10 Conclusion 
The roles that the SSB performs are essential to sharia governance to monitor 
sharia-related matters. To the structure of the corporate governance, however, the SSB 
is a strange body. Concentrating the role of legislation, auditing and advising in an 
internal body is not the solution to ensuring effective sharia supervision. Instead, these 
roles should be analysed more carefully to identify the most appropriate mechanism that 
suits the structure of corporate governance. 
The high volume of work on the SSB suggests the need to restructure its framework. 
It is almost impossible to manage all of the tasks with which the SSB is entrusted: 
setting up and continuously updating sharia legal and ethical codes to comply with; 
advising and approving products, services, transactions, and the process of 
implementation to be compliant with these codes; and auditing and reviewing the 
institution’s dealings to ensure compliance. Combining these tasks together creates 
uncertainty about the nature of SSB decisions and whether these should be advisory or 
enforceable, a situation that confuses regulators over how to consider the SSB in legal 
terms. This situation exists even in Islamic jurisdictions where Islamic banks have a 
relatively higher legal recognition. The structural framework of the SSB is not 
standardised and has different models that different jurisdictions adopt which creates 
confusion about the position and the roles of this body. Moreover, the current SSB 
structure threatens the independence needed to perform its role of legislation and 
auditing. Therefore, the roles of the SSB should be examined in order to be fitted within 




It can be seen that the consideration of the SSB as a board of directors is 
inappropriate within the corporate governance structure. The roles and objectives of the 
SSB could not suitably fit into the board of directors’ roles and objectives because of the 
significant differences between these two boards. Regardless of these theoretical 
differences, the SSB could not practically be set up as a board in the two-tier system 
since it matches neither of the two boards. Moreover, the two-tier board system would 
pose many legal challenges for Islamic banks operating in the unitary system 
jurisdictions. Similarly, there are legal and theoretical challenges to regarding the SSB 
as a sub-committee of the board which would make sharia supervision ineffective. While 
this discussion concerns only the roles and objectives of both boards, the accountability 
framework, which will be discussed later, is also subject to a possible comparison.  
Combining different roles makes it challenging to compare the SSB with only one 
body. However, looking at the wide picture of the audit profession, there are similar 
analogies between the roles it performs and those performed by the SSB. Considering 
the auditing role of the SSB, it should be a gatekeeper, like external auditors. Non-audit 
services provided by external audit are similar to the advisory role of the SSB. The role 
performed by the national organisations to legislate and standardise the profession of 
auditing is akin to the SSB’s legislative role. 
Since the respective roles of the SSB and audit are similar, the structure of audit 
could provide a better framework for the SSB to be accepted within the corporate 
structure more easily rather than a totally new body. This means that the roles of the 
SSB should be separated. The next chapter examines the role of legislation and how it 






Chapter Five: The Need for a Sharia Standard-setting Board 
5.1 Introduction 
One of the roles assigned to the SSB is to legislate and set sharia standards with 
which IFIs should comply. As a component of regulation, standard setting gives each 
SSB legislative authority over its relevant institution, a situation that is associated with 
negative effects for the Islamic finance industry. The inconsistency in the sharia 
standards in the industry and the existence of conflict of interests are two consequences 
of each SSB setting its own standards. Taking into account the different interpretations 
of the Islamic sources as an inherent feature of Islamic law, the impact of these 
consequences would be even greater. As a result, the sharia governance framework 
would not be strong enough to ensure sharia-compliance for its stakeholders. Within 
this situation, more discipline is a necessity.  
This chapter explains the weaknesses of the governance structure that result from 
individual SSBs performing a legislative role. For a stronger regulatory framework, a 
sharia standard-setting board is proposed. The feasibility of having such a board is 
examined in the chapter. This includes the effects, challenges, and level of 
standardisation. Although efforts have been to establish a standardisation board 
nationally and internationally, its roles have limitations, which are laid out in this chapter. 
The chapter, also, reviews a recent case of NCB’s IPO, where there was 
controversy over whether subscription is permitted under Islamic law or not, to highlight 
some of the negative impacts of failing to standardise the Islamic banking industry. 
It should be noted that the meaning of standardisation in this chapter concerns the 
sharia rules and principles. Although standardisation in Islamic finance might cover 
other financial regulations for Islamic finance such as prudential requirements, these are 
not the main concern of this chapter since they are outside the scope of the SSB’s 
legislative role which mainly concerns the issuing of fatwas and setting of sharia 




5.2 Consistency of Fatwas in the Social and Legal Contexts 
As explained earlier, ijtihad is a tool used for the interpretation of Islamic law which 
usually leads to different opinions regarding sharia. Disagreement is inevitable in 
Islamic law, which makes it unsystematic and non-uniform.489 This is not a disadvantage 
as it provides the flexibility to apply Islamic law in different cases in different 
circumstances all the time. To express a sharia opinion on a specific case, a fatwa is 
issued, which is a “non-binding legal opinion issued in response to a legal problem”.490 
Although not binding, it plays an important role in conservative Muslim societies.       
By default, issuing fatwa in Islamic law enables scholars with sufficient knowledge of 
sharia and a good understanding of the legal matter subject to the fatwa to make a 
decision. Despite the fact that fatwa is purely informative and non-binding, it is deeply 
respected by Muslims, as it is seen as an interpretation of God’s law.491 In the case of 
Saudi Arabia, social and cultural norms are significantly influenced in accordance with 
local fatwas. These fatwas are commonly used in relation to the understanding of the 
connnection between religion, society, and the state.492 In the past, most fatwas were 
issued by an individual mufti, a person who issues fatwas. The power of fatwas in 
Muslim societies as well as political systems led governments to seek some control over 
this activity so they tend to appoint a grand mufti as the ultimate source of fatwas.493 
When fatwa institutions, that is where the same fatwa is signed by more than one mufti, 
emerged in the 20th century in the Islamic world as a result of modernisation, many 
Islamic states established their own fatwa institutions.494 These institutions reinforce the 
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social power of states and give them some control over the behaviour of Muslim 
societies. A political State could influence these institutions to issue fatwas that are in 
accordance with the former’s political interests. 
In Saudi Arabia, the first fatwa institution was established in 1953, when Dar Al-Ifta, 
the institute of fatwa, was founded under the name of Dar Al-Ifta and the Supervision of 
Religious Affairs, and was later restructured, in 1962, as part of “King Faisal Ten Point 
Programme” to reform the religious institutions and create greater cooperation between 
the government and muftis.495 After Royal Order No.A/137 in 1971, the current structure 
of fatwa institutions was established. The order created two fatwa agencies. The first is 
the Board of Senior Ulama, scholars, (BSU), whose members are Islamic law scholars, 
appointed by the King. The BSU’s job is to issue sharia-based opinions on matters 
submitted by the King as well as advise the King on matters related to common law 
issues. The other agency is a branch of BSU and its members are selected from within 
it. It is called the Permanent Committee for Scientific Research and Legal Opinions 
(CRLO) and is responsible for preparing the issues to be discussed at BSU as well as 
issuing fatwas for individuals.496  
As stated above, fatwa in Islam is not binding and this is consistent with the advisory 
role granted to BSU by the Royal Order. However, as the highest religous authority in a 
state whose main source of law is sharia, BSU has a strong influence on public affairs. 
Its impact extends to the judiciary system, where most judges, respectfully, issue 
decisions in accordance with BSU’s fatwas.497 The fact that the Supreme Council of 
Justice, for a long time, had among its members many scholars who were also 
members of BSU has given BSU greater influence over judicial decisions.498 A further 
impact is that some state laws and regulations were initially BSU decisions.499 The 
power of BSU was further reinforced in 2010 by Royal Order No.B/13876, which grants 
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the exclusive right to issue public fatwas to members of BSU or those who have been 
given permission to do so.500  
However, controlling social public fatwas leads to many challenges. Individuals view 
neither BSU nor CRLO as the exclusive source of fatwas and may rather consult, for 
different reasons, any Islamic law scholar. It has been predicted that the Royal Order 
would fail to impose a monopoly on the issue of fatwas since it is impossible to control 
the media and outlets through which public fatwas can spread.501 Nowadays, public 
fatwas are still being disseminated through different channels, including social media, 
TV programmes, and radio stations. Moreover, such a control over issuing fatwas 
restricts the religious choices in personal matters. The flexibility under Islamic law gives 
sharia scholars room to develop different interpretations of the Islamic sources which 
provide religious choices for Muslims with different ideologies, cultures, and 
backgrounds. For example, liberal Muslims find it hard to accept conservative 
interpretations on issues concerning the relationship between different genders, dress 
codes for women, and the permissibility of certain social events and occasions. Sharia 
scholars are part of society and their fatwas reflect the social divergence which might be 
significant and represents the different backgrounds within society.502 A fair 
representative of this divergence would not be achieved by having a body with the 
exclusive source of social fatwas.  
In the legal context, consistency refers to the codification of Islamic law which is “the 
process by which the various rulings of Sharia of a particular subject matter (property, 
torts, family law, etc.) are collected and restated in a succient manner to form a legal 
code that has full effect within a given political jurisdiction”.503 This process might be 
less problematic than controlling social public fatwas. Given the wide range of opinoins 
that result from different interpretations of the sources of Islamic law, some aspects of 
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sharia law need to be codified to guarantee consistency and harmony in the judicial 
decisions. It is better for the legal system to govern sharia opinions by having a level of 
codification where a specific opinion, out of several, is adopted into a statute to be the 
ultimate legal reference.504 This adds greater clarity to the legal system rather than 
seeking a judgement from the broad range of views and interpretations to be found 
within different Islamic law sources. 
Historically, there have been several endeavours to codify Islamic law. An early 
attempt at codification was made in the eighth century by an adviser to an Abbassid 
Caliph who argued that codification is necessary to overcome civil conflicts in courts 
resulting from the divergence of opinions in Islamic law.505 Although the political 
authority refused the proposal, the same Caliph and his successors tried unsuccessfully 
to convince some of the prominent scholars at that time.506 Malik B. Anas (D. 796), one 
of the four scholars whose opinions and methods are followed by many sunni Muslims, 
refused to impose his opinions stated in his book Al-Muwatta over the whole Islamic 
state when he was offered the opportunity to do so.507 The religious reactions were 
negative about these attempts since they were strongly supportive of and welcomed the 
differences in opinions within Islamic law. They viewed that imposing an opinoin 
contradicts the freedom to interpret Islamic sources granted to qualified scholars. 
Codification was deemed to be a restriction on the application of Islamic law on Muslims 
from different geographical and cultural bacgrounds. In his response to the proposal 
regarding standardisation, Malik argued that qualified scholars should have the freedom 
to disagree in order to ensure the continuity of ijtihad. He referred these differences to 
the way in which people differ in their thoughts and the impact of societies on such 
differences.508   
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The development of the political state brought about more civilisation and modernity 
to the different aspects of people’s lives. Sharia scholars adopted different approaches 
to the application of Islamic principles and rules in modern life. Such a situation 
increased the divergence of opinions, including the juristic judgements. The freedom of 
juidicial opinions led to many situations of conflict of opinions, which confused the 
political authority.509 To reduce this severe divergence, the four different schools of fiqh 
were seen as a solution. Depending on the geographical area, each region has a 
dominant school to which most of its scholars and judges belong. As a form of 
codification, each school was officially adopted in that region to become its juidicial 
reference.510  
Under the Ottoman Empire, the codification of Islamic law took several positive 
steps. Although the Hanafi doctrine was its judicial and legal reference, more advanced 
phases were followed to overcome the diversity within the same doctrine and achieve a 
unified code of law. The effort at codification matured by issuing two purely sharia-
based codes: its famous code of law, Majallat Al-Ahkam Al-Adliyah, completed in 1877, 
which covers commercial transactions, oaths, and court procedures; and the Ottoman 
Law of Family Rights, issued in 1917, which became the first family code based on 
sharia.511 The former was a pioneering step towards modernising Islamic law from its 
classical text into a more technical legal text.512  
Today, the majority of Muslim states tend to adopt a codified Islamic law for certain 
legal aspects.513 In general, family law is derived from Islamic legal principles. This is 
not the case in Saudi Arabia. Although Islamic law is the main legal and judicial source, 
it has not been codified into a set of clear legal rules. In its early days, it was announced 
that a royal desire to codify Islamic law opinions from the different school of thoughts 
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had been challenged by its lengthy process and disagreement by prominent sharia 
scholars and, instead, a set of classical fiqh books in the Hanbali School was 
designated to be the judicial and legal reference.514 The same set of books was used by 
the Chief Judge in Macca, Ahmed Alqari, as a framework for producing a civil code 
similar to that issued during the Ottoman Empire but in the Hanbali School of fiqh.515 
However, this codification was not officially adopted. In fact, the scholars’ attitudes 
towards codification was and remains controversial and the main obstacle, so that 
codification has not occurred, to date.516 This does not mean that Islamic law has no 
effect on Saudi laws and rules. They are inspired by it and many laws clearly state that 
the application must not contradict Islamic principles. However, many areas of law, such 
as family, civil, and criminal, are not codified but controlled by the traditional Islamic law 
sources which are subject to different interpretations.  
In the modernisation approach of a state, the codification of law is seen as 
inevitable. Recently, a sharia committee has been established in order to design a 
compilation of the Code of Judicial Rulings on legal cases that meet the judiciary 
need.517 This aims to establish an obligatory judicial reference to control the severe 
divergence of judicial opinions whose negative impact might have caused political 
concern.  
Through the brief overview of the historical stages of Islamic law codification outlined 
above, it may be inferred that the political authority prefers to frame the islamic legal 
sources rather than have the freedom of judicial opinions. Among the disruption that this 
freedom might bring is economic instability. In a situation where laws have a very wide 
area of expectation, rights and duties are poorly-protected. The parties to a contract, for 
example, are unable to guarantee their rights even if well-written because it is difficult to 
expect the legal grounding that different judges would treat the terms and conditions of 
the contract. This negatively affects the credibility of the economic environment and 
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shakes its stability. Therefore, the economic factor is an essential incentive for 
codification and, therefore, commercial codification attracts greater attention. In the 
Ottoman Empire, its first sharia code was designed for commercial transactions and 
issued several years before the family one. Similarly, the effort of the codification carried 
out by Ahmed Alqari disregards the criminal or family aspects of law. The importance of 
legal consistency regarding economic aspects provides a basis for its importance in the 
context of Islamic finance as well. Inconsistency in Islamic finance could lead to a 
similar result, especially when the sharia-compliant asset occupies a considerable 
percentage of the capital market and economy, such as is the case in Saudi Arabia. The 
remaining parts of this chapter discuss this issue specifically.  
5.3 Independence and the Role of Legislation in the SSB 
Independence is an essential feature for any institution or body performing the role 
of legislation. It has to be free from any pressure that could influence the objectivity of 
its decisions. Regulated persons may try to influence the legislative authority to tailor 
rules and regulations that better serve their interests. Therefore, independence is crucial 
in the legal framework and the regulator must be fully independent from the 
regulated.518 Within the meaning of regulation, autonomy is considered a major 
characteristic of the regulatory agencies, enabling them to rule-make and shape their 
preferences regarding regulatory choices independently.519 In the Islamic finance 
industry, the SSB plays a major role in setting sharia standards. The analysis of the role 
of the SSB shows that it satisfies the components of regulation and acts as a regulatory 
authority role by performing both ex-ante and ex-post action in relation to the regulation 
process. This means that each IFI has its own regulatory power. In certain jurisdictions, 
as the case of Saudi Arabia, the SSB is the sole and final authority for sharia standards 
for its relevant IFI. By performing such a duty, the SSB faces a strong conflict of interest 
case that puts its independence at stake. 
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One of the aspects of conflict of interest that arises is in the employment relationship 
between SSB members and IFIs. This relationship puts SSB members under pressure 
from the management to achieve financial interests which might compromise sharia 
principles.520 Whether their appointment is assigned to shareholders or the board of 
directors, the members of SSBs are lack of independence they need to objectively issue 
sharia standards. The management may exercise an indirect interference due to the 
power they have on the board and shareholders in reappointing, compensating, and 
even modifying the contracts between the IFI and SSB members to put them in a less 
advantage situation. Therefore, the impartiality of the standards established by an SSB 
may be affected by their financial interests.521 When a specific standard or fatwa 
prevents an IFI from conducting a profitable transaction, the members could be put 
under pressure to modify the standard.522 Therefore, the decision might not be taken 
objectively but tends to assist the achievement of economic objectives over strong 
compliance with sharia.  
If poorly-governed, the different interpretations of Islamic law may facilitate what is 
called “fatwa shopping”. This happens when “a firm contacts various shariah advisors to 
find an affable opinion as to the Islamic nature of a transaction”.523 This could be 
defined as “the process of searching for suitable religious opinions”.524 SSB members 
may shop for a fatwa that better suits the financial interests of the IFI, regardless of their 
own beliefs. Under the employment relationship, SSB members have financial interests 
in IFIs which might compromise their sharia-compliance. This will lead to a more 
permissive approach, where the members give more weight to economic factors over 
sharia principles and adopt controversial opinions that facilitate the design of 
conventional products even though more genuine sharia-compliant ones might be 
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available.525 This would be preferred by the management since it would be easier for 
them to operate with products similar to those offered by the conventional banks instead 
of issuing products that the market may find strange and take time to be absorbed and 
understood. Consequently, IFIs would tend to hire members who are willing to provide 
opinions that are more convenient in the management’s point of view, instead of more 
qualified ones.526 One investment banker working for a major Western financial 
organisation explains: 
"We create the same type of products that we do for the conventional markets. 
We then phone up a sharia scholar for a fatwa [seal of approval, confirming the 
product is shari'ah compliant]. If he doesn't give it to us, we phone up another 
scholar, offer him a sum of money for his services and ask him for a fatwa. We 
do this until we get sharia compliance. Then we are free to distribute the product 
as Islamic".527 
The above situation casts doubt on the independence of sharia scholars and 
whether they can fairly set sharia principles or not. Giving IFIs the freedom to hire 
members to serve on their SSB threatens the objectivity of the decisions taken. The 
diversity in sharia opinions may be manipulated to seek more profit at the cost of losing 
the spirit of the law.528 Consequently, sharia interest is compromised and the credibility 
of the IFIs would then be at stake. Stakeholders might be inadequately assured of 
sharia-compliance, which is a negative effect for the industry. SSB members have 
already been “accused of being bankers” window dressing and of over-stretching the 
rules of shariah to provide easy fatwa for the new breed of bankers”.529 
Management interference, however, is not free from challenges. It could be highly 
costly as it undermines the reputation and trust of the IFI among its stakeholders as well 
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as the potential punitive consequences.530 Despite that, the process of setting sharia 
standards needs to be governed to ensure a high level of independence and objectivity.  
Conflict of interests does not occur in an SSB by merely setting sharia standards for 
its relevant IFI, as independence is also undermined by combining the role of fatwa as a 
legislative tool in Islamic law with auditing. Having the SSB also operate as external 
sharia auditors and check sharia-compliance brings its impartiality and objectivity into 
question.531 This combination creates an inefficient supervision model in sharia 
governance. In the process of regulation, rule-making and monitoring/enforcement, the 
mechanisms need not be located in a single institution to ensure greater 
independence.532 In Islamic finance, the separation between the two roles is essential to 
avoid modifying the fatwas issued by the SSB if there is slippage on the part of the 
executive managers.533 If an issue regarding sharia compliance is found, there is a 
possibility of stretching the role or standard set by the same board to make such an 
operation permissible. This might be done by a permissive interpretation of the issued 
standard or its modification by the same board to regard the subject matter as 
permitted. The different interpretations of Islamic law may provide a ground for this. 
Considering the objective of the SSB, discussed in the previous chapter, verifying 
sharia-compliance does not necessarily involve setting-sharia standards. In fact, the 
legislative role was originally assigned to the SSB due to an urgent need for Islamic 
banks, in the early days, to have a reference to a sharia code in order to produce 
sharia-compliant products and ensure that their operations were compliant. The lack of 
such a code was a genuine reason for IFIs appointing an SSB to do this job at that time 
and the negative effect of the combined roles might be compromised because of the 
immaturity of the industry and its limited spread. Then, the industry experienced a 
revolutionary development. The SSB made a sound contribution to the efforts to market 
Islamic finance and helped it to grow. However, this has not been associated with the 
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equivalent reform in the legal and governance structure. There is a need to reconsider 
the legislative role performed by the SSB within a more robust governance structure. 
Therefore, there were calls for a reconsideration of the current SSB roles since these 
roles were assigned in the past, when the circumstances required specific duties to be 
undertaken by the SSB.534 The development and spread of Islamic finance should end 
the past-multi roles of the SSB that combine fatwa and certification.535 These duties 
should be clearly separated to avoid the perception among the stakeholders that the 
SSB lacks independence.536  
The process of setting sharia standards by the SSB involves an obvious situation of 
conflict of interest. This duty needs to be reconsidered and governed in a more efficient 
way. In fact, some jurisdictions have recognised, partially, that the SSB should not 
perform a legislative role and they have taken a relatively more advanced step towards 
standardisation. However, there are still limitations related to the current practice of 
standardisation and the next section provides a critical overview of this.  
5.4 Limitations on the Current Practices of Standardisation  
Due to the issue of conflict of interest that involves individual SSBs performing the 
role of setting sharia standards, various approaches to standardisation have been 
adopted to minimise their legislative authority. Standardisation is enforced, to different 
levels, by different legal tools in different jurisdictions. The current legal frameworks that 
govern the process of sharia standardisation contain limitations which do not effectively 
wipe out the conflict of interests in the SSB.  
As explained before, the SSB is governed by four different models, where 
jurisdictions vary to regulate sharia supervision between being totally decentralised to 
different levels of centralised models of governance. Adopted to different extents by 
some Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) jurisdictions, the decentralised model does not 
have any national authority to undertake sharia supervision. Saudi Arabia represents 
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the extreme form of this model where the jurisdiction does not have any governance 
regulation regarding the practice of the SSB and IFIs have the total freedom to create 
their own sharia governance structure. There is no legal form for enforcing sharia 
standards in the industry and each SSB enjoys complete authority to set its own sharia 
standards for its relevant IFI. In this case, inconsistency in the decisions is obvious and 
the SSB is exposed to a high level of conflict of interests.    
The other GCC jurisdictions take a less decentralised form by placing some aspects 
of the governing roles found in the SSB into IFIs, as is the case in Qatar,537 Kuwait,538 
and Bahrain.539 Although these jurisdictions have established a type of high authority of 
sharia supervision, this authority is too limited to be considered a regulatory authority 
over sharia supervision. The regulation, therefore, is limited and does little to solve the 
conflict of interest associated with the inconsistency and lack of standardisation. In 
Kuwait, the law refers disputes or conflicts between SSB members to the Fatwa Board 
in the Ministry of Awqaf (endowment) and Islamic Affairs, whose authority should be the 
ultimate one on that matter.540 Otherwise, there is no supervisory authority over the role 
of the SSB. Sharia standards could be set by individual SSBs without interference if the 
members could reach a decision. The authority given to the Fatwa Board is too limited 
and does not qualify it to be a national SSB. It lacks important supervisory authority to 
regulate and control the practice of sharia supervision and only performs a very limited 
role in standardisation, which is arbitration in the case of conflict. Provided that there is 
no dispute between SSB members over a particular subject matter, any previous 
decision that has been taken on the same matter by the Fatwa Board is not binding and 
so the SSB is not required to comply with it. In fact, the Fatwa Board’s role of 
standardisation is purely theoretical and rarely occurs in practice. Since the SSB takes 
its decisions based on majority votes, situations where conflict between SSB members 
could not be resolved are not envisaged.541 In Qatar, the situation is similar, where 
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disputes should be referred to the Supreme Sharia Council of the Ministry of Awqaf.542 
Bahrain does have a national SSB in its central bank. However, this board serves only 
the central bank to ensure the compliance of its own products.543 The board has no 
oversight authority whatsoever regarding the practice of SSBs in Bahraini IFIs and, 
therefore, is not a regulatory agency.  
In the centralised model, a higher sharia supervision authority is established within 
the sharia governance structure to enforce sharia rules. With different roles and duties 
for their national SSBs, this model is common in Southeast Asian countries, of which 
Malaysia is a prominent example.544 Generally, central SSBs are concerned with 
standardisation, compliance and arbitration to settle sharia disputes between SSB 
members.545 The literature also adds the cooperative role of a central SSB to set 
training programmes for Islamic finance practitioners.546 Recently, an increasing number 
of jurisdictions have adopted the centralised model in their sharia governance 
framework. After a long lull, Oman established the High Authority for Sharia Supervision 
in 2012 as a regulatory authority for SSBs.547 The cabinet in UAE was legally authorised 
in 1985 to form a Higher Sharia Authority attached to the Ministry of Justice and Islamic 
Affairs to regulate sharia-compliance practice in the financial industry.548 However, the 
cabinet waited until 2016 to establish the Authority.549 Despite the fact that the federal 
law states that the Authority should be attached to the Ministry of Justice and Islamic 
Affairs, the responsibility for forming and restructuring this authority was assigned to the 
Central Bank of the UAE. In 2015, Bahrain announced that its Central Bank would 
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establish a central sharia board to supervise the Islamic finance sector in the country.550 
These examples are very recent and there are insufficient data to analyse the legal 
framework and its effect on the standardisation role of the central SSBs in these 
jurisdictions. 
A National SSB is a positive step taken by certain jurisdictions to make the sharia 
governance structure more robust in their Islamic finance sectors. The soundness and 
reliability of sharia governance depends heavily on the independence of the SSB and 
the consistency of the pronouncements or sharia rulings between SSBs within a state or 
region.551 Recently, AAOIFI recommended, within its governance standards, the 
establishment of a national SSB in the sharia governance structure to achieve a greater 
level of standardisation.552 Although standardisation is the main objective of these 
regulatory agencies, national SSBs are given insufficient authority to standardise the 
practice fully. Most of national SSBs do not have effective authority over SSBs and their 
main purpose is to advise the central banks or security commissions on sharia matters 
and resolve conflict of opinions between SSB members.553  
Sudan and Pakistan are among the few jurisdictions which allow only Islamic banks 
to operate in their financial industry. However, the standardisation in these countries is 
insufficiently developed effectively to govern the process of setting sharia standards. 
Sudan established the Higher Sharia Supervisory Board in 1992 as the first country to 
introduce a national SSB.554 The objective of the national authority is to standardise the 
practice in the Islamic finance industry and ensure the sharia-compliance of the central 
bank’s own products. However, it seems that the legislative authority given to the 
national SSB described by the law is limited to arbitration and resolving conflicts 
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between members of individual SSBs.555 While decisions are taken by majority vote, 
conflicts that need to be referred to the national SSB are rare. The governance 
framework grants the SSB at the institutional level the authority to play a legislative role 
in its relevant institution in addition to its duty to conduct sharia audit to assure the 
stakeholders of sharia compliance.556 Such a combination of roles exposes the SSB 
members to conflict of interests. The situation in Pakistan is similar. There is a national 
SSB affiliated with the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) that supervises sharia-compliance 
of the bank’s own products and resolves any conflict in sharia opinions that may arise 
from the institutions.557 As a compromise for independence, dual membership on this 
board and the SSB at the institutional level is allowed.558 Also, the sharia governance 
framework assigns individual SSBs legislative authority over their relevant IFIs as well 
as providing a sharia-compliance check.559 
A more advanced application of standardisation is applied in Malaysia and 
Indonesia. In Malaysia, the Sharia Advisory Council (SAC) has been established within 
the central bank, mainly to function as “the ascertainment of Islamic law for the purpose 
of Islamic financial businesses”.560 Kunhibava discusses the “ascertainment” role 
through the Malaysian court’s interpretation of its meaning in different cases.561 The 
court differentiates between the ascertainment and determination of the law. 
Accordingly, SAC is not authorised to issue new roles and standards but merely to 
explain and ascertain Islamic law regarding a particular issue. Such a role should not 
extend to cover the application of this issue and deciding whether the transactions 
executed between the parties were sharia-compliant or not. The court considers this 
matter to be its own responsibility and the SAC is only an expert whose ruling, although 
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legally binding on the court, is purely to ascertain sharia-compliance regarding the 
specific issue, while the court has a judicial function to examine the compliance issue 
more widely. 
This role is insufficient to ensure effective standardisation. Although SAC is 
recognised as the sole authority over Islamic financial products in Malaysia, it has a 
limited role of standardisation, mainly involving approving products sent to it by 
individual SSBs. The governance framework requires SSB members to comply with, 
respect, and not publicly criticise any of the SAC’s published rulings.562 However, this 
requirement is within the context of the professional ethics standards whose objective 
seems to govern the professional behaviour of the the SSB’s members if the outcome of 
the SAC’s decision contradicts their point of view. In fact, the authority given to the SSB 
includes a legislative role. In the absence of enforceable comprehensive sharia 
principles and standards, individual SSBs play a role in determining sharia rules. In 
order to obtain product approval or sharia guidance from SAC, the SSB needs to 
provide the supportive sharia opinions.563 The SAC’s decisions might be strongly 
influenced by the sharia opinions provided by the SSB to support its point of view. The 
arguments provided by the SSB, whose objectivity is questioned as it is not fully 
independent from its relevant IFI, might be a major factor in the SAC’s approval. Fatwa 
shopping might be utilised by the SSB to influence SAC and facilitate certain decisions. 
Moreover, the legislative authority given to the SSB, although limited, compromises its 
independence, since the SSB is also responsible for sharia audit.564 Combining the duty 
of rule-making and auditing in the SSB would increase its conflict of interest status. 
Additional conflict of interest situations might arise if an SSB member is appointed as a 
director in the board. The governance framework expresses its preference for this dual 
membership because it results in a better understanding between the SSB and the 
board.565 As a member of the board, the financial interest and performance of the 
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corporation is an important responsibility which leads to a liability issue. This 
responsibility, as a director, affects the objectivity of the member’s sharia ruling.  
In Indonesia, the National Sharia Council (DSN) is affiliated with Majelis Ulamas of 
Indonesia and responsible for interpreting fatwas regarding Islamic banks, providing 
input to the framework of fatwa implementation.566 The Indonesian regulations require 
strict compliance to the sharia principles issued by DSN. Besides an ex-post duty which 
involves ensuring sharia-compliant operations, the ex-ante role given to the SSB is 
purely to advise IFIs on how to comply with DSN’s Sharia Principles.567 It is inferred that 
the SSB in Indonesia does not have the authority to make the rules but only to help, as 
sharia experts, IFIs regarding the issue of sharia-compliance. Fatwas containing 
comprehensive guidance relating to Islamic finance are issued by DSN.568 The 
requirement of strict compliance to the legislative authority is an advanced step to 
ensure a more independent process of sharia standardisation. However, unlike 
Malaysia,569 members of the national sharia board are permitted to serve on the SSB at 
the institutional level, with some restrictions.570 This dual membership, as explained 
before, compromises independence since it creates a possible conflict of interest 
among legislators whose employment interest with their relevant IFIs could affect their 
objectivity when legislating. Also, members may perform a combined role of legislating 
and auditing, which has a further negative effect on their independent status. 
From the overview above, it seems that the industry has not yet achieved the mature 
practice of standardisation. There remain limitations which undermine the independence 
and objectivity of setting sharia standards. While establishing a national SSB positively 
contributes to standardisation, more improvement is needed to develop and govern the 
rule-making structure and so reflect greater independence and objectivity. The inclusion 
of the word “advisory” in the title of the central SSBs reflects indirectly that these 
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authorities have an advisory function and the industry may opt not to follow their 
decisions, a situation that has a negative effect on the credibility of these authorities.571 
Another concern is the participation of SSB members in international organisations such 
as AAOIFI and IFSB and/or national SSBs. Where it is allowed, IFIs might appoint these 
members in their SSBs due to the shortage of sharia scholars in Islamic finance. This 
would compromise the independence since the same members would: determine the 
IFIs’ Islamic framework; drive public opinion; and give advice to IFIs.572 To foster the 
role of standardisation further, more governance aspects need to be considered in the 
structure of national SSBs. The board should have the highest level of autonomy and 
not be affiliated with an administration that might substitute sharia interest for another. 
The affiliation with the central banks under the dual system, where both Islamic and 
conventional banking operate, might put the members of national SSBs under pressure 
by the central banks to prioritise interests other than sharia-related ones for economic or 
political reasons. The Indonesian model, where its national SSB is affiliated to Majelis 
Ulama of Indonesia, a religious body concerning Islamic law, ensures that sharia 
interest is prioritised. This model could be adopted in Saudi Arabia by establishing a 
national SSB affiliated with BSU. The governance framework should seriously consider 
the independence of members who need to be restricted from serving in any of the 
regulated institutions or in a public position that might affect their objectivity and 
independent status.  
These regulatory agencies should adopt comprehensive sharia guidance which 
entails enforceable sharia standards to be applied by IFIs. To avoid conflict of interests, 
these regulatory agencies should be considered the sole legislative authority and 
substitute any legislative role that might be performed at the institutional level. This level 
of standardisation could be viewed as impractical, since codifying Islamic law might 
affect its flexibility and ability to satisfy the variable needs of the industry. This issue will 
be discussed further in the next section.  
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5.5 Standardisation and the Issue of Practicality 
Islamic law is derived from different interpretations of its sources. Therefore, it is not 
a definite set of rules but, instead, provides general principles that must be followed. 
These principles might be very wide in order to ensure flexibility of application in 
different circumstances. In light of different interpretations of Islamic law, 
standardisation might be considered an impractical approach to apply. While the 
previous experience of the general codification of Islamic law explained before proves 
otherwise, the case of Islamic finance is, arguably, special and needs careful 
consideration. The rapid growth of the industry and the nature of the financial products 
that require constant development need flexible ijtihad to supply the industry with its 
needed sharia-compliant products. Therefore, standardisation might be viewed as a 
restriction on the practice of Islamic finance. 
It has been argued that the necessity for standardising conventional banking is not 
applicable to Islamic principles. IFIs need to use a more creative way to find sharia-
compliant financial solutions, free of interest.573 So innovation might be reduced due to 
standardisation, where IFIs must strictly follow a set of standards instead of referring to 
a wider range of general principles that provide more room to offer innovative new 
products.574 An executive of an IFI argued, during an interview, that standardisation 
could work only in theory and that it is almost impossible to apply a standardised set of 
sharia rules to the whole industry. According to him, the effect of the non-standardised 
industry is exaggerated. Only a small fraction of opinions are subject to differences 
between scholars in the industry, which creates the necessary room for fostering 
innovation and adapting to changes in the market.575 
The above view disregards the discipline that the financial market seeks by 
regulation. The total inconsistency of sharia opinions increases the conflict of interests. 
As mitigation, some prefer a semi-standardised model. Despite its limitations, explained 
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above, some researchers express a preference for the Malaysian standardisation model 
as a balanced model that lies somewhere between the diversity in sharia opinions which 
provides flexibility to the industry on the one hand and standardisation on the other.576 
According to this view, the model adopts unstandardised sharia opinions in an 
organised way by having a high authority which should prevent the exploitation of the 
diversity within sharia. Another proposal for balanced standardisation between detailed 
sharia standards and total freedom of opinion suggests that the tools and methodology 
of ijtihad should be standardised, which would increase the degree of consistency within 
the industry.577 If the methods and tools were to be standardised, this would, however, 
leave plenty of room for SSBs to legislate their own sharia standards. This level of 
standardisation might place restrictions on sharia members from having complete 
freedom of interpretation, but the issue of conflict of interests associated with giving the 
SSB the authority to set its own sharia standards remains. 
The environment in which different opinions are allowed may be preferred in order to 
allow room for innovation in Islamic financial products but this would cause chaos by 
producing inconsistency and divergence.578 In fact, innovation could be achieved 
through standardisation, which would help to clarify the role of IFIs and enable them to 
operate in a more organised way. Standardisation makes sharia standards better 
understood by the market since they will become an integral part of daily financial life. 
Therefore, IFIs would have more opportunity to focus on innovation which would be the 
major instruments of competition between IFIs and lead to greater prosperity in the 
market.579 Efforts made by IFIs to set standards would be dedicated to innovate 
products based on the compulsory sharia standards and, therefore, make them more 
focused on making a profit.   
The industry needs a governance mechanism to enforce a specific set of Islamic 
principles to achieve harmony. In fact, the different interpretations of Islamic law is not a 
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unique feature. Any other law is also subject to such a diversity of interpretations. Legal 
scholars may have different interpretations and adopt different perspectives of legal 
theories. For example, corporate governance theories are subject to differences 
between theorists. However, several authoritative mechanisms are usually used to 
enforce a specific interpretation which is not the case in Islamic finance.580 This marks 
Islamic finance with a great diversity that affects its governance. There is also room for 
different interpretations and implementations in auditing and accounting practice.581 
However, the practice is standardised in such a way that discipline is preserved. The 
different implementations give the institutions the flexibility to apply it in different 
circumstances. In public policy, public institutions are a natural response in situations 
where conflict of interests exists to prioritise these interests.582 The previous chapter 
provided an overview of such institutions in the auditing profession. By analogy, 
different opinions could be treated in the same manner. A national sharia standard-
setting board may be established to put sharia interest above others, taking into 
consideration the overall needs and requirements of the Islamic finance industry.  
The detailed level of standards needed for a more objective and effective sharia 
governance framework might be difficult to tailor. It is not expected for standardisation to 
be comprehensive to a level that identifies singular correct answers in many areas.583 
Generally, there should be a codification that allows flexibility and the systematic 
application of the rule. On the other hand, it should eliminate the need for individual 
SSBs to play a role in setting sharia standards. Flexibility needs to be highly maintained 
in standardisation. The literature offers guidelines on how sharia principles in Islamic 
finance should be standardised. Since standardising all disagreements is not 
straightforward, it is suggested that harmonisation should be created on the basis of the 
objectives of Islamic law rather than a micro-juristic opinion. Put differently, codification 
should be based on “the law as it ought to be” rather than “the law as it is”, and to 
achieve this, the standardisation should be supported by the objectives and philosophy 
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of Islamic law.584 Expressing the objectives of the standards is an effective way of 
achieving the specification of the rule and satisfying flexibility as well. The industry 
would have obvious rules to comply with but not in a very literal or precise way that 
might damage the flexibility. Compliance is maintained as long as the action is 
consistent with the expressed objectives of sharia. It might be helpful to disclose the 
reasoning why a specific opinion was adopted to help the IFIs, sharia auditors, and 
sharia advisors to understand the context and objectives of each sharia standard. This 
would work as a guideline for dealing with new issues that have not yet been 
determined by the national sharia board. 
Overall, standardisation should be generalised to allow institutions discretionary 
room for the institution’s own actions.585 Generalisation ensures greater flexibility in 
application. In his proposed model of standardisation, Mashal projects that 
standardisation should be at a level that satisfies an appropriate but not absolute 
uniformity in applications.586 He suggests that standards should have the flexibility to 
cover a wide range of applications in different situations and to create a pattern that 
includes different applications. He recommends including an experimental period to test 
the newly-issued standards to overcome gaps and difficulties in application that IFIs 
may face, especially at the beginning. After that, the applicability and generalization of 
the standards should be determined.  
Flexibility might also be preserved by formulating the standards to include different 
perspectives as potentially applicable. The idea of standardisation does not necessarily 
mean that one view must be put aside to give way to another contradictory one but, in 
many cases, these two different views could be jointly applied in order for both to be 
acceptable as sharia standards.587  
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The main issue with the level of standardisation is that the rule-making authority 
should be removed from the SSB. Most of the above guidelines remain theoretical and 
do not concern a specific model to govern standardisation. When the industry becomes 
fully standardised by independent regulatory authorities, such as national SSBs, it is 
helpful to consider these guidelines during the process of setting sharia standards. To 
increase the practicality, the standards need to be tested over time in practice. This 
requires frequent reviews and assessments of the standards to meet the variable needs 
of the financial industry. To ensure greater consistency, institutions may be forced to 
seek approval from the national SSB for their newly-designed products, a similar 
procedure to the current requirement in Malaysia. Seeking such approval, however, 
should not be supported by merely sharia opinions since this involves a role of 
legislation, as explained before. It should rather explain the relevance of the newly-
designed products to the published sharia standards. Such a procedure preserves the 
sole authority of legislation to the national SSB.   
5.6 The Market’s Need for Standardisation  
Standardisation also provides the market with more stability and credibility. 
Stakeholders’ confidence is an important factor in ensuring the success of the industry. 
In a situation where each SSB creates its own jurisprudence and adopts its own 
standards, inconsistency is likely to be the case in the industry. It could reach such a 
level that the same bank adopts conflicting standards over time or in different 
jurisdictions within the same banks.588 Inconsistency is classified as one of the greatest 
challenges facing the Islamic finance industry because of the confusion it can create 
among customers and stakeholders.589 The same products may have significantly 
different points of views between scholars in different banks due to different factors 
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which can influence their decisions. Consistency, therefore, is important in promoting 
customers’ confidence, contract enforceability, and market efficiency.590  
As the situation of inconsistency increases, the repercussions regarding the 
enforceability of the contracts increase and the stakeholders’ confidence is damaged. 
Incoherent decisions can undermine the legal certainty and shake the customers’ 
confidence regarding the authenticity of the industry, a situation that may lead to a 
critical mass and systemic instability in the industry, which lead to a possible failure.591 
In the absence of clear sharia standards, contradictory opinions may be argued by 
different SSBs as being sharia-compliant to prove the legitimacy of their decisions, a 
situation that would confuse the stakeholders and shake their trust in the industry and 
the SSB itself.592 Also, in an environment where contradictory standards are deemed to 
be compliant within the same jurisdiction, sharia auditing, which is the main tool used to 
assure stakeholders that the interest of sharia is preserved, would not be 
straightforward but would become a source of confusion among auditors and other 
stakeholders. Moreover, the lack of standardisation causes uncertainty about the 
enforceability of the contracts and permissibility of the products. Consistency of 
interpretation would enhance the enforceability of contracts before the civil courts. They 
might not consider the opinion of the relevant SSB and decide that the contract is non-
sharia compliant and impermissible, a situation that increases the sharia risk and leads 
to vagueness regarding the legal rights existing between IFIs and their customers.593  
Consistency creates discipline which is an important factor that the market needs. It 
might be very difficult for the market to adopt inefficient players only because of the 
believers’ willingness to pay a premium to protect their faith.594 Currently, there might be 
sufficient confidence among stakeholders that IFIs satisfy their religious interest, so the 
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market can endure the cost of inconsistency and uncertainty.595 At some point, 
stakeholders may lose this confidence due to doubt whether the SSB is the protector of 
their interest and IFIs might, eventually, find the price of inconsistency too high to pay. 
In many instances, inconsistency has caused confusion in the industry, which may have 
shaken the confidence of its stakeholders. A prominent case which caused such 
confusion occurred when the Fiqh Academy of the Organisation of Islamic Conference 
(OIC) declared that financial products based on tawarruq, the monetisation of 
commodities, as commonly practised by certain IFIs, were not sharia-compliant, 
notwithstanding their previous authentication by the relevant SSBs.596 In Saudi Arabia, a 
recent disruption in the financial industry could be linked to inconsistency in the Islamic 
rules relating to the collection of zakat. Instead of corporate tax, Saudi firms are subject 
to an annual Islamic tax, zakat. At the beginning of 2018, major Saudi banks disclosed 
that the General Authority of Zakat and Tax (GAZT) had been seeking additional zakat 
payments from them for several years, dating back as far as 2002, which in some cases 
exceeded half of a bank’s annual net profit, a situation that had a negative impact on the 
banks.597 One of the Islamic banks issued a statement explaining that the dispute 
regarding the additional payments of zakat between the bank and GAZT was mainly 
due to the different sharia perspectives adopted on the zakat base, where the view of 
the bank’s SSB is that the claimed payments do not fall within the obligatory zakat.598 
Although this issue is not specific to Islamic banks but generally related to tax issues, it 
provides an example of the effect of inconsistency on the sharia rulings in the market. A 
more relevant example is highlighted at the end of this chapter. 
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In fact, the market did have to pay a high cost as a result of losing customers’ 
confidence. A prominent internationally-known sharia adviser declared in 2009 that 85% 
of the sukuk in the global financial market were not sharia-compliant and involved, in 
one way or another, a form of interest.599 The comment he made was in the context that 
he had withdrawn his own previously issued approval of sukuk. His statement indicates 
a problem related to the governance of setting sharia standards. After the statement, 
the demand for sukuk declined despite its previous authentication by the respective 
SSB and the whole industry was affected.600  
Standardisation would provide the market with discipline and a systematic operation 
that creates a more stable market and helps to develop its growth. While financial 
products have globally become less diverse in order to attract more customers, the 
customers and other stakeholders of Islamic finance need to be enticed in the same 
way by providing more standardised products.601 Having a special code of sharia 
standards would be valuable to sharia-compliance stakeholders, who would be able 
easily to measure the level of compliance and evaluate IFIs under a similar 
environment. Also, cross-border Islamic investments would find it easier to seek and 
utilise guaranteed sharia-compliant corporations. In addition, standardisation helps to 
create a more competitive environment, which is an important factor for the market. 
Different sharia standards will place IFIs within the same jurisdictions under different 
legal environments which can endanger certainty. Implementing a standardised sharia 
dynamics would place IFIs under the same circumstances and restrictions where they 
can fairly compete with no major effect.602 
These situations demonstrate the significance of standardisation and its effect on the 
marketability and acceptability of Islamic finance. The consistency and uniformity of 
Islamic financial products within the same jurisdiction would help to increase and 
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reinforce the credibility of IFIs.603 The standards and decisions set by an independent 
national board are deemed more credible by stakeholders than the ones made by 
internal SSBs. As the above instances show, if the SSB’s decision conflicts with a more 
known sharia scholar or authority such as OIC, the stakeholders’ credibility about sharia 
compliance and their trust of the relevant IFIs would be negatively affected. 
Inconsistency may lead to the issuance of strange fatwas in the industry which 
threatens the credibility of these products in the eyes of Muslim communities, and 
hence the development and the stability of the industry in general.604 Customers not 
only want stamped products; their strong commitment to sharia might lead them to 
doubt the credibility of a fatwa if they feel that their duty of commitment has not been 
discharged. In light of the different interpretations, declaring the standards and Islamic 
rulings that the IFIs may use in their products would give clients more satisfaction.605 
The supervision by the central banks of IFIs would be more effective and less costly 
if the sharia rulings were consistent.606 As argued in Chapter Three, IFIs require special 
financial regulations since they might face challenges by operating under conventional 
financial regulations. Also, competing with the conventional financial institutions would 
be difficult under regulations that ignore the nature of Islamic finance requirements. 
Standardisation would pave the way for the creation of an Islamic financial market as a 
secondary market to help IFIs to operate under a similar environment.607 It could help 
the financial regulators to understand Islamic finance better and so react accordingly. 
The role of national SSBs could be extended to cooperate with the financial regulators 
and other standard setters. Such cooperation is necessary to help the regulators to 
understand the needs and special requirements of the Islamic finance industry. National 
SSBs would represent IFIs in their special requirements regarding sharia-compliance 
and help the financial regulators to tailor convenient regulations for the Islamic finance 
markets. This cooperation may also extend to helping the financial regulators to set 
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guidelines and rules for dealing internationally with foreign IFIs who might adopt 
different sharia standards or with conventional financial institutions. The lack of 
standardisation is, also, seen as an obstacle to the financial and monetary regulation in 
the industry. The financial regulators tend to adopt certain international standards to 
secure the financial markets, such as Basle Accords. However, the global Islamic 
finance industry faces challenges related to developing prudential regulatory standards 
across IFIs in different jurisdictions due to the lack of uniformity within the practice of 
Islamic finance.608 
Standardisation by a national board would make the process of sharia standard 
setting more institutionalised rather than leaving it to individual efforts. This is an 
important factor for improving the industry and keeping it long-standing. In fact, the 
instability of opinions is one of the major obstacles to the development of the industry. 
Many opinions have been subjected to change once the members have been replaced, 
a situation that calls for a better mechanism for ensuring as much consistency over time 
as possible.609 National SSBs should be able to revise and develop standards through 
collective dialogue and deliberation.610 They would be able to assess the market needs 
more generally and efficiently before setting the standards and creating a national 
sharia policy. Also, the complexity of the market requires sophistication in the process of 
setting standards. National SSBs would be better equipped to do this job efficiently 
while individual SSBs may set standards that might harm the industry due to their 
obstructed view of the market.  
When sukuk emerged as an alternative to conventional bonds, the Central Bank of 
Bahrain issued sukuk valued at 40 million Bahraini Dinar (more than USD100 million). 
The issued structure of sukuk was authenticated by its SSB. Later, two prominent SSB 
members withdrew their approval of such a structure after they discovered that the 
structure was artificially sharia-compliant.611 They confessed that they had not 
                                            
608 Hakim, 'Harmonization of Shariah Rulings in Islamic Finance: An Analysis' (n 601) at 272 
609 Almuzeini, 'Business Practices According to Islamic Legislation in Islamic Financial Institutions' (n 577) 
at 8 
610 Schneiberg and Bartley, 'Organizations, Regulation, and Economic Behavior: Regulatory Dynamics 
and Forms from the Nineteenth to Twenty-First Century' (n 585) at 42 




examined the format in depth and had ignored major facts which affected the 
decision.612 As a new product at that time, it was challenging for a regular SSB to 
examine a complicated structure in depth. New complicated products are susceptible to 
a similar situation. Recently, short selling was approved to be introduced into the capital 
market in Saudi Arabia.613 It is defined as “the action of selling borrowed securities; 
provided that the investor returns them to the lender within an agreed upon period”.614 
The process of short selling is questioned as a sharia-compliant action and might evoke 
different reactions from different SSBs. An executive from a Saudi IFI stated that its 
SSB was working to design a compliant version of a short selling product.615 The 
individual efforts of such a complicated financial operation may result in contradicting 
views, followed by negative consequences in the market due to the absence of clear 
standards that deal efficiently with new issues. Because of the institutional shortage in 
the industry, the solutions sought to overcome its obstacles are temporary rather than 
strategic.616 New structures would be subject to more efficient examination by an 
equipped standard-setting board that could deal with new issues and publish relevant 
standards. Also, the process of central standardisation should involve a careful 
assessment and analysis of the market. Therefore, the standards would be tailored to 
be more suitable for the overall industry. For example, the different environments in 
which sharia-compliant products are offered need to be carefully analysed in order to 
apply proper standards in each one. Fatwas might differ considering whether the sharia 
principle is applied in a fully-fledged Islamic institution, gradually converting, an Islamic 
window within a conventional institution, or just sharia-compliant products within non-
compliant ones.617 In such a situation, each sector might need some exceptions or 
special considerations to apply sharia rules due to its unique circumstances. What is 
deemed proper for Islamic windows to provide as a compliant product might not be a 
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satisfactory sharia-compliant product in fully-fledged Islamic institutions. In the absence 
of a high legislation authority, the industry would be subject to greater diversification and 
inconsistency. Individual SSBs might not set the proper standards for each sector and 
many sharia standards might be improperly applied and used interchangeably across 
these different sectors. The fact that many sharia members simultaneously work in 
SSBs in different sectors could increase this chance. This situation of great 
inconsistency would be very confusing to the market.   
Another aspect of standardisation is the cost associated with having SSBs to set 
standards in every IFI. This would be very costly, particularly for smaller banks.618 The 
cost is reduced when Islamic principles are clear to practitioners and investors and IFIs 
will not have to have a lengthy, costly process for obtaining sharia approval from their 
SSBs.619 As a result, the transaction cost to the industry as well as to the regulators will 
be reduced.620 Also, standardisation reduces the chances of sharia risk since sharia 
rules would be clearer and easier to comply with.  
Overall, standardisation is important for improving the industry and bringing more 
satisfaction to the stakeholders. It provides the market with a better environment. In fact, 
the advantages of standardisation for the market have led IFIs to apply several 
strategies for achieving greater consistency. In the absence of an efficient 
comprehensive standardisation framework, IFIs recruit the same SSB members as a 
strategy of standardisation that helps to minimise inconsistency. However, such a 
mechanism is not an effective tool of governance and would not solve the issue. It 
rather creates a monopolistic behaviour where the circles of the IFIs could have an 
influence over the members of the SSB.621 Such a situation would increase the conflict 
of interests where IFIs would find it easier to control the few scholars who could 
monopolise the practice and influence the outcome of sharia decisions to better serve 
the IFIs’ perspectives. Also, it is costly for each IFI to recruit its own legislative body. 
Instead, these members should be recruited to a central SSB and enforce their 
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decisions and standards among IFIs. In fact, multi-membership has negative effects on 
confidentiality and conflict of interests, which will be discussed later.622 
5.7 The Level of Standardisation: National or International 
Standardisation seems to be an obvious need in the industry. The discussion goes 
beyond whether to standardise the sharia principles and rules or not. The feasibility of 
international harmonisation has become a subject in the context of the standardisation 
discussion, especially with the rise of international organisations concerned with such 
issues, like AAOIFI. The enforcement of international standards, however, remains an 
issue, especially in the absence of effective national mechanisms for standardisation.  
International harmonisation has become a trend in the legal framework in different 
disciplines. They tend to abandon the traditional scheme of standardisation where the 
national bodies have the exclusive authority to set standards and turn toward a new 
form which increasingly relies on regulatory bodies that are external to the state.623 
Globalisation requires less diversity in these rules for practical and economic reasons. 
In the accounting and auditing field, the international harmonisation of the standards 
with the adoption of IFRS is seen as a huge achievement in terms of overcoming 
different cultural, legal, regulatory, and economic priorities among nations.624 It came as 
a result of the global financial interconnection between individuals, institutions, and 
governments.625 The divergence in the standards between jurisdictions could be a 
critical challenge for companies wishing to expand their business internationally and 
could restrict the international trade as well. Where these are not obligatory, companies 
prefer to adopt the international standards to enhance their foreign exposure; increase 
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customer recognition; secure foreign capital; and reduce the political cost of 
international transactions.626  
The situation in Islamic finance is no different. It is the sharia-compliant version of 
these dealings and, so, exposed to the same circumstances. Therefore, the same result 
could be inferred in the Islamic industry. Harmonising sharia standards internationally 
could offer an economic advantage for IFIs, as it improves their international exposure 
and increases the understanding of customers who are interested in engaging in sharia-
compliant businesses cross-borders. They will find it safer to invest in foreign IFIs as 
these institutions have more consistent sharia products. The cost of international 
transactions will therefore be reduced. Without a level of international standardisation, 
products and then the whole industry would see major inconsistency between different 
jurisdictions.  
Jabbar lists some justifications for having an international level of harmonisation that 
covers the whole industry.627 First, it is a practical way to market and promote financial 
sharia-compliant products across different jurisdictions. Second, it would be easier to 
assess the level of compliance by the rating agencies. Third, more certainty and 
confidence about the legal rights to products would be obtained. Fourth, the 
development and growth of the industry would be more promising. Fifth, international 
standards would mitigate political considerations which may be exercised to influence 
sharia standards.  
The global growth of Islamic industry is extraordinary and needs to be maintained 
through standardisation.628 The lack of standardisation is seen as the major barrier to 
the cross-border sale of Islamic financial products.629 The International Organization of 
Securities Commissions Report states that harmonisation is an essential factor in 
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enhancing the spread of Islamic finance globally.630 Duplicate sharia standards applied 
cross-border create a challenge to the acceptance of the Islamic financial market 
globally as it would not be perceived as an integral market, which obstructs the flow of 
international Islamic finance.631 A non-standardised industry creates a possibility that 
one group of IFIs operating in different jurisdictions may have products that are deemed 
sharia-compliant in one jurisdiction but not in another.632 Moreover, international 
harmonisation would satisfy the need for a greater plurality of approaches and widen 
the scope for scholarly knowledge and intellectual depth in the process of setting sharia 
standards.633   
Also, international harmonisation helps IFIs in non-Islamic or secular jurisdictions. It 
provides a legal reference to the financial authorities in these jurisdictions. For example, 
the English courts in different cases have held that the term “sharia law” could not be a 
governing law since the rules of sharia are insufficiently precisely determined to govern 
commercial and financial transactions.634 Sharia law as a non-country law might not be 
considered by the Rome Convention, which provides that the choice of law should be a 
law of a particular country.635 Financial authorities and courts cannot judge between 
different interpretations within Islamic law.636 They would be in a neutral objective 
position that refrains from taking any religious point of view to ensure that they are in an 
equal position regarding all different religious and cultural backgrounds.637 The absence 
of definite references to Islamic finance law has challenged the industry in these 
jurisdictions. Harmonisation would be a major determinant for ensuring the 
enforceability of the contracts as civil courts could depend on these standards in 
disputes which would contribute to the development of Islamic finance globally.638 When 
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an IFI in non-Islamic jurisdictions adopts a unified set of international sharia standards 
as a superior reference, the courts may find it justifiable as a referencing law which 
could be easily defined, especially if these standards are adopted by some Islamic 
countries which would meet the requirements of the Rome Convention. Without a doubt, 
enforcement is better assured through explicit reference to well-defined standards.  
In his proposal for standardisation, Mashal argues that the international standards 
should substitute the need to establish a national SSB for standardisation.639 However, 
international standards could be too general to have a consistent market. International 
harmonisation does not replace the need to have a national board for the local 
assessment of application. Applying certain international standards might cause 
difficulties due to the different legal requirements, geographical regions, or cultural 
backgrounds. These different circumstances may require the different tailoring of 
standards. Therefore, the international standards need to be sufficiently general to 
cover as many cases as possible. Individual jurisdictions should be given the room to 
differ regarding the level of specification and requirement for application. Therefore, a 
national agency should adopt and tailor these standards according to the local needs. In 
fact, it is inferred from other experiences that international harmonisation does not mean 
total consistency cross-nations but that there should be a room for different 
interpretations driven by the cultural differences. Although the aim of the international 
accounting and auditing standards is to provide consistency within audit practice 
globally, total consistency is too difficult to achieve, given the different regulatory 
requirements and cultural backgrounds that each nation has.640 Due to these variations, 
harmonisation in the global auditing practice is not absolute since the international 
standards are usually tailored nationally to suit the local circumstances.641   
Probably a more practical proposal is provided by Khan who suggests that 
standardisation should take two forms; nationally, where each country should clearly 
standardise the legal opinions followed by its IFIs to clarify any ambiguity for 
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stakeholders; and globally to mitigate the effect of the diversification between different 
jurisdictions by establishing international coordination to standardise the different 
approaches.642 The proposal suggests that the international effort of standardisation 
should provide jurisdictions with a defined regulatory framework and standards to apply 
regarding monitoring, supervision, and assessment. 
There are some positive efforts toward global standardisation which might be helpful 
to build on. OIC, recognised by a large majority of scholars, could be a possible player 
in this approach.643 However, this organisation is concerned with general issues of 
Islamic law and is not exclusively applied in the Islamic finance industry. AAOIFI, IFSB, 
and IIFM are more sophisticated organisations which specialise in Islamic finance. In 
addition to sharia, accounting, governance, prudential, and ethical standards are the 
concern of these organisations. These standards also help to harmonise sharia 
principles. Sharia standards, the main issue considered in this chapter, are more 
comprehensively considered by AAOIFI, which has issued, to date, 57 sharia 
standards.644 Not all jurisdictions that are members of AAOIF have adopted sharia 
standards as mandatory as there are many only use them as guidelines.645 It is 
expected that many countries will eventually adopt the AAOIFI standards in response to 
the rapid growth of their Islamic financial systems and the need to resolve conflicts 
between the legal opinions issued by SSBs.646 However, the mere adoption of the 
standards could not be effective with a lack of a national governance mechanism. A 
national SSB must be established in order to provide national legitimacy; adopt more 
detailed or additional standards for local applications; and set modifications or 
exceptions to certain standards, if necessary. As seen above, the current practice of 
national SSBs needs a stronger and more effective role for standardisation which 
should substitute any similar role performed within IFIs. Compliance with the standards 
and accountability framework is another concern that needs to be addressed nationally 
and will be discussed in the following chapters.  
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5.8 Challenges Related to Standardisation 
Despite its benefits, the way to achieve standardisation may not be easy. The efforts 
toward standardisation need to address and overcome certain obstacles and 
challenges. Political and legal recognition is one of these challenges. IFIs in non-Islamic 
and secular jurisdictions might have difficulties adopting international sharia standards 
due to their special legal requirements which make the application of certain standards 
inappropriate. Legal restrictions could be the main challenge in this regard. The special 
requirements of Islamic finance, which sometimes needs tailored rules different from the 
conventional ones, may not exist in these jurisdictions. While the differences could be 
mitigated by having a national SSB authority and special legal frameworks, this could be 
a sensitive issue in secular states.647 Therefore, some sharia standards set by 
international organisations might not be legally applicable in these jurisdictions.  
In such a situation, there are two possible solutions. First, the international 
organisations could adopt parallel standards for such jurisdictions that face challenges 
in adopting the regular standards. However, these parallel standards might not work 
consistently in every jurisdiction due to their different legal frameworks and rules 
governing the industry. An alternative solution could be to establish a self-regulating 
non-profit association composed of Islamic finance experts to promote the 
harmonisation and convergence of sharia interpretations.648 This solution could be an 
ideal approach, especially for non-Islamic jurisdictions. 
In fact, standardisation might face a similar challenge even in some Islamic states 
which consider such an issue a private religious matter, in which they prefer there to be 
little or no interference. Saudi Arabia is an example of an Islamic state which politically 
does not prefer to interfere in any legal arrangement regarding Islamic finance. In the 
absence of a strong governance framework of standardisation, IFIs in these jurisdictions 
may agree to standardise their sharia principles and rules by establishing a private 
mechanism as a reference for standardisation.  
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Another obstacle is the resistance to standardisation by some sharia scholars. They 
might oppose the monopoly of Islamic law interpretation.649 In their view, 
standardisation would damage ijtihad, which is the feature that enables Islamic law to 
survive in all times and places.650 Making a view from one doctrine dominant over 
another might not be universally acceptable.651 A prominent SSB member explained his 
personal view of why even national harmonisation is unacceptable.652 First, it would 
lead to restricting fatwas to only a few scholars, which creates a monopoly, a situation 
that is inconsistent with the Islamic principles that give qualified scholars with different 
understandings the freedom to interpret Islamic sources. Second, harmonising Islamic 
finance standards is not a practical approach due to the variable nature of the products 
which change rapidly and make it difficult for only one authority to issue standards.    
The issue of practicality has been discussed and it has been argued that 
standardisation is necessary for the discipline and prosperity of the industry. The claim 
that standardisation damages ijtihad is inaccurate. Standardisation does not end the 
religious concept of ijtihad and the freedom for qualified scholars to make different 
interpretations of Islamic law. It only adopts an appropriate opinion for a formal 
application which is a necessary arrangement. Other sharia perspectives are still 
considered in other forms and might prevail to be adopted after all. The practice of 
adopting one opinion over another is even practised in one way or another as it is the 
way in which OIC adopts the opinion of its majority of scholars. In fact, standardisation 
could improve ijtihad in Islamic finance subjects in a more effective way. Sharia experts’ 
efforts would be collectively organised in authorities and organisations, which would 
ensure a better quality of decisions, especially if they are equipped with experts from 
other disciplines.    
As indicated earlier, the issue of codification in Islamic law is controversial in Saudi 
Arabia. Scholars who oppose codification are mainly influenced by the conservative 
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school in Saudi Arabia.653 This makes setting standards in Saudi Arabia more 
challenging because it confronts the central religious opposition to standardisation. The 
religious and political authorities might eventually give more consideration to the 
benefits of standardisation to outweigh any other concerns.  
5.9 The Case Study of NCB’s IPO 
Three billion shares owned by Public Investment Fund, a Saudi governmental 
institution, representing 15% of the NCB’s shares, were offered in the market for Saudi 
individual investors during the period from 19 October 2014 to 2 November 2014. In 
addition, two billion shares owned by the same governmental institution, representing 
10% of the NCB’s shares, were allocated to the Public Pension Agency, another 
governmental institution, generating a total of five billion shares, constituting the NCB’s 
IPO, approved by the Capital Market Authority’s (CMA) Board in Saudi Arabia in 
21/09/2014.654 This USD 6 billion IPO was the biggest not only in Saudi Arabia but also 
in the Arab financial world and the second biggest in the world in 2014 after Alibaba.655  
The IPO sparked a huge, controversial debate in Saudi society regarding whether or 
not NCB is Islamic. Society is strongly tied by Islamic rules so arguments about the 
IPO’s compliance with sharia were raised. The opportunity for this profitable investment 
was a strong incentive for buying NCB shares, so the discussion spread nationwide via 
social media. Many people were seeking different sharia scholars’ opinions and their 
justifications before deciding whether or not to buy NCB shares. 
5.9.1 A Brief History of NCB 
In 1953, a Saudi Royal Decree was issued to establish NCB as the first Saudi 
licensed bank in the country.656 Initially, NCB was formed as a general partnership 
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654 The Capital Market Authority announces the Initial Public Offering of The National Commercial Bank 
<http://www.cma.org.sa/En/News/Pages/CMA_N_1539.aspx> accessed 12/11/2014  
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following a merger of two currency houses: Saleh and Abdulaziz Kaki, and the Salem 
bin Mahfouz Company. Then, it was converted into a limited joint stock company in 
1997. By 1999, the Saudi government, represented by the Public Investment Fund and 
the General Organization for Social Insurance, owned the majority of NCB’s shares.657 
Prior to offering its NCB shares to the public, the two Saudi governmental institutions 
held 79.29% of the shares.658 As mentioned earlier, NCB was the first to decide to 
convert some of its branches into Islamic services and, in 2005, the board decided to 
convert all of the remaining ones. 
5.9.2 NCB’s Sharia Board 
Three sharia members comprise NCB’s SSB, which is responsible for approving 
sharia-compliant products in the bank. The board is supported by the Sharia Group, 
which is an internal department of the bank that assists with other sharia-related day-to-
day requirements.659 The members do not exclusively serve on NCB’s Sharia Board as 
they participate in many sharia boards and committees, both nationally and 
internationally. Some banks share exactly the same sharia board members. Table 5.1 
shows the membership of the NCB’s sharia members in the other national bank’s sharia 
boards at that time. The table demonstrates that 9 out of 12 banks had at least two 
members of NCB’s SSB. Abdullah Almaneea, chair of NCB’s SSB, is the chair of all of 
the sharia boards of which he is a member. 
The body of the SSB, according to the bank, is independent. However, its authority 
is derived from the bank’s board of directors.660 
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accessed 13/11/2014 
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Table 5.1: Membership of NCB's Sharia Board in the national banks' sharia boards (As of May 2014)661 
 Abdullah 
Almaneea 




1) NCB Chair Member Member No 
2) The Saudi British 
Bank (SABB) 




Chair Member _ Yes 
4) Alinma Bank _ _ _ Yes 
5) Banque Saudi 
Fransi 
Chair Member _ Yes 
6)    Riyad Bank                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              Chair Member _ Yes
7) Samba Chair Member _ Yes 





Chair Member Member No 
9) Al Rajhi Bank _ _ _ Yes 
10) Arab National 
Bank (ANB) 
Chair Member _ Yes 
11) Bank Albilad Chair _ _ Yes 
12) Bank Aljazira Chair Member _ Yes 
 
                                            
661 NCB: Sharia Committee (n 659); SABB: Shariah Committee <http://www.sabb.com/1/2/sabb-
en/about-us/profile/sahariah_advisory_commitee> accessed 29/5/2015; SAIB: Sharia Committee 





5/L0lDUmlTUSEhL3dHa0FKRnNBLzROV3FpQSEhL2Vu/> accessed 29/5/2015; Banque Saudi Fransi: 
Sharia Board <https://retail.alfransi.com.sa/islamic-banking/our-sharia-board> accessed 29/5/2015; Riyad 
Bank: Islamic Banking <https://www.riyadbank.com/en/personal-banking/learn/islamic-banking> accessed 
29/5/2015; SAMBA: Islamic Products <http://www.samba.com/en/personal-banking/islamic-
products.html> accessed 29/5/2015; SHB: Sharia Board Members 
<http://shb.com.sa/en/about/AboutSHB/ShariahBoardmembers.aspx> accessed 29/5/2015; Al Rajhi 
Bank: Sharia Group <http://www.alrajhibank.com.sa/en/about-us/pages/sharia-group.aspx> accessed 
29/5/2015; ANB: Islamic Banking Division Profile <https://www.anb.com.sa/about_islamic.asp> accessed 
29/5/2015; Bank Albilad: Sharia Board 
<http://www.bankalbilad.com/sites/en/Albilad1/Pages/Sharia.aspx> accessed 29/5/2015; Bank Aljazira: 




5.9.3 The Controversies Related to NCB’s IPO 
Many Saudis wanted to know, as before every IPO takes place in Saudi Arabia, 
whether it is permitted, under Islamic law, to buy shares in NCB. Although NCB 
declared all its branches would be converted into Islamic banks, the problem with non-
compliant assets persisted. 
Many scholars, including several prominent members of other SSBs, declared that 
participation in the NCB’s IPO is not permitted since it has too many sharia non-
compliant assets. Publicly, this view was received very well, especially after some 
members of CRLO issued a fatwa, only a few days before the IPO, declaring that 
participating in NCB’s IPO is not permitted under sharia.662 Although CRLO decisions 
are not legally binding, they are highly respected and it is hard to criticise them publicly. 
On the same day as the CRLO’s fatwa, a statement legalising the IPO under sharia was 
issued by NCB’s Sharia Board.663 664 These conflicting statements made this IPO a 
controversial topic in the country. The Grand Mufti, who is also chair of both BSU and 
CRLO, was asked about the IPO during an interview.665 The Mufti, whose opinion is 
respectfully followed, especially by other official sharia scholars,666 stated that people 
should not participate in any IPO of a company that deals with interest, indicating that 
NCB’s IPO is not permitted under sharia. Then, the chair of NCB’s SSB declared, during 
an interview, that the statement that NCB’s SSB issued to defend the IPO is 
meaningless in light of the official statement issued by CRLO and the opinion of the 
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663 Since NCB is not fully Islamic, some decisions, as the decision of the IPO, do not have to pass its 
SSB. 










665 Grand Mufti and NCB's IPO (Interview) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0_tkxrfUClY> accessed 
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Mufti, since the statement conflicts with the highest authority of fatwa in the country.667 
This declaration came a few days after an interview during which he justified NCB’s IPO 
as being sharia-compliant and defended its SSB’s statement.668  
The argument about NCB’s IPO relates to two main points. The first is whether or 
not NCB’s assets are sharia-compliant. Although there was no doubt that NCB had 
interest-based assets and profits, the argument focused on whether the interest could 
be tolerated. The statement of NCB’s SSB argued that the interest paid by the 
government for its bonds to the bank should be deducted by the same percentage it 
owned in the bank because interest paid by the beneficiary itself is lawful. This would 
make the remaining percentage of interest sufficiently small to invest in the bank.669 
Some legal experts have challenged this justification as it ignores an obvious legal 
principle; that corporations are separate legal entities from their owners or other 
individuals. Even though the bank is majority-owned by the government, it is, by law, a 
separate legal entity that has a separate existence from its shareholders. Therefore, 
regardless of its ownership in the bank, the government is not the beneficiary when 
paying the bank interest since it pays a different person, namely the corporation.670 
Furthermore, Muhamad Alosaimi, a prominent SSB member, issued a statement 
challenging the justification of the decision taken by NCB’s SSB. His statement argued 
that, in spite of deducting the interest paid by the government, NCB still holds too many 
non-sharia compliant assets based on the criteria that NCB’s SSB sets for the 
investment of NCB’s Islamic Mutual Funds, so this IPO should not be permitted even if 
the same SSB’s criteria were to be applied.671 
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The second point related to the argument is whether the intention to convert into a 
fully Islamic bank justifies the investment. According to the SSB’s statement, the bank 
had passed a plan and demonstrated a serious intention to convert, which alone, 
according to some scholars, justifies investing in the bank. Alosaimi, in his statement, 
argues that the bank should have shown more of a serious move toward conversion by 
applying clear standards such as those set up by AAOIFI, which imposes a strict time 
limit for conversion.  
5.9.4 The Outcomes of the IPO  
The public reaction to this IPO is important for measuring the effectiveness and 
credibility of this non-standardised industry. Investors had to choose between two 
difficult options. On the one hand, NCB was a very profitable investment opportunity. 
According to its prospectus, NCB’s share return was 19% in the financial year preceding 
the IPO.672 Also, the share price had been set significantly under its market value so it 
was a good investment for the middle classes wishing to make profits.673 On the other 
hand, fatwas prohibiting the IPO were widely adopted among sharia scholars. This was 
a tough choice in a society where people strongly adhere to their religious beliefs.   
The outcomes of the IPO (Table 5.2) reveal interesting data. The IPO was only 50% 
covered until the 11th day after it was made public. Surprisingly, this percentage grew 
dramatically on the 12th day to around 210% and continued to rise dramatically until the 
IPO closed, with 2301% coverage. One could not have predicted these percentages 
after 11 days of weak turnout. Banks played an important role in facilitating many loans 
to finance the purchase of NCB shares.674 Possibly, excessive soft loans were offered 
to balance the weak outcomes of the participants in one of the most important IPOs in 
the country. 
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Although NCB’s IPO ended up with high coverage, the number of participants was 
relatively small. Despite the total of SAR 311 billion (more than USD 82.5 billion) 
collected, only 1.26 million people participated in this IPO. The result was very weak 
compared with the previous IPOs of Islamic banks, whose activities were unproblematic 
from the sharia perspective. In Albilad Bank’s IPO in 2005, more than 8.85 million 
participated, making a total of SAR 7,750 million (more than USD 2 billion).675 In 2008, 
8.8 million participated in another Islamic bank’s IPO, Alinma Bank, for a total of SAR 
18,270 million (more than USD 4.8 billion).676 There were around seven times more 
participants in each bank compared with NCB. Taking into consideration that, unlike 
NCB, Albilad and Alinma banks were not operating prior to their IPO so they could not 
prove their profitability, the number of participants in NCB’s IPO was very weak for such 
a profitable investment, especially when compared with the take-up in the other banks 
mentioned above. In this regard, a Saudi analyst stated, “If NCB was an Islamic IPO, 
the number of subscribers would have definitely been very high. Clients in the region 
prefer Islamic services. It’s a big deal for the region, especially Saudis”.677 
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Table 5.2: Progress of NCB's IPO678 
Date (2014) % of coverage Number of Participants (*1000) Money Collected 
(*1000,000) SAR 
19-20/10 6.1% 166 824 
21/10 10.2% 266 1380 
22/10 13.9% 355 1880 
23/10 18% 432 2290 
24-26/10 22.3% 551 3010 
27/10 27.2% 611 3680 
28/10 35.4% 684 4780 
29/10 50.3% 757 6790 
30/10 210% 857 28340 
31/10 281.1% 904 37950 
1/11 480.8% 947 64910 
2/11 2307% 1260 311000 
 
5.9.5 Lessons from the Case 
The case of NCB highlights very important issues regarding standardisation. In this 
case, both profits and moral motivations were apparently present and measured in 
society. Despite the high profit motivation of the IPO, the number of subscribers was 
small because many doubted the legitimacy of this investment and so considered it 
morally unacceptable for them to subscribe. The indefinite legitimacy obviously caused 
public and market confusion. Therefore, the call for a mechanism to govern Islamic 
banking standards should receive more attention after this case. 
The important question in the case is not whether NCB’s assets are Islamic or not 
but how to determine whether they are. Clearly, the absence of rules and regulations 
defining and governing Islamic banking services was the real issue. The adoption of 
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standards determining clear procedures for banks that wish to convert to Islamic ones 
would provide an important legal tool for the case to measure how serious NCB was in 
its endeavour to convert. Such guidelines are of interest to certain jurisdictions, like 
Qatar, that have recently adopted a system of sharia governance.679 It was explained 
earlier that national standardisation should place special focus on the different 
environments, including converting banks, which was a subject of difference between 
scholars in this case.  
The case reveals the need for a disciplined environment such as the financial market 
for standardisation. While the differences in opinions within sharia is one of sharia’s 
advantages, the market needs some level of consistency of opinion to avoid 
unpredictability being caused by the wide level of sharia divergence. In this case, the 
percentage of acceptable interest was subject to disagreement, so the decision was 
strongly affected by this factor. Would it have been the same if the industry had a 
mechanism for standardising sharia opinions? For example, if the percentage of 
acceptable interest to invest in companies was standardised, would sharia scholars still 
disagree in the same way that confused the investors?  
Another important issue the case raises is the credibility of the SSB. Despite the IPO 
being declared a sharia-compliant investment by the sharia scholars closest to the 
bank, the statement issued by NCB’s SSB did not receive widespread public 
acceptance. Although this case alone is insufficient to draw a conclusion about the 
credibility level of the SSB, it should raise a concern regarding the impartiality of SSB 
members when issuing decisions for their relevant institutions. This case also shows 
that, where the impartiality of the SSB’s decisions is questioned, the public’s trust might 
be significantly affected. Thus, stricter governance mechanisms of the process of 
setting sharia standards need to be imposed in the industry. An independent national 
Sharia Standard-setting Board seems an ideal solution. 
The Islamic banking industry has been legally ignored for a long time in Saudi 
Arabia. This case might attract greater attention to this issue. It would be better for the 
                                            




market as well as the public if the industry were to be standardised. Standardisation is 
part of the legal recognition of the industry that the country needs in order to gain more 
trust and thus to continue as a promising industry. Otherwise, the public’s trust could be 
lost.  
5.10 Conclusion 
Autonomy should be strongly maintained in the process of rule-making. Under the 
framework of sharia governance, the method for setting sharia standards needs more 
governance to ensure a higher level of objectivity and independence. The current 
practices where the SSB is given, to different extents, the authority of legislation and 
setting sharia standards for its relevant IFIs creates a situation of conflict of interest. 
Being hired by IFIs, sharia members have a great financial interest which might lead 
them to shop for fatwas and choose an opinion that does not reflect sharia interests in 
the best way. Also, the SSB members, in most cases, combine ex-ante and ex-post 
roles which is a compromise of independence. Therefore, giving the individual IFIs the 
right to legislate, even on a small scale, would weaken the sharia governance structure. 
Consequently, stakeholders might doubt the legitimacy of sharia-compliance.  
Therefore, the process of setting sharia standards needs to be assigned solely to an 
independent national Sharia Standard-setting Board. Individual SSBs should not 
participate in such a role. Although some jurisdictions tend to form a national SSB, there 
are limitations to its role as a sole authority for setting sharia standards and individual 
SSBs are somehow involved in such a role. There is a need for a stronger governance 
framework for these agencies to be the sole and final responsibility for independent 
standardisation. This leads to more legitimate sharia decisions. Moreover, this would 
benefit the market since it would enforce a standardised set of sharia rules. The 
standardised market provides more discipline and a systematic operation, so the 
stakeholders will have greater clarity about sharia products, which will positively affect 
their trust. Strong national governance over standardisation would eventually ensure a 
more standardised market globally. This has been a concern for the Islamic finance 




However, the effect of these international organisations remains minimal without a 
strong mechanism being enforced nationally. 
In many cases, the market was susceptible to the weak governance of the process 
of setting sharia standards. Recently, the market has experienced several instances in 
this regard, some of which were remarkably large, such as the case of sukuk in Bahrain 
and NCB’s IPO, which were highlighted in this chapter. 
Standardising sharia rules in the Islamic finance industry would have a positive 
effect on the market and facilitate its growth globally. It provides IFIs in non-Islamic and 
secular jurisdictions with greater legitimacy. However, there might be political 
challenges associated with its legal recognition. Religiously, standardisation might also 
face opposition from the conservative school of Islamic law, which is against 
codification. The considerable growth of the industry might eventually require a 














Chapter Six: Sharia-compliance and the Accountability Framework 
6.1 Introduction 
It was highlighted earlier that the role of the SSB falls into three categories: setting 
sharia standards, providing sharia assurance, and acting as counsel to the company 
regarding sharia-compliance matters. The previous chapter discussed the role of setting 
sharia standards and why the SSB should not be authorised to perform this role. 
Instead, it has been argued that this should be the responsibility of a national 
independent Sharia Standard-setting Board. This chapter focuses on the other primary 
role of the SSB, which relates to sharia auditing. The perceived SSB role as sharia 
auditors makes it necessary to study and analyse its position regarding how sharia 
interest could be assured for the stakeholders. 
For a more comprehensive examination of the audit role, the accountability 
framework in IFIs needs to be analysed to clarify the structure within which the audit 
should be conducted. Thus, a more explicit picture about how external sharia auditing 
should be provided to assure stakeholders about sharia-compliance can be drawn. This 
assurance requires a clear accountability framework in order to achieve this goal more 
effectively. To reach this, it is essential to identify why accountability is important in 
sharia governance, who is accountable, for what, to whom, and how. The analysis also 
includes an assessment of the current situation. 
Accountability is a concept that cannot merely be used interchangeably to achieve 
different objectives. While a specific framework is sufficient to promote accountability in 
certain areas, it might work less well regarding other objectives due to different 
priorities.680 Implementing the accountability framework applied in corporate governance 
might not be appropriate for sharia governance. Therefore, the analysis of accountability 
within sharia governance needs to be examined in light of its own objectives and 
priorities, which are not necessarily similar to those in corporate governance. 
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Arguably, sharia auditing faces two major problems: the lack of accountability and 
the lack of professionalism in conducting sufficient sharia audit which satisfies the 
interests of stakeholders. In this chapter, the former will be analysed in depth to explore 
what is actually desired in the accountability framework and so achieve more effective 
sharia supervision. The proposed framework should promote more professionalised 
practice, a matter that will be discussed in the next chapter. 
6.2 The Meaning of Accountability  
Despite its importance, accountability is a concept whose meaning has not been 
identified very well and certainly not with precision. In the corporate governance context, 
the concept has been used frequently but it lacks clarity regarding what the concept 
involves compared to its use in other contexts.681 This might be problematic when 
assessing an accountability framework because promoting accountability without 
precisely clarifying its meaning within its context may lead to the desired objectives and 
goals not being satisfied. Keay and Loughrey argue that accountability needs to be 
clearly explained because a lack of clarity makes assessment of whether a particular 
mechanism promotes accountability difficult, and which might lead to the adoption of 
poorly-designed accountability mechanisms.682 They explain that a sufficient 
accountable framework for some acts may not necessarily be satisfactory for others and 
may actually undermine them due to the existence of different goals and objectives. 
Thus, each action requires a separate assessment regarding what precisely is needed 
to promote its own accountability framework. 
Bovens describes accountability as a concept which could refer to a very general 
meaning as a virtue indicating a positive quality of organisations or a narrower meaning 
as a mechanism of the institutional relation or arrangement to hold an agent 
accountable to another agent or institution.683 As a virtue, the concept is difficult to 
define. Different languages, ideologies, times, and cultures have had an impact on how 
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to define and understand accountability.684 It could be viewed from different 
perspectives due to the different social and cultural theories that describe the 
concept.685 These different perspectives make it impossible to produce a single agreed-
upon definition of the general concept of accountability.686 The efforts in this regard 
result in a loosely-defined concept that covers many elements which are considered 
“umbrella concepts” in themselves, such as clarity, transparency, responsibility, 
involvement, deliberation, and participation.687 Sometimes, accountability is seen as a 
synonym for good governance.688 These concepts could be used as synonyms and may 
overlap with the concept of accountability but do not precisely describe it and many of 
them are, indeed, mechanisms used to achieve accountability.689 
For example, transparency and responsibility might, on occasions, be used 
interchangeably with accountability. However, this is somehow problematic since 
accountability has a broader meaning. Concerning transparency, it is seen as an 
important element of accountability. However, accountability involves more than 
revealing or reporting facts.690 Transparency alone could be meaningless for 
stakeholders since it may not necessarily lead to accurate or examined information. 
Therefore, transparency must be connected to accountability as one of its mechanisms 
for achieving meaningful information that has been subject to careful examination.691 
The situation is similar for the concept of responsibility, as it is seen as an essential part 
of accountability. Responsibility involves responding to the issues in question which is 
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an important aspect of accountability.692 As argued by Mulgan, accountability is an 
expanding concept which used to refer to a relatively limited meaning of being part of 
the concept of responsibility but its current meaning has expanded to cover 
responsibility as part of its meaning.693 
In the religious context, accountability is a common term used to describe the 
relationship between individuals and God. It is perceived as a vertical perspective 
process where answerability is owed to the proper authority in the higher parts of the 
order.694 In Islam, the concept has deep roots and is used to describe the relationship 
with God and the responsibility for individuals’ actions.695 Accountability, therefore, is a 
reference to the responsibility of Muslims to fulfil their duties as described by Islamic 
law.696 The reference to this meaning is drawn, in many instances, from the main 
sources of sharia. In the Quran, many verses describe accountability in general as 
relating to “one’s obligation to account to God on all matters pertaining to human 
endeavour for which every Muslim is accountable”.697 It also touches more specifically 
upon financial accountability, where fulfilling the financial trust placed on someone is 
strongly stressed.698 In Sunnah, the term has an identical usage. Prophet Mohammad 
(PBUH) stressed the accountability of individuals in different sayings. Prominent 
examples of his sayings in this regard are, “beware that every one of you is a shepherd 
and everyone is answerable with regard to his folks…” and “beware that every one of 
you is a guardian and every one of you shall be questioned with regard to his trust”.699 
Translations should be taken into account when accountability is discussed in 
different languages. In fact, one of the reasons for the vague meaning of accountability 
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might be the language factor and its use in English, which cannot be easily translated 
into other languages as they may lack the precise terms to describe it.700 Generally, 
answerability, questioning, and responsibility are common synonyms of accountability in 
the main sources of sharia law. They are, actually, the closest words in the Arabic 
language that can be used interchangeably to translate the term “accountability”. In 
Arabic, the words mas’ūliya or musāʾala could be used to describe accountability, as 
they refer to the same root in Arabic (saʾala) which means to ask or question. In the 
Saudi Corporate Governance Regulations, these two Arabic words are used to refer to 
questioning, liability, and responsibility, and are translated as “accountability” in the 
English version.701  
Due to the difficulty of identifying a precise meaning of accountability, referring the 
concept to the process and mechanisms to be achieved might be a more practical way 
to analyse its effectiveness in a specific area. The above explanation might help to 
perceive the concept in general but, in the end, the analysis needs to be applied as 
clearly as possible. It is also the aim of this chapter to examine accountability as a 
mechanism and a process to be applied within the sharia governance framework.  
Bovens describes accountability in this sense as a passive phenomenon, which is 
defined as “a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an 
obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and 
pass judgement, and the actor may face consequences”.702 Keay describes the 
mechanism of accountability as a process which involves four stages: reporting, 
explaining and justifying, questioning, and the possibility of the imposition of 
consequences, which could be positive or negative.703 The first stage is “informative 
accountability”.704 The accountable person or entity must report their conduct to their 
accountability reference point. The accountability relation does not exist without the 
obligation to disclose information about the procedures and outcomes of the conduct 
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and report any failure or incident associated with performing the task.705 In the second 
stage, the actor must provide an explanation as well as justification of the conduct which 
might be even more crucial if it has not been done according to the accepted values and 
standards. This is to ensure that nothing has been done to satisfy interests other than 
those of the accountees, which are usually the stakeholders in the corporate 
governance case.706 In the questioning stage, which might be called the answerability 
stage, the actor’s reasons are questioned, debated and interrogated to ensure the 
adequacy of the information and legitimacy of the conduct.707 The final stage concerns 
the consequences, which are the result of passing judgement either approving or 
condemning the conduct.708 This stage is called “coercive accountability”709 or 
“responsibility accountability”710 and strengthens the accountability by including the 
responsibility element in the concept to make it possible to hold the actor 
accountable.711 It might be described as the “weapon” of supervision in corporate 
governance.712 Coercive accountability represents a strong accountability form, where 
the possibility of punishment could produce a more effective accountability framework 
along with informative accountability.713 The punishments include fines, disciplinary 
measures, civil remedies, or even penal sanctions.714  
To examine the accountability framework in sharia auditing, these stages provide 
helpful guidelines regarding how accountability should be conducted but several 
questions need to be answered before doing this. First, why is accountability important 
in sharia auditing? Second, who is accountable? This touches on the SSB and 
discusses its position and eligibility within the accountability framework. Third, for what 
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is accountability to be rendered and to whom should it be required? This is important in 
identifying the stakeholders in sharia, the accountees, in order to draw up the desired 
accountability framework that is suitable for the specific purpose. After that, the stages 
of accountability are applied to discuss how the framework should protect the sharia 
interest. 
6.3 Why Accountability?  
6.3.1 Corporate Governance, Accountability, and Auditing  
Accountability is an important concept in corporate governance. As stated above, it 
may not always be differentiated from good governance. It is linked and regarded as a 
part of many corporate governance definitions.715 It is stated that governance, not only 
corporate governance, always assumes accountability.716 Enron and other scandals, 
which were caused mainly by a failure linked to accountability issues, prove that 
stronger accountability strengthens the governance structure.717  
Financial auditing and reporting are very closely linked to accountability.718 The 
American Audit Association (AAA) defines audit as a “systematic process of objectively 
obtaining and evaluating evidence regarding assertions about economic actions and 
events to ascertain the degree of correspondence between those assertions and 
established criteria and communicating the results to interested users”.719 As described 
in the Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, 
commonly known as the Cadbury Report, auditing is one of the main cornerstones of 
corporate governance because it provides a very important tool for ensuring that the 
required checks and balances are carried out.720 While the board is given a high level of 
authority in order to be more flexible in running the company, there is a need for 
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accountability to balance this authority and correct errors.721 This balance requires the 
use of sound audit practices where auditors are deemed independent and so protective 
of the shareholders’ interests.722 In fact, accountability exists very intensively in the role 
of external auditors.723 The role of auditing constitutes a key component in the 
accountability process where it goes beyond being an independent tool for verifying the 
reporting stage of accountability to providing the basis for other stages: explanation, 
questioning, and even holding accountors responsible.724 The connection between 
accountability and external auditors could not be clearer after Enron, where most of the 
legal reforms, such as Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the US, focus on the practice of external 
auditors. It is suggested that a failure to audit properly was a major cause of the 
collapse of Enron in 2001.725 Since then, significant steps have been taken to improve 
the effectiveness and independence of the audit function within the corporate 
governance frameworks, including the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) in the US and the 
Smith Report (FRC 2003) in the UK, which were issued in response to the collapse of 
Enron and many other large corporations.726  
6.3.2 The Rationales for Sharia Auditing 
Accountability and auditing share similar rationales. Many see the need to address 
agency problems as the primary rationale for accountability.727 Even outside the agency 
theory, accountability remains crucial. Shareholders need to know that their agents are 
acting appropriately and with clear motivation, and accountability might demonstrate 
situations of conflict of interest.728 Also, accountability aims to reinforce a trustworthy 
relationship between shareholders and the management regardless of the basis of this 
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relationship. It is unlikely that all shareholders will have the same level of confidence in 
their agents.729 Similarly, external audit is one of the main tools used within the 
corporate governance framework to protect the interests of stakeholders. Their 
independent position should provide objective opinions about the accuracy and 
credibility of the financial statements of the company. In the principal-agent relationship, 
different motivations and information asymmetries exist and impact the level of trust 
between the principals and agents. In such a situation, auditing is seen as a tool for 
aligning the interests of the agents with those of the principals and bringing more trust 
and credibility to their relationship by providing independent checks on the information 
presented by the agents.730 The credibility brought by external auditors is not exclusive 
to this relationship. In fact, auditing is characterised as a “link of trust” between the 
management and all other stakeholders whose relationship relies on audited information 
in the financial statements.731 In public companies, many use and refer to the 
information in the financial statements which makes external auditing a valuable source 
of trust to them. 
In sharia governance, sharia auditing has been introduced as a similar tool to 
conventional auditing. The concept has not been defined in a way that has attracted 
unanimous support.732 This might be due to the lack of professional practice of sharia 
auditing and the negligence regarding this important function. Bank Negara Malaysia 
defines sharia auditing as “the periodical assessment conducted from time to time, to 
provide an independent assessment and objective assurance designed to add value 
and improve the degree of compliance in relation to the IFI’s business operations, with 
the main objective of ensuring a sound and effective internal control system for sharia 
compliance”.733 A widely accepted definition of sharia auditing has been proposed by 
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Haniffa, who describes it as “a systematic process of objectively obtaining and 
evaluating evidence regarding assertions about religious and socio-economic actions 
and events, in order to ascertain the degree of correspondence between those 
assertions and the applicable financial reporting framework, including the criteria 
specified based on shariah principles as recommended by SSB, and communicating the 
results to all interested parties”.734 Theoretically, sharia auditing is essential in the 
framework of sharia governance, to be used by IFIs as a mechanism for preventing 
actions that are not sharia-compliant which might lead to greater sharia risk.735 For 
stakeholders, sharia auditing provides an independent certification that an IFI has an 
effective internal control system in order to comply with the sharia standards.736 
Additionally, sharia auditing is essential to protect the legal, image, and reputational 
risks that might arise for IFIs due to sharia non-compliance and whose effects could 
reach the entire industry.737  
Similar to conventional auditing, sharia governance needs auditing to protect sharia 
interests and provide a source of trust and comfort to the stakeholders by assuring them 
of sharia-compliance.738 To enhance the accountability framework, sharia auditing is 
essential, as it increases the stakeholders’ faith in the company.739 In fact, the agency 
problem exists in sharia governance. The management might not be strongly committed 
to ensuring sharia-compliance operations. Therefore, the stakeholders depend on the 
SSB as independent sharia auditors to protect the interest of sharia from any deviation. 
The SSB is delegated the power of ensuring that the company does not commit any 
sharia violation. However, the SSB, in its current position as an internal board within the 
company, creates a two-fold agency problem which might be similar to the relationship 
that exists between shareholders and the board of directors. Put differently, the agency 
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problem in sharia governance extends to include, in addition to the owners and 
management, other stakeholders of sharia as important elements of the sharia 
governance structure.740 This emphasises a more “stakeholder accountability” form, 
where the stakeholders are more valued than in the traditional accountability, which is 
addressed mainly to shareholders.741 Arguably, sharia auditing should be given even 
more value in sharia governance because the protection of sharia interest demands the 
mechanism of auditing more than do financial interests. Several reasons, I would argue, 
might explain this. 
First, although certification is the objective of both audits, the scope and aim of this 
certification differs between the sharia audit and the financial one. Considering the 
scope, sharia auditing is wider and broader.742 To satisfy sharia interest, the whole 
institution, not only the financial statements, should be audited. A sharia review is 
defined by AAOIFI as “an examination of the extent of an IFI’s compliance, in all its 
activities, with the sharia. This examination includes contracts, agreements, policies, 
products, transactions, memorandum and articles of association, financial statements, 
reports (especially internal audit and central bank inspection), circulars, etc”.743 
According to Najeeb and Ibrahim, sharia review is another term for sharia auditing and 
the AAOIFI’s definition is the most reflective definition of sharia auditing, which includes 
a wide range of functions.744 Due to its broader scope, sharia auditing needs to be 
considered as a more comprehensive tool which requires a wider range of 
qualifications. The purpose of certification is also different in the case of sharia auditing. 
Certification within financial audit concerns only the accuracy of the financial statements 
to represent the fair and true status of the company without any fraud or misleading 
information. It does not provide opinions about the economy, future validity, efficiency, 
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or effectiveness of the management.745 Put differently, the financial status and 
performance do not lie within the scope of the conventional audit. Therefore, financial 
audit does not decide how satisfactory the financial interest which is left to be evaluated 
and measured by the stakeholders after the auditors have ensured that the statements 
are accurate. However, sharia auditing is supposed to certify the status of the company 
regarding its compliance with sharia. To satisfy sharia interest, sharia auditors should 
report to the stakeholders an opinion about the religious validity of the company based 
on the specified sharia principles. Unlike the case of the financial audit in relation to 
financial performance, the stakeholders of sharia depend completely on the opinion of 
sharia auditors regarding the company’s sharia status, so stakeholders of sharia rely 
more strongly on sharia auditing, which should be reflected in sharia governance.   
Second, the nature of sharia interest offers little choice of mechanisms that might be 
used to protect the interest. Some tools used to safeguard the financial interest might 
not be suitable for protecting sharia interest. To protect financial interest, incentive-
based mechanisms might be set to spur the management to act in a way that promotes 
the owners’ wealth. For example, performance-related remuneration might work 
effectively to incentivise the management to work in the best interest of the 
shareholders.746 Such a mechanism, along with auditing, would back up and reinforce 
the trust and confidence produced by the agency problem. However, the situation 
regarding sharia interest is quite different because the payment incentive might not 
achieve its objective of aligning the interests of the executives with those of sharia. As 
argued before, sharia interest is a pass-or-fail interest, where an institution is either 
sharia-compliant or not. Unlike financial interest, evaluating compliance on a scale could 
not be a satisfactory measure for sharia stakeholders, so it is impractical to set 
incentives for the management based on the level of compliance.  
Third, compared with financial interest, it is more difficult to determine whether the 
sharia interest has been satisfied or not. Auditing might be the only effective tool 
available to ensure this. The management might find it easier to divert from sharia 
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interest than from the financial one. This is because corporations, including IFIs, are 
usually established mainly to generate a profit and increase the shareholders’ wealth. 
The whole setting of the company’s governance structure is set up in this direction and 
it is not easy for the management intentionally to direct the company toward a 
completely different direction to provide the managers with absolute personal interests. 
The financial interest of the company should be noticeable by shareholders through, 
mainly, the distribution of dividends and capital growth. Diversion would be noticeable 
even by other stakeholders. For instance, before the Enron Scandal became public, its 
employees were questioning the company’s accounting practice.747 There is, of course, 
room for manipulation to achieve personal interests, which is why auditing and other 
mechanisms are used but it is not usually easy to completely divert the company away 
from the financial interest. In IFIs, the financial interest is still the main objective. It is 
inaccurate, as some scholars argue, that IFIs belong to the broader sector of non-profit 
organisations.748 They could not be classified as religious institutions whose main goal 
is to promote religious values since they, like other financial institutions, seek profits to 
increase their shareholders’ wealth. The presence of sharia is only a condition for 
achieving the financial interest. For the stakeholders, sharia interest is not tangible 
because there is a very fine difference between sharia-compliance and non-compliance. 
The only indication to stakeholders that the interest has been satisfied is certification by 
experts. Sharia supervision is primarily designed for stakeholders of sharia who lack the 
necessary skills and knowledge to evaluate the level of sharia-compliance of the IFI.749 
Without the expert certification, the company could easily be directed to act against the 
interest of sharia.   
Fourth, unlike the financial interest, owners/shareholders might be less interested in 
sharia-compliance than other stakeholders, as will be explained later. As non-owners, 
these stakeholders do not have the protective tools given to shareholders who can hold 
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the board responsible for negligence via, for example, derivative actions. Audited 
reports are the best way for stakeholders to ensure that their interests are satisfied. 
Whereas these reports are a valuable resource for non-owners in corporate 
governance, they are more necessary in sharia governance because non-owners are 
likely to be more interested in sharia-compliance. This requires more consideration of 
sharia auditing as the most effective tool for protecting the interests of non-owners who 
are, in all probability, the main group of stakeholders. 
In addition to the agency problem, legitimacy is an important rationale of 
accountability.750 It provides a justification for the existence of an entity and the 
assumption that its action lies within the accepted norms, values or beliefs.751 
Accountability provides greater legitimacy power by increasing the confidence in the 
relationship through putting in place more transparent procedures.752  
The legitimacy of sharia auditing is questioned due to the ambiguity and vagueness 
surrounding the role of auditing by the SSB. Sharia auditing is improperly conducted as 
a result of the lack of an effective mechanism.753 The practice of sharia auditing does 
not reflect its importance as a crucial tool within sharia governance. The SSB is 
assumed to perform the role of sharia auditing despite its defective structure and lack of 
independence.754 It supervises the work of internal audit and conducts the review 
function which gives it a similar role to the external auditors.755 AAOIFI entrusts the SSB 
with the role of reviewing and ensuring compliance.756 In fact, in the jurisdictions where 
a central SSB exists to issue sharia standards, auditing is usually the focus of the role of 
the SSB within IFIs.757 This is the case in Malaysia758 and Indonesia.759 However, 
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although the SSB should certify sharia-compliance, it is rare that it conducts any ex-post 
review in this regard.760 Usually, this is entrusted to internal auditors alone.761 Even 
when sharia auditing is conducted by the SSB, auditing is not given the time and effort it 
needs. Certification reports are usually issued without a thorough audit, if an audit is 
even conducted.762 Due to its broader scope, sharia auditing requires more dedicated 
time than conventional auditing.763 However, the volume of work given to SSB’s 
members whose job is only part-time, and who may have multi-memberships of sharia 
boards, means that the need for a sharia audit is ignored. In practice, the role of setting 
sharia standards along with advising the institution on sharia issues constitutes the 
majority of the SSB’s work.764 Involvement in sharia auditing usually happens in the 
case of internal disputes over sharia issues which need the SSB intervention.765 In 
comparison, the practice of external financial auditing is well-governed which creates a 
functional gap between the reports of the external auditors and the SSB.766 This 
suggests the need to enhance the accountability framework in sharia audit for greater 
legitimisation. Alkahmees argues that the poor accountability framework in the SSB, 
even in jurisdictions with more advanced sharia governance frameworks, is linked to 
SSBs’ lack of legal standing within IFIs.767  
Linked with legitimacy is the idea that accountability is an important justification for 
power.768 The level of discretionary power that someone possesses is significant in 
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determining that individual’s degree of accountability.769 To legitimise this power and 
protect stakeholders from any abuse of it, a system of accountability is required.770 This 
applies to the SSB as a superior body within a company regarding sharia matters. The 
decision taken by SSBs has a very strong impact on the business. Such power should 
be partnered with a strong system of accountability. 
Public interest is another rationale for accountability since the public has a legitimate 
expectation that companies are managed properly.771 In sharia-compliance, the public 
and community as a whole is a genuine stakeholder. This will be explained later in this 
chapter. 
The above discussion provides justifications of the need for more consideration of 
accountability within sharia governance. The framework of accountability should take 
into account the unique requirements and players regarding sharia interest. As part of 
this analysis, the question of “who” is discussed below in order to investigate whose 
responsibility it is to ensure sharia-compliance. This analysis assesses how the SSB fits 
into this responsibility. 
6.4 Who is Accountable for Sharia-compliance? 
6.4.1 Sharia-compliance and the Responsibility of the Board of Directors  
One of the ambiguous areas in the Islamic finance is whose responsibility it is to 
ensure sharia-compliance. In the literature, it is unclear whether this responsibility lies 
with the SSB or the board of directors.772 In Chapter Four, I argued that the board of 
directors should be responsible for sharia matters since it is ultimately responsible for all 
matters in the company, which include sharia-compliance as an important factor in any 
IFI. The SSB is a panel of experts who help IFIs to comply with sharia rules and 
principles. The responsibility of the board for ensuring sharia-compliance is implied by 
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the AAOIF’s suggestion that there should be a clear statement by the management that 
ensuring compliance with sharia rules and principles is among its responsibilities.773  
The responsibility of the board towards sharia-compliance, however, does not mean 
that the board should be directly involved in sharia auditing but it must ensure that a 
proper sharia governance framework is established and effectively applied. This 
responsibility is similar to its responsibility to ensure effective auditing. An audit 
committee is usually formed as a sub-committee of the board to ensure the proper 
conduct of auditing.774 This includes ensuring that external auditors, as expert 
gatekeepers, conduct an independent audit for the stakeholders.  
It is necessary to enhance the responsibility of the board for stronger sharia 
governance. For this purpose, some regulations, such as those in Malaysia, suggest 
that a member of the SSB should be appointed to the board of directors.775 However, 
this strategy might prove impractical. It has been argued that sharia members might not 
always fit, legally, as a member of the board of directors.776 Moreover, appointing a 
sharia member to the board might be insufficient to provide the attention necessary to 
protect the interest of sharia. Similarly, IFSB suggests that a governance committee 
shall be formed and may include a member of the SSB.777 This may compromise 
independence. Sharia experts appointed to sub-committees should have no relationship 
with the external auditors. Alternatively, the supervision of the process of sharia auditing 
should be assigned to the auditing committee. In its governance standards, AAOIFI 
assigns the duty of reviewing compliance with the sharia rules and principles to the 
audit and governance committee of IFIs.778 This will bring more attention to the sharia 
governance framework. Independent directors on the audit committee should play an 
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important role in ensuring the independence of the sharia review process.779 It can also 
ensure more impartial supervision since the independent status of the auditing 
committee is highly regarded. In Saudi Arabia, no executive directors, current or 
previous executives in the last two years, or current or previous employees of the 
external auditors in the last two years are allowed to be members of the auditing 
committee.780 Such attention to the issue of the independence of the auditing committee 
would enhance the sharia governance framework. Where regulations allow the 
appointment of non-directors to the audit committee, such as is the case in Saudi 
Arabia,781 an expert in sharia auditing, with no relationship to the external auditors, 
should be ideally appointed.  
6.4.2 The SSB as a Tool for Auditing: The Issue of Conflict of Interests 
While enhancing the responsibility of the board to ensure sharia-compliance would 
strengthen the accountability framework of sharia supervision, it would be insufficient 
without using an effective tool for sharia auditing. The concern is whether the SSB is still 
an appropriate tool for assuring the stakeholders of sharia-compliance. The issue of 
conflict of interests is a long-standing one, which the literature addresses in the SSB. 
Such an issue negatively affects the role of the SSB as independent auditors. 
Independence requires the ability to act with objectivity, integrity, impartiality, and 
free from conflict of interests.782 The structure of SSBs is somewhat confusing. The fact 
that IFIs adopt the SSB as a board within the company has raised concerns regarding 
the SSB’s independence. As discussed earlier, it cannot be regarded as a board parallel 
to the board of directors. Although the need for SSB’s independence from the board is 
indisputable, the SSB is regarded as subordinate to the board of directors, a position 
that compromises its independence.783 Even in cases where the SSB reports to the 
shareholders, the board of directors, as this section explores, has sufficient power to 
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threaten the independence and objectivity of SSBs. This happens as a result of 
assigning an internal board to conduct a gatekeeping role.   
In the previous chapter, the issue of independence is discussed with regard to the 
legislative role of SSBs. Related to this discussion, which applies here as well, is the 
case of combining the legislative role with auditing. As suggested, the legislative role 
should be completely removed from SSBs to avoid conflict of interests in combining 
such rules. This leaves the SSB with advisory and audit roles only. Still, there arise 
issues related to conflict of interests associated with the SSB’s role as auditors, which 
are reviewed below. 
Issues surrounding appointments 
There are several methods related to the appointment of SSB members: 
• By the board of directors. 
• By the board of directors and approved by the central authority, central banks 
or national SSBs. 
• By the shareholders, based on the recommendations of the board. 
• By the shareholders and approved by the central authority.784 
 
AAOIFI and IFSB suggest that members of SSBs should be appointed by the 
shareholders upon nomination by the board.785 
While giving shareholders the authority to appoint SSB members provides SSBs 
with a stronger position, independence is not necessarily maintained. The board might 
have a strong influence on the shareholders’ decisions.786 Shareholders usually 
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approve the board’s nominations, without objection.787 The board’s decision about the 
appointment of SSBs is, commonly, influenced by the management.788 This places the 
independence of SSBs in danger. The authority of the shareholders over appointments 
would be even more minimal, where the ownership of IFIs is concentrated. In this case, 
only a few shareholders have control of and representation on the board, whose 
influence on SSBs would be stronger due to the minimal role of the other shareholders. 
This type of ownership is common in Saudi Arabia.789 Therefore, the appointment 
approach of seeking final approval from the regulatory body may help to reduce the 
influence of a few individuals on appointment.790  
Still, the management and board have a strong influence on the appointment and 
reappointment of SSB members. Presumably, the members of SSBs who are interested 
in reappointment may prioritise their personal goals rather than sharia principles and try 
to avoid as far as possible whatever may endanger their reappointment.791 To ensure 
reappointment, doubtful products may be approved as sharia-compliant to satisfy the 
interest of the management. To avoid such a conflict, it is suggested that contracts 
between IFIs and SSB members should be temporary.792 A long-term client relationship 
impairs objectivity by enabling the management to build a strong relationship with the 
auditors which may be diverted in order to serve other interests.793 Rotation is a tool 
used by regulators to enhance the independence of external auditors. Mandatory 
rotation would eliminate the interest of external auditors with regards to reappointment. 
Hence, the influence of the management on them would be minimised. Before Enron, 
the idea of audit rotation attracted little legal attention.794 Rotation now is a common 
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regulatory requirement for audit firms in many jurisdictions, such as the US,795 the 
European Union,796 and Saudi Arabia as well.797 Rotation, however, has been criticised 
for its negative impact on audit quality, since a lengthy relationship increases the 
understanding of the client’s business.798 In response to this, FRC finds that the impact 
of rotation on the quality of the auditing has been unexpectedly limited and audit firms 
have become more experienced due to rotation.799 In the SSB, rotation has received 
little attention as a practice for minimising conflict of interests. Rotation could reduce the 
management’s power to influence SSB’s decisions through periodically interrupting the 
relationship. SSB rotation, however, has been criticised, as it may cause inconsistency 
in the application of sharia, so individual members’ rotation alone is suggested.800 
However, such a criticism considers legislation as a role of SSBs. As argued in the last 
chapter, this should not be assigned to SSBs. If SSBs only perform sharia audit, there 
would be little concern about the inconsistency of sharia application due to SSB 
rotation. Individual rotation is suggested by AAOIFI, which recommends rotating at least 
one member of the SSB every five years.801 Yet, jurisdictions, generally, do not adopt 
rotation.802 Recently, Oman has taken a progressive step of limiting the number of 
renewable terms of SSB members to two three-year terms.803  
The dismissal of SSB members is another area where conflict of interests may arise. 
It is suggested that the authority to dismiss is given to the shareholders at the request of 
the board of directors.804 Nevertheless, the power of the management may be exercised 
to influence the board to dismiss members of the SSB, which puts SSB members at risk 
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of being dismissed if their opinions about sharia-compliance conflict with the interest of 
the management.  
Remuneration 
Generally, the remuneration of the SSB is proposed by the management and 
approved by the board, which creates a conflict of interests in situations where the 
management may put pressure on the SSB by controlling the remuneration.805 
Currently, the way in which the members of the SSB are remunerated negatively 
impacts on their credibility as far as moral beliefs and religious values are concerned 
and this requires more regulatory attention.806  
Some argue that independence is achieved as long as remuneration is not 
associated with the content of SSB’s decisions, so there should be no conflict of 
interests if a member is remunerated based on the number of meetings attended or via 
a lump sum.807 Some add that, in order to avoid conflict of interests, remuneration 
should not be in the form of salary or linked to the performance or profitability of the IFI, 
and needs to be disclosed in the financial statements.808 Fixed remuneration could be 
the best way to diffuse conflict of interests.809 
Regardless of how the SSB members are remunerated, the assumption of the 
employment relationship with IFIs creates a conflict of interests. The issue of SSB 
remuneration lacks of policy standards regarding how SSBs should be remunerated and 
by whom.810 In the absence of such rules, remuneration is surrounded by ambiguity in 
terms of how and how much SSB members are paid. Where this is not obligatory, IFIs 
may not disclose such information, as is the case in Saudi banks. This lack of 
supervision of remuneration puts SSB members under pressure from the management. 
They can exercise their power to control the remuneration in order to influence SSB’s 
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decisions. Critics accuse IFIs of paying high remuneration to SSBs in exchange for 
doubtful religious validity.811 Therefore, it is suggested that shareholders must take 
responsibility for determining SSB remuneration.812  
Ownership and other financial interests 
The regulations related to external audit do not tolerate any factor that negatively 
affects the independence of external auditors from the management. If a conflict of 
interests arises, such as combining audit with non-audit services, trust will be lost.813 
Therefore, restrictions are placed on auditors to avoid any potential conflict with their 
clients that could impair the audit objectivity. For example, external auditors in Saudi 
Arabia are not allowed to audit a firm if they have: ownership of the business; direct or 
relatives’ employment or board membership; business partnerships with the board 
members, executives, or big shareholders; or contracts that might affect the 
independence of the audit such as advisory services.814 Similar restrictions should be 
imposed on SSB’s members by AAOIFI815 and IFSB,816 and are, to some extent, 
considered in some jurisdictions such Malaysia.817 In fact, this type of conflict is 
considered within Islamic law. Commercial partners are not allowed to witness in favour 
of their partnership which could be applied to SSB members who have financial 
interests in the entity.818  
The percentage of auditors’ ownership of their clients is subject to variations in 
different jurisdictions. In the US, AICPA’s Code of Professional Conduct sets 5% as the 
threshold for auditors’ ownership of the client.819 However, SEC prohibits any direct 
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financial interest of an auditor in the client, a public company, which includes stock 
ownership.820 Direct ownership also disqualifies external auditors in the UK from 
acting.821 In Saudi Arabia, external auditors are only prohibited from having “material 
ownership” of the client.822 Generally, a 1% ownership of the client constitutes material 
ownership.823  
SSB ownership receives little attention. A few rules and regulations consider setting 
limits on SSB ownership. For example, IFSB and the Malaysian Shariah Governance 
Framework consider a 5% ownership of the relevant IFIs to disqualify members to serve 
on the IFI.824 Ash-Shubaily argues that SSB members should be restricted only from 
material ownership, which is 5% or more, since this is the legally identified percentage 
of ownership that must be disclosed by publicly-owned firms in some jurisdictions like 
Saudi Arabia.825 However, even ownership less than 5% could be too high. It is a legal 
requirement to disclose this percentage of ownership because owners with this 
percentage could have sufficient power to influence the value of the shares of the 
company. Less than this could rarely attract public attention. Yet, the situation of conflict 
of interests is not related to public attention. It could happen even with less than 5% 
ownership, especially if the company is large, as is the case with Saudi banks. As the 
biggest economy in the region, there are only 12 local banks in Saudi Arabia, and only 
four of these are fully Islamic. Compared to the number of banks in the regions, there is 
a concentrated market involving large banks. Therefore, owning even less than 5% 
could constitute a considerable conflict of interests. Indeed, even one share, surely, 
constitutes a potential conflict of interests. Generally, auditors’ ownership of the client is 
expected to affect negatively the perceived independence.826   
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The credit facility provided to SSB members by IFIs is another area that needs legal 
restrictions. Credit facilities for both personal and commercial use negatively impact on 
independence. In Saudi Arabia, external auditors are not allowed to perform an audit if 
they have a credit relationship with the company.827 Only a few jurisdictions place 
restrictions on SSB members accessing the credit facilities of their relevant IFIs.828  
Some IFIs intentionally appoint one SSB member to an executive position to create 
a cooperative environment between the management and the SSB. This has been the 
practice among certain Saudi IFIs. Such an approach significantly constitutes a conflict 
of interests. The employment relationship and self-interest as an executive would have 
an effect on the objectivity of auditing. An empirical study shows that SSB executive 
positions significantly increase the conflict of interests in the SSB.829 In the external 
audit, the employment relationship is considered a threat. To ensure a high level of 
independence, many regulations impose a cooling-off period, where external auditors 
are prohibited from working for a previous client.830 The employment relationship 
receives little legal attention in the SSB. Restrictions on SSB employment are rarely 
found in sharia governance regulations. Such a restriction can be found in Oman, where 
no SSB membership is allowed for current employees or those who were employed by 
the organisation during the last financial year.831 
Combining audit with non-audit services 
Some situations of conflict of interests in the SSB occur due to the content of the 
roles it performs. Related to this issue is the combination of audit and legislation, 
discussed before. Similarly, providing an advisory role along with auditing could 
compromise objectivity. 
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In the accounting and auditing profession, combining audit with non-audit services 
has been subjected to a thorough discussion. Such combination is proven that it 
significantly impairs the independence of the external auditors.832 Coffee argues that 
audit firms’ provision of non-audit services along with audit was the major cause of 
gatekeepers’ failure and the collapse of Enron and WorldCom.833 He describes how 
non-audit services were used by managers as a bribe to secure auditors’ acquiescence. 
This issue was solved by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act which limits most consulting services 
to non-audit clients only.834 Similarly, the International Ethics Standards Board of 
Accountants (IESBA) addresses the issue of providing non-audit services to clients.835 
Many jurisdictions apply such a prohibition, such as the UK,836 EU,837 and Saudi 
Arabia.838 
The issue of this combination is not identical in the case of SSBs. Audit and non-
audit services are not provided as separate services by SSBs. The members are hired 
to perform the roles of issuing fatwas (legislation), sharia audit, and consultation 
collectively. Hence, there is not a separate fee for each service. Nevertheless, the 
combination of audit with non-audit services is still a concern. If the audit is conducted 
by the same body that has engineered and approved the products, it is likely that the 
audit would be lenient. Also, it has been argued that even internal auditors should not 
be allowed to provide consultation to the management because this action, combined 
with auditing, would negatively affect their objectivity due to potential attempts to please 
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their employers.839 Similarly, this could be the case for SSBs assuming the employment 
relationship and other conflict of interests mentioned above. 
Confidentiality 
Sitting on more than one SSB exposes the members to the possibility of breaching 
confidentiality by possessing confidential information, and so constitutes a possible 
conflict of interests.840 The regulations in many jurisdictions do not place any limit on the 
number of SSBs on which individual scholars may serve.841 The practice shows that an 
individual may serve on a vast number of SSBs. A study on SSB membership, 
published in 2011, reveals an interesting number of SSB memberships among sharia 
scholars. According to this study, a scholar may be a member of as many as 101 
SSBs.842 The top 20 scholars have 621 board memberships collectively.843 The study 
shows that SSB membership is highly concentrated, whereby the top 10 members 
represent 39.44% of all SSB memberships and the top 100 members represent 
83.52%.844 In Saudi Arabia, the study finds that the top five members represent 56.58% 
of the SSBs in the country and hold 28, 27, 12, 11, and 8 positions, respectively.845  
Multi-membership can cause what is called “separate-matter conflict”, whereby a 
member of different SSBs may possess confidential information from one IFI that is 
relevant to a matter in another. Whether disclosing the information or not, the SSB 
member of these IFIs would end up breaching a duty to one of them. This applies to 
auditing and advisory roles, where both expose the members to inside material 
information.846 In a highly competitive industry such as Islamic finance, possessing such 
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information might exacerbate the conflict of interests.847 The possession of confidential 
information about contracts, operations, and documentation places the SSB members in 
a strong position, similar to that of the board of directors.848 The case of multi-
directorships, however, is usually regulated by the corporate governance, where 
restrictions are set on the number of directorships that individuals can hold. In Saudi 
Arabia, directors are not allowed to have more than five memberships of public 
companies at the same time, and this is provided that the companies concerned are not 
in competition.849 More specifically, directors in the banking industry are not allowed to 
serve more than one bank in the country at the same time.850 While directors can only 
serve one of the 12 operating Saudi banks, only one bank clearly bans its SSB 
members from holding multiple memberships.851 In the remaining 11 banks, there are 
43 SSB seats, with the top three occupying 25 seats.852 This represents more than 58% 
of the SSB membership in these banks. This does not include SSBs in other IFIs, such 
as sharia-compliant insurance, takaful, or mutual funds.  
To avoid this situation, regulations in some countries tend to disallow multi-
membership. Malaysia, Nigeria, and Oman apply such a restriction.853 This is similar to 
the restriction imposed on multiple directorships in the field of corporate governance. 
However, the imposition of a strict limitation on multi-memberships could create a 
situation of scarcity in the industry, due to the limited numbers of qualified scholars in 
the field.854 Distinguished, well-known sharia scholars who can serve in SSBs are in 
short supply, which explains this high number of SSB memberships.855 This highlights 
                                            
847 Grais and Pellegrini, 'Corporate Governance and Shariah Compliance in Institutions Offering Islamic 
Financial Services' (n 387) at 7 
848 Hamza, 'Sharia Governance in Islamic Banks: Effectiveness and Supervision Model' (n 314) at 230 
849 Saudi Arabia, Companies Law Article 72; Capital Market Authority (CMA), Corporate Governance 
Regulations Articles 17, 20 
850 Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), Principles of Corporate Governance for Banks Operating in 
Saudi Arabia (2014) No.21 
851 Al Rajhi Bank, The Internal Rules for Sharia Supervisory Board in Al Al Rajhi Bank (1999) Article 5 
852 Based on data available on the banks’ websites. 
853 Bank Negara Malaysia, Sharia Governance Framework for Islamic Financial Institutions (n 562) at 32; 
Grassa, 'Shariah Supervisory Systems in Islamic Finance Institutions across the OIC Member Countries' 
(n 388) at 154 
854 Ahmeen, 'The Governance Standards of Sharia Supervision' (n 384) at 12 




the need to professionalise the practice, which would be explored both below and in the 
next chapter.  
The above situations of conflict of interests explain the need for more legal attention 
to preserve the independence of SSB members. Neglecting this, such as is the case in 
Saudi Arabia, or even a weak consideration of a regulatory framework for the SSB 
places the credibility of SSB members under question, which threatens the industry as a 
whole. The debate about the independence of SSBs is not a new one. However, it has 
become essential, with the rapid development and spread of Islamic finance globally, 
which requires the legal reform of the practice. In the absence of a strong regulatory 
framework that enhances the independent status of SSBs, ethics and moral beliefs play 
a strong role in preventing conflict of interests. A failure regarding sharia-compliance 
could be extremely costly for sharia scholars’ reputations, as they are presumed to be 
the guardians of sharia principles.856 They are seen as invulnerable to conflict of 
interests because they relaise their accountability to God. However, this is insufficient to 
preserve the interests of the stakeholders. The industry, still, might be vulnerable to 
sharia risk. A failure regarding sharia-compliance would be too difficult to discover due 
to the absence of effective regulations.857 Parallel to auditing firm, the next section 
discusses sharia firms as an alternative to the SSB for conducting sharia audit more 
independently. 
6.4.3 External Sharia Audit and the SSB Alternatives: Is it Time for Sharia Firms? 
Given the issue of conflict of interests surrounding SSBs, this section explores 
sharia firms as a more objective and independent tool. The movement towards sharia 
firms in place of SSBs satisfies the concept of gatekeeping more than SSBs. Currently, 
the development of external sharia auditing is at a point where it is obligatory only in a 
few jurisdictions. Similarly, this was the case in the early 20th century with regard to 
external financial audit.858 Its development was usually scandal-driven.859 In many 
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corporate collapses and crises, the issue of the lack of auditors’ independence was 
discussed as a main cause and prompted regulatory reforms.860 This should draw more 
attention to the need to develop external sharia auditing to avoid any risk associated 
with a lack of sharia-compliance. Because of the similarities between these roles, it is 
useful for this analysis to consider, very briefly, the historical evolution of external 
auditors as gatekeepers.  
In the early stage of the concept of corporations, the size of corporations and the 
number of owners might not require strict auditing. In the mid-19th century, audit was 
conducted by the shareholders, the principals, themselves.861 To increase the 
sophistication, business owners employed bookkeepers to perform the necessary 
audit.862 Later, it became more practical for shareholders to depend on expert auditors 
to undertake this task. Based on Ronald Coase’s insight, a firm makes products and 
services internally until it is less costly to rely on the market.863 This explains the shift 
towards relying on gatekeepers for auditing.864 The idea of depending on reputable 
expert gatekeepers, which include external auditors, has developed to help investors to 
obtain verification more effectively.865 The trust and confidence provided to the 
stakeholders by external auditors is essential for companies to maintain. At the 
beginning, companies were not obliged to appoint external auditors but it was an 
initiative for assuring others of the reliability of their statements.866 Before it became 
obligatory, the idea of external audit was challenged by resistance from certain firms 
and practitioners.867 
The transfer of auditing from the shareholders to professional auditors appointed by 
directors has highlighted the need for independence among the auditors.868 Due to the 
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lack of trust and confidence regarding the management carrying out the audit function, 
independent experts are hired to perform audit for shareholders. Therefore, auditors are 
also the agents of the shareholders so the agency problem may arise.869 Independent 
auditors will be more impartial when auditing the company’s profiles and will place limits 
on the power given to the management and the board. In the auditing profession, 
independence is a precious asset and is the only sound basis for an auditor-client 
relationship.870 Without independence, the value of audit is meaningless.871 Therefore, a 
high level of independence is maintained in the regulations concerning external 
auditors.   
In this historical preview, inference can be made that, to some extent, SSBs are on a 
similar track towards the development of external auditors. As illustrated earlier with 
regard to the history of SSBs, they did not exist in the early stage of Islamic banks. They 
was later introduced as an internal panel of experts to ensure sharia-compliance. At that 
time, external sharia auditors were not a requirement due to the limited size of the 
industry and its basic operation. In 1990, Abdel Karim argued against the need for 
external sharia auditing due to the limited size of the industry, where all transactions 
need to be reviewed, unlike external financial audit where only samples are reviewed.872 
He continued that sample auditing might become inevitable in future due to the 
significant increase in the number of Islamic transactions, after which external audit 
might become necessary. This argument reflected the need for sharia auditing at an 
early stage of Islamic finance. Even conventional audit experienced this stage, where 
there was only an internal audit. Nowadays, however, there is an increasing call for 
external sharia audit. The weak performance of the auditing and the independent status 
of SSBs have been questioned. The role of auditing performed by SSBs is insufficient to 
assure the stakeholders and give them confidence regarding sharia-compliance.873 
External audit is not required by most of the regulatory frameworks despite the current 
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development in the industry and the introduction of more sophisticated products which 
require more effective external sharia auditing than ever before.874 The need for 
external auditing to ensure sharia-compliance is consistent with the current social 
movement, where societies trust nothing and audit everything, when previously they 
used to audit nothing and trust everything.875 Therefore, Sharia auditing needs to have a 
similar function to conventional financial auditing.876 
As a response to this need, new consultancy businesses have evolved to serve the 
Islamic finance industry, called sharia firms. External sharia firms have evolved as a tool 
of sharia supervision.877 This type of firm provides services, including: consultation and 
training, internal sharia auditing as outsourcing, and external sharia auditing.878 Having 
external sharia firms to conduct external sharia auditing enables the stakeholders to 
receive stronger assurance about the independent sharia-compliance verification.879 
Where operating, sharia firms tend to be an optional tool used by IFIs rather than a legal 
requirement. This might be parallel to the stage of development of external financial 
audit where it was only a voluntary initiative by companies. However, there is increased 
legal attention regarding requiring external sharia auditing. In Malaysia, external sharia 
auditing is required only in circumstances where the central bank, upon assessment, 
deems this necessary.880 Only recently has external audit been introduced as a regular 
requirement in some jurisdictions, such as Oman881 and Pakistan.882 Bahrain has 
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announced that, by 2020, it will be mandatory to have an external sharia-compliance 
audit report.883  
An important question arises here: will sharia firms avoid the situations of conflict of 
interests that exist in SSBs? In fact, many of these situations may apply to sharia firms 
as well. They are also present in conventional financial audit. However, these situations 
have less impact due to the regulations surrounding the profession. Supervisory 
regulators and ethical codes could be effective in reducing these situations. While 
absolute independence is a myth and impossible to achieve, sharia firms, parallel to 
audit firms, may help to alleviate this problem, supported by the fact that the idea of 
gatekeepers provides the most ideal solution, to date, to the issue of conflict of interests 
in auditing. Regulations that ensure independence could be applied for sharia firms. 
Rotation, duration, financial or employment interests are well-regulated in such a way 
that independence is highly maintained. 
It is true, however, that these regulations could also be imposed on SSBs to ensure 
greater independence, so the need for sharia firms as an alternative to SSBs remains in 
question. However, it should be noted that regulations alone cannot be sufficiently 
effective to ensure independence. While there are instances of conflict of interests in 
firms similar to those in the SSB, these instances would be significantly reduced in the 
case of firms. The adoption of sharia firms as an alternative to SSBs would create a 
professional environment that creates more value than the tool itself. Such an 
environment will ensure more independent practice of sharia auditing. Therefore, an 
assessment of the value that sharia firms may bring to improve independence should be 
considered here.  
Arguably, moving to sharia firms would enhance independence in different ways. 
First, it would satisfy the gatekeeping role and its structure to build more reputational 
capital that could play an important role in achieving greater independence from clients. 
For sharia members, their reputation could establish resistance to pressure from the 
                                            





management.884 However, the current structure and characteristics of SSBs are 
insufficient to assume the gatekeeping role. As argued in Chapter Four, the reputation 
that SSB members enjoy is different from the reputational capital of gatekeepers. 
Therefore, this reputation is more adequately and effectively maintained by sharia firms 
as gatekeepers. Since external gatekeepers are expecting to pursue their verification 
job in the future, they will have a stronger incentive to preserve their reputation and 
honesty than insiders, who engage in fewer frequent transactions and direct financial 
stakes.885 This reputational capital, built up by firms, is very valuable, as it creates a 
barrier to achieving personal goals that might harm such valuable assets. Therefore, 
protecting their reputation works as an incentive for maintaining the independence of 
the gatekeepers.886 There is always, of course, a possibility that the gatekeepers will get 
too close to the management, as was the case with Enron.887 Thus, effective regulation 
should consider such a possibility. In all circumstances, this would not be comparable to 
the current structure of SSBs, which is surrounded by a closer relationship and more 
significant conflict of interests. Also, this close relationship is usually built through the 
non-audit services provided by audit firms to the company. While financial non-audit 
services may be comprehensive and cover the whole business, the scope of sharia 
advice would be restricted to sharia-compliance issues alone. Therefore, sharia firms 
would have less room to engage in the provision of advisory services than audit firms 
and thus would be less likely to have a close relationship with the management.  
Second, sharia firms would put an end to dealing with individuals as external sharia 
auditors. Individuality is more susceptible to conflict of interests as it places members in 
a weaker position when engaging with IFIs. Professionalisation is essential in today’s 
world, where there has been a shift in the market towards empowering those clients 
who can offer sufficiently significant fees to impair the independence and objectivity of 
the auditors.888 Therefore, sharia firms would help to create a stronger sovereignty and 
more powerful status for external sharia auditors as professionals who, in turn, ensure 
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greater sharia-compliance. Acting as a team of sharia auditors in a firm would also 
create a stronger accountability framework. Instead of individuals dealing with their 
clients, sharia auditors in the firm would consider other factors, such as the other sharia 
auditors in the team, and the hierarchical superiors. This framework would create 
stronger resistance to any possible diversion. Such multiple sources of accountability 
have been shown to increase the pressure on auditors and enhance accountability.889 
Other factors within the firm could play an important role in accountability, such as 
career advancement and other incentives.890 These elements motivate more objective 
behaviour to ensure sharia-compliance. 
Third, sharia firms would create a stronger legal recognition of sharia auditing as a 
profession which brings more ethical and legal standards. Improving sharia supervision 
as a profession would be important in enhancing independence. For example, a code of 
ethics would be applied to sharia auditors to regulate and ensure more independent 
professional practice. While AAOIFI has issued one for accountants and auditors in the 
industry of Islamic finance, there is a lack of a code of ethics for SSB members. This 
may negatively affect the SSB independence.  
Finally, sharia firms would improve the profession by drawing a clear separation 
between internal and external auditing.891 Currently, these two duties are not clearly 
divided, which compromises the SSB independence. In effective accountability 
frameworks, a strategy of the separation of the power of different decision-makers is 
implemented.892 The introduction of sharia firms serves this purpose. A clearer line 
between internal and external reviews would be drawn so the process would become 
easier and more systematic. While IFIs have the authority to appoint external auditors 
from different sharia firms, their influence on the sharia supervisors as independent 
gatekeepers would not be the same as on internal SSBs. This separation is essential 
also due to the issue of liability surrounding sharia non-compliance, which would be 
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assigned more easily. Also, the gatekeeping role, if well-governed, could have a 
significant effect in deterring misconduct. While this deterrence could be directly 
implemented by public gatekeepers, such as regulators, market gatekeepers such as 
lawyers, auditors, and underwriters, whose detection of misconduct depends on private 
incentives, could be an effective complement to direct deterrence which reduces its 
cost.893 
Along with regulations that could be imposed to enhance the independence of sharia 
auditors, the above factors, brought about by moving towards sharia firms as external 
auditors, would minimise any potential conflict of interests to which SSBs are exposed. 
Below is an illustration of how sharia firms could alleviate conflict of interests in light of 
these three factors. 
Concerning appointment issues, the absence of sharia firms places a burden on the 
board of directors and management to find qualified members to serve on the SSB. In 
such a situation, IFIs may tend to appoint prominent names, regardless of the quality of 
sharia assurance they might bring. Therefore, central authority approval, that some 
regulations require, is essential to verify the eligibility of the members to conduct sharia 
auditing due to the lack of professionalism in the industry. This approval works like 
licencing members to serve as sharia auditors in order to assure the stakeholders of the 
eligibility of sharia auditors. In the absence of a professional record, prominent scholars’ 
names might be equivalent to the big four audit firms. In the end, the industry applies a 
similar process to that followed to appoint external financial auditors. Instead of 
acquiring regulatory approval for the appointment, audit firms are already licensed and 
presumed eligible to conduct audit by their relevant regulator. This saves time due to 
repeated inquiries to approve the appointment of external auditors. Similarly, adopting 
sharia firms as external sharia auditors should include this process of appointment, 
which ensures a higher level of independence. Moreover, by being a stronger party in 
the contract than SSB members, sharia firms would be able to include terms that 
preserve their independence and objectivity in order to avoid harming their reputational 
                                            




capital. For example, punitive consequences for dismissal may be imposed in the 
contract and should restrict the freedom of the management regarding termination. 
Regarding remuneration, sharia auditors would be more independent, operating as 
sharia firms rather than individuals. In the case of SSBs, the members get paid 
individually. However, more independence is achieved by a team of auditors who would 
share the income compared to solo practitioners, since income sharing reduces the 
efficiency of attempted corruption.894 The reputational capital that gatekeepers possess 
is so valuable that it would not be sacrificed for a single client for a modest fee.895 
Moreover, sharia firms would reduce the power of the management to exert pressure on 
SSB members regarding remuneration. A sophisticated market would be established 
and the price would be determined accordingly. Instead of contracting individuals, IFIs 
would contract firms, which are in a more powerful position to determine the price. The 
pressure is far less to prioritise anything other than sharia interest. 
Sharia firms would not experience confidentiality as a big issue. Acting as a firm, 
rather than individuals, would reduce the issue of confidentiality which affects SSBs 
mainly because of the presumption that they are affiliated with IFIs. Instead, sharia firms 
would have independent sovereignty, under which sharia auditors would be considered 
outsiders. Furthermore, a code of ethics should provide an effective solution regarding 
confidentiality.896 Also, sharia firms would provide solutions to the issue of poor quality 
sharia auditing associated with the excessive number of SSB memberships, which can 
amount to more than 100. Under no circumstances can an individual audit this number 
of companies while working part-time. Sharia firms which have qualified sharia auditors, 
assistants, and facilities could do this more effectively. More importantly, sharia firms 
would open the door for more individuals to join the profession and put an end to the 
scarcity of sharia experts in the industry. In fact, professionalising sharia supervision, 
which will be discussed further in the next chapter, would improve the practice. 
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Yet, sharia firms would not be free of challenges regarding conflict of interests. 
Concerns regarding the independence of external financial auditors, such as combining 
auditing and consultation at the same time, might be transferred to sharia firms. 
Therefore, similar restrictions regulating the practice of auditing need to be applied. It is 
suggested that the contemporary practice of auditing and the standards regarding 
independence is very useful to apply to sharia auditors, especially given the similarities 
between auditing and SSBs.897 The independence of gatekeepers, especially external 
auditors, has attracted intensive legal attention recently, which might be utilised in 
sharia firms. In all cases, sharia firms would enjoy a more independent status than 
SSBs. 
6.5 Accountability to Whom? Identifying the Stakeholders of Sharia Governance 
Identifying the stakeholders of sharia-compliance is a key issue in the accountability 
framework. Neglecting this issue usually results in importing an accountability 
framework that is not designed to achieve the same objectives. Consequently, 
accountability may be rendered to the persons who are less interested in sharia-
compliance. In corporate governance, an accountability framework is applied to the 
shareholders to call the management to account for the performance more than the 
customers, whose main right is to refuse to make a purchase.898 Under sharia 
governance, stakeholders need to be given a different consideration and this should be 
reflected in the accountability framework. For an effective accountability framework, an 
analysis of sharia stakeholders and their interests needs to be carefully illustrated to 
identify important elements of accountability in sharia governance: for what? And to 
whom?   
The discussion of to whom accountability is rendered often requires clarification of 
for what the accountability is conducted. These two questions are usually joined in 
accountability analysis.899 In the relevant literature, the question of “for what?” in sharia-
compliance accountability is, arguably, mixed with accountability to God. The discussion 
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about the stakeholders of IFIs refers to God, among other stakeholders. This is because 
Muslims believe that all actions, including financial transactions, are noted, so they must 
account to God for all matters.900 The application of this accountability means that 
stakeholders’ interests are not the priority but God’s will.901 It has been said that the 
most important stakeholder in IFIs is Islam itself.902 
However, it is somewhat inaccurate to consider God and Islam as stakeholders, 
among others, in IFIs while they are, in fact, the subject of accountability. This is so 
important to clarify in order to strengthen the position of stakeholders and not compare 
them with God as accountees. The consideration of God’s interest compared with those 
of other stakeholders might confuse the picture of sharia governance stakeholders. 
Satisfying God and the adherence to Islamic principles is a priority interest for the 
sharia-compliance stakeholders themselves and it is exactly what classifies them as 
stakeholders. Their interest is to prioritise Islam or God, among other interests. The aim 
of IFIs and their stakeholders is to be obedient to God’s will in their financial dealings. 
They might avoid transactions which are beneficial for both parties in order to please 
God and adhere to Islamic rulings,903 so executives, as the representatives of the 
shareholders, might contract customers or other stakeholders in a transaction which 
does not maximise the financial interest of either party, in order to please God.  
Accountability to God, as discussed in the literature, refers to the adherence to the rules 
and principles of Islamic law which is, in fact, what accountability in IFIs is about. 
Therefore, satisfying God should be the subject of the accountability in sharia 
governance, which answers the question “for what”?  
 God, Islam, or even sharia rulings are still insufficient to identify a clear reference to 
accountability in sharia governance, since they are too general subjects. As thoroughly 
discussed in the previous chapter, Islamic law is subject to different interpretations and 
understandings among Muslim scholars, a situation that makes adherence to sharia a 
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controversial matter. However, the proposed standardisation mechanism, which grants 
national SSBs the exclusive authority to set enforceable sharia standards, would be a 
suitable reference for accountability in sharia governance. IFIs would be accountable for 
God’s will and Islamic principles based on the collective understanding of the members 
of the central SSB. 
The question of “to whom” the directors are accountable in corporate governance is 
mainly affected by the approach to maximising the shareholders’ value. However, there 
should be a broader range of accountability that includes, in addition to shareholders as 
the main accountees, all persons who are affected by the conduct.904 Accountability 
might be extended in corporate governance to be rendered to, besides the 
shareholders, creditors, regulatory agencies such as stock exchanges and securities 
commissions, and consumers.905 
The situation within IFIs is more complex. IFIs require the same governance 
mechanisms that are applied in conventional institutions but, as a result of their sharia-
compliant operations, they have different groups of stakeholders to consider.906 
Therefore, the interests of these stakeholders in sharia need to be independently 
considered. The following examination reveals that stakeholders in IFIs should be given 
a different weight and consideration from how they are considered in corporate 
governance.  
Ahmed argues that the owners of IFIs constitute the most important stakeholders of 
IFIs, followed by depositors.907 However, this might be inaccurate if sharia interest is 
considered. Owners, the most widely recognised group of stakeholders in corporate 
governance, might not be the most interested stakeholders in sharia-compliance. They 
might invest in an IFI for purely economic reasons without any consideration of the 
Islamic values to which the IFI is committed. In his classification of IFIs’ investors, Abdel 
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Karim states that investors who are unconcerned whether or not their return is sharia-
compliant are probably the majority owners while investors with a strong commitment to 
Islamic finance values who invest in IFIs based on this commitment might be minority 
shareholders.908  
Economically, Islamic banks might appear very attractive to investors. Islamic banks 
are not allowed to give their depositors any interest in return for their deposits, which is 
a positive factor that enhances the stability of the banks.909 The prohibition on interest 
provides Islamic banks with the advantage of having a large amount of demand 
deposits which do not pay any interest. A recent report shows that demand deposits 
form more than 61% of the holdings of Saudi banks. This, comparatively, very high 
percentage places banks in a better situation to be more profitable because of the low 
cost of lending.910 It can be inferred that the conservative attitude of depositors in Saudi 
Arabia and their commitment to sharia principles provide the banks with this high 
profitability. Consequently, investors might find Islamic banks a good investment in their 
portfolio. Profit might be the only incentives for many shareholders in Islamic banks 
whose owners could even include non-Muslims.  
Examining the ownership in Islamic banks in Saudi Arabia, sharia is not usually the 
main drive for all investors. For example, the government of Saudi Arabia is the biggest 
shareholder in two of the Islamic banks but its shares in all conventional banks 
constitute 10-64%.911 This indicates that sharia interest is not the main driver for the 
government in its decision where to invest. However, it might be argued that the 
government might have political or economic reasons other than profitability to invest in 
banks.912 This makes the government investment unusual, so it might not be a proper 
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case to depend on. Therefore, I identified the largest 17 shareholders, after excluding 
any government investment, in the four Islamic banks in Saudi Arabia. At least 8 of 
these shareholders also hold non-sharia investments. Many of these investors are 
mutual funds, based in countries like England, Norway, Luxemburg, Germany and the 
US, where it is probable that these investments are purely profit-driven.913 
While the shareholders in an IFI who care about their sharia-compliant investment 
might be in the minority, customers driven by religious commitment usually form the 
majority of an IFI’s customers.914 These customers could be categorised as depositors, 
IAHs,915 and consumers, who would be the borrowers in conventional banks.916 It is 
highly likely that these customers are religiously-driven. Arguably, they have the 
strongest interest in sharia-compliance of all the stakeholders. This is obvious in the 
case of IAHs and consumers, who would see Islamic banks as a solution to avoid 
dealing with directly receiving or paying interest in other banks. They benefit from the 
products offered as alternatives to interest-based loans or saving accounts. For them, 
satisfying their religious interest is more important than accessing interest-based 
products at a lower cost, if any.  
Depositors are also an important group of stakeholders in Islamic banks. Despite the 
fact that conventional banks provide an option of interest-free banking accounts, 
depositors still have a big interest in Islamic banks. The condemnation of the payment 
of interest is not limited to the parties who directly pay or receive it but extends to 
include the witnesses and notaries to the agreements.917 It is inferred, therefore, by 
many scholars, that the prohibition of interest in Islam is extended to any facilitator to 
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this “sinful action”, which includes depositors.918 The Islamic Fiqh Council, associated 
with the Muslim World League, has declared that it is prohibited to deal with 
conventional banks while there is a sharia-compliant alternative.919 In Saudi Arabia, the 
Permanent Committee of Fatwa, the official institution of fatwa in the country, also 
adopts this opinion,920 so depositors who affiliate themselves with these fatwas would 
have a strong interest in Islamic banks, even though they could avoid receiving interest 
in conventional banks. Thus, Islamic banks would be their only choice.  
The presumption of indirect dealing with interest as facilitators also applies to the 
employees and suppliers of Islamic banks. Employees may engage directly in writing or 
witnessing the payment of interest, which is clearly prohibited. Rather, they would be 
classified as supporting an interest-based institution. Official fatwas in Saudi Arabia on 
this specific matter have been issued to declare that is unlawful to work in conventional 
banks.921 Similar to depositors, the suppliers of Islamic banks may have a strong 
interest in sharia-compliance. They could be committed to avoid facilitating a prohibited 
action even at a higher financial cost. However, employees and suppliers, albeit 
committed to sharia, may have less interest than other stakeholders. They may find 
other employers or contracting parties outside the banking industry which could fulfil 
both their financial and religious interests. 
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Accountability to the community is discussed as a main stakeholder in IFIs. Many 
individuals, civil societies and organisations in the community desire a sharia-compliant 
financial system.922 It is narrated that the Prophet Muhammed (PBUH) said, “A time will 
come over people when not a one of them will remain other than consumers of interest; 
and even those who do not consume it will be affected by its dust”.923 For Muslims, this 
constitutes a warning about the spread of interest in the community, where earnings 
cannot be completely pure of interest. Accordingly, the community, as a stakeholder of 
sharia interest, has a concern about interest becoming mingled with other sharia-
compliant earnings. 
The above discussion illustrates that the stakeholders of sharia governance should 
not be treated similarly to those in corporate governance, where the owners are the 
main consideration. The significance of other stakeholders in sharia governance 
suggests that a different weight and consideration needs to be allocated. Therefore, it 
might be challenging to apply the same framework to corporate governance, where the 
accountability is mainly rendered to the shareholders. The traditional mechanisms of 
accountability used in the financial services might not produce greater stakeholder-
oriented accountability, which needs a broader range to enhance stakeholders’ 
inclusivity.924 The remaining part of this chapter discusses this issue and proposes how 
accountability should be conducted to protect the special interests of sharia 
stakeholders. 
6.6 How Accountability Should be Demonstrated?  
6.6.1 The Lack of Protective Tools for Stakeholders of Sharia Interest 
The discussion of the stakeholders of sharia-compliance, considered above, shows 
that their interests are weighted differently from those of stakeholders in corporate 
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governance. Shareholders are not the stakeholders who most need protection. They 
may have less interest in sharia-compliance than other stakeholders. Yet, shareholders 
have access to more protective tools, through their voice and exit strategies. Other 
stakeholders, with a stronger interest in sharia, may not possess these tools. An exit 
strategy is not always easily available to these stakeholders. When sharia violations 
emerge, they may be bound by a contractual relationship. For example, consumers, the 
borrowers in conventional banks, might be in a desperate situation if the contract with 
the IFI is found to be non-sharia compliant. 
Voice and exit tools, however, are not meant to serve the nature of sharia interest. 
Sharia-compliance operations may require a different treatment in order to protect the 
stakeholders. Usually, sharia interest, as explained earlier in Chapter Four, needs a 
veto power in order to be protected. The majority needed to steer the management 
towards better sharia-compliance behaviour may not be possessed by the shareholders 
who are committed to sharia. Therefore, the best thing they can do is to sell their 
shares.925 Selling shares, however, might be ineffective as this might occur too late to 
act as a protective tool.926 Sharia violation might be discovered too late, since it is 
usually too difficult for non-experts to identify. While voice and exit, at least to some 
extent, could protect the sharia interest of shareholders, these are rarely available to 
other stakeholders. 
In the literature, little attention has been paid to how to protect sharia interest. It 
tends to analyse the financial interests of these stakeholders. More specifically, 
protecting the financial interests of IAHs, as a unique group of stakeholders, has been 
the focus in the literature.927 Protecting the financial rights of IAHs is a dilemma for IFIs, 
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due to the absence of loan-based structures within Islamic finance.928 IAHs do not have 
the shareholders’ rights or the protection of the lenders. They lack internal corporate 
protection tools, as they are unrepresented on the board and have no voting rights. 
They also lack legal protection as creditors, since the mudaraba mechanism is applied 
instead of loans, so they lose their position as being the first claimants to the bank 
assets.929 Voice representation is suggested to protect the financial interests of IAHs.930 
Other options include extending shareholders’ rights to include IAHs, setting up a 
deposit insurance scheme to protect them, or creating a governance structure that 
caters to the IAHs’ specific needs, such as having a body of representatives to act as 
intermediaries.931 However, these mechanisms are designed to protect financial 
interests and may be ineffective with regard to sharia.  
The voice strategy is used as a tool to protect some stakeholders in corporate 
governance. For example, some systems enhance accountability to employees as 
stakeholders by giving them similar voting power to shareholders through 
representation on the board.932 However, this mechanism has attracted criticism for 
constituting an ineffective and impractical approach within corporate governance.933 In 
sharia governance, as discussed, sharia stakeholders are protected by the veto power, 
not the voting approach. Also, it is impractical to apply voting for consumers, who are 
the main stakeholders. In the specific case of banking, regulators may follow different 
approaches to protect the financial interest of the depositors including deposit insurance 
schemes.934 Sharia-compliance, however, needs effective ex-ante and ex-post 
supervision which is better satisfied by a regulatory agency. 
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6.6.2 The Need for an Effective Regulatory Agency to Protect Sharia Interest 
Whereas accountability in the corporate governance framework is designed to 
ultimately satisfy financial interests, it is, in sharia governance, for the God’s will, based 
on sharia rules and principles. Sharia scholars are responsible to God to provide 
clarifications regarding these rules and principles. The general presumption is that these 
scholars are trustworthy and credible for this job. However, undertaking this job in the 
business context may undermine this credibility due to the conflict of interests 
surrounding sharia scholars sitting on SSBs. Financial auditors are exposed to a similar 
concern regarding credibility. When performing external audit, auditors act as agents of 
the stakeholders, so there is a concern regarding trust and confidence, similar to that 
existing in the director-shareholder relationship, a situation that prompts the question of 
who is auditing the auditors.935 Therefore, there is a need to strengthen the 
accountability framework in sharia governance to restore the credibility of sharia 
auditors. As is the case with audit firms, where there is a regulatory authority, sharia 
auditors should be made accountable to a higher independent authority to increase the 
confidence regarding sharia-compliance. 
Generally, regulators are essential within the accountability framework in the market. 
Corporate activities require government supervision as a source of accountability to 
improve efficiency.936 Having a regulatory authority would implement legal accountability 
as an additional form of accountability where there is accountability to the regulators 
with regard to compliance with the legal norms.937 In legal accountability, an outsider 
party would have the controlling power to impose legal obligations or sanctions.938 
Regulatory agencies in the market play an essential role in governing and protecting the 
interests of the stakeholders. In fact, institutional checks are a corporate governance 
tool that is used to provide stakeholders with protection of their interests, since such 
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protection would ensure a stronger, well-developed market.939 In a well-functioning 
financial system, regulators act on behalf of the society at large.940 They can be an 
effective actor in ensuring that their interests are appropriately considered by imposing 
requirements which reinforce the weak position of stakeholders and help to maintain 
greater trust and confidence.941 In the accounting profession, the primary purpose of the 
regulatory bodies is to enhance the public’s confidence in the financial reporting.942  
In sharia governance, there is a need to apply such protection through a regulatory 
authority, especially since the interest of the public is more salient. Implementing a 
regulatory authority within the accountability framework would enhance the efficiency of 
sharia supervision. Recently, IFSB stressed the role of a supervisory authority in 
determining whether an IFI applies a robust sharia governance system that ensures an 
effective independent oversight of sharia-compliance.943 Such an authority would play 
an important role in promoting sharia audit.944 Also, an independent regulator would 
provide the effective protection that the wide range of stakeholders needs. Its powerful 
position should provide the necessary protection for stakeholders who might not be very 
well recognised at the bank level.945 It would represent the broad range of stakeholders 
of sharia-compliance and become a stakeholder itself. With its powerful regulatory 
authority, it should set up a strong sharia governance framework in order to reinforce 
the trust between stakeholders and IFIs. This makes the regulatory authority a dual 
element in the accountability framework, where it is a stakeholder as well as responsible 
for sharia-compliance. This may provide an answer to both questions regarding 
accountability: who is accountable? and to whom? 
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The discussion about the need for a regulator within the accountability framework in 
sharia governance should consider the four accountability elements (reporting, 
explaining, questioning, and the possibility of consequences) to assess how they are 
better off with such a regulator. The regulator would be necessary to implement the 
rights of stakeholders to be accounted to through acting on their behalf. Currently, SSBs 
at both levels are seen as responsible for protecting the rights of all stakeholders of 
sharia-compliance based on its role as the guarantor of the sharia-compliance of the 
business.946 The role of the national SSBs, however, is insufficiently effective to act as a 
regulatory authority. The standardisation of sharia rules and principles, although 
inadequate, as discussed in the last chapter, is their main objective. Where there exists 
a sharia governance framework, the central bank usually acts as a regulator. 
Regardless of the source of authority, the regulator should enhance the four elements of 
accountability. 
Concerning transparency as a main factor of accountability, which touches upon 
reporting and explaining, the practice suggests that it is weak and insufficient to inform 
stakeholders of the level of sharia-compliance. The issue of sharia-compliance 
disclosure has not received sufficient attention either from IFIs or regulators.947 
Transparency in sharia compliance does not seem to be widely prevalent and the 
disclosure of the SSBs’ decisions and their process is very weak, which threatens 
stakeholders’ confidence.948 In fact, some prominent SSB members argue against the 
disclosure of sharia violations within an IFI, since these could be solved internally, 
without threatening its reputation.949 This completely neglects the right of stakeholders 
to be informed and protected. In practice, there is a significant number of IFIs which do 
not submit a sharia report to the general assembly.950 If submitted, the items disclosed 
in sharia reports are usually very limited, where many important ones are missed. For 
example, it is rare for the reasoning and arguments underlying the SSB’s opinions to be 
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made available.951 Also, the criteria for the selection and appointment of SSB members 
as well as the quantitative and qualitative dimension of the SSB’s financial and non-
financial rewards are not clearly disclosed publicly.952 In Malaysia, where there is an 
advanced sharia governance framework, sharia reports consist of only a short 
statement that the relevant IFI is in compliance with sharia.953 
The literature assigns several reasons to the lack of transparency regarding sharia 
applications in the industry. First, the lack of standardisation promotes the non-
disclosure of sharia applications. Scholars might choose not to disclose their 
disagreements with other scholars.954 Second, the nature of Islamic banking, which 
requires innovation, may be added as a reason for the lack of transparency regarding 
sharia applications. The severe competition in the industry inhibits the disclosure of 
innovative sharia-compliant products.955 Usually, Islamic banking is less transparent 
than conventional banking, due to a concern that too much disclosure might promote 
the imitation of sharia-compliant products by other IFIs.956 Third, the ignorance about 
sharia among stakeholders is also another reason for non-disclosure.957 Understanding 
detailed sharia reports might be too difficult for non-experts, which reduces the need for 
sharia reports. This leads to the fourth reason, which is the credibility of the sharia 
supervision within IFIs. To increase the customers’ trust, IFIs tend to appoint religiously 
reputable members to their SSBs. In sharia-compliance, credibility is achieved not by 
more disclosure but by the reputation of SSB members.958 Fifth, another reason for the 
non-disclosure of the sharia findings is that Islamic banking is in an early stage, where 
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sharia observations might not only harm the specific IFI but even the whole industry.959 
Sixth, the sensitivity of the issue of sharia-compliance could be another reason for the 
low level of disclosure. Regulators in Muslim countries might be reluctant to take action 
against IFIs which might be deemed as taking action against the whole Islamic finance 
industry.960 This might be attributed, to some extent, to the final reason, which is the 
very little legal attention being paid to disclosure. The industry lacks legal consequences 
for non-disclosure, which might also be reflected by the lack of economic incentives for 
disclosure.961 The imposition of legal consequences for non-disclosure would 
encourage IFIs to achieve a higher level of transparency. As a result, IFIs with a higher 
level of transparency would be more attractive to stakeholders of sharia governance.  
The last reason, which is the lack of enforceable regulations for transparency, is very 
important when considering the role of the regulator in the industry to enhance the 
transparency of sharia-compliance legally by imposing items for mandatory disclosure in 
sharia reports or other means. Other reasons might be temporary and could change 
over time or are caused by the weak accountability framework of sharia supervision and 
the lack of professional practice regarding sharia auditing. Therefore, these factors 
could be deterred by imposing regulations that reinforce the accountability framework 
where transparency is strongly promoted. 
Greater transparency regarding sharia-compliance would bring advantages to both 
the stakeholders and the industry as a whole. This includes, first, increasing stakeholder 
confidence. The existence of the agency problem and consequently information 
asymmetry in sharia governance makes transparency an essential requirement for 
increasing trust and confidence.962 Second, it would educate the public and minimise 
the ignorance about the industry, thereby giving the public a broader role in supervising 
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sharia-compliance.963 This would reinforce the status of the public and other poorly-
protected stakeholders. Third, it would be very important to protect the interest of the 
public and other stakeholders. Greater transparency would provide the stakeholders, 
including the public, with useful information about the extent of sharia-compliance.964 In 
Islamic societies, such information is essential, since it provides an indication of the 
level of compliance with various Islamic obligations. For example, it is in the interest of 
the public in Muslim societies that zakat is properly calculated and distributed.965 
Therefore, information regarding this obligation should be disclosed. The high level of 
transparency would provide a basis for a more competitive environment, where IFIs 
would compete for more creative sharia-compliant products and services.966 Such an 
environment strengthens the position of the stakeholders and provides greater 
protection over their interests. Finally, there are some economic advantages associated 
with greater transparency. For example, the cost of assessing the quality of internal 
sharia audit would decrease.967 Also, greater transparency, as indicated earlier, would 
attract more stakeholders and provide an economic incentive to IFIs. 
For more effective transparency, it is suggested that sharia reports should follow the 
process and procedures of financial audit. For example, sharia reports should include 
non-compliance instances, and the management’s failure to address certain issues 
regarding sharia application.968 Mulyana and Ibrahim suggest that the ideal sharia audit 
report should contain: 
• The objective of the sharia audit. 
• The process and procedures followed when undertaking a sharia audit. 
• An opinion regarding the extent of sharia-compliance. 
• Details about the breaches and violations of sharia principles. 
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• Recommendations for improvement.969 
 
The transparency and disclosure requirements also need to reflect the unique 
requirements of sharia governance. For example, the percentage of non-sharia 
compliant earnings and how these earnings were distributed should be disclosed.970 
Another example is the unique competitive environment within the industry due to the 
need for innovative products. To minimise the competition drawback due to the 
disclosure of sharia-compliance, reporting can be limited to the general principles 
utilised to design the specific products, without stating the exact details.971 
The role of the regulator is not limited to imposing disclosure requirements but 
extends to playing an important role in enhancing other elements of accountability. 
Sharia knowledge is essential for the reporting, explaining, and questioning elements of 
accountability. However, the knowledge of stakeholders might be insufficient to protect 
their interests due to the difficulties associated with understanding certain sharia rulings. 
Therefore, it is necessary to have a legal authority which has the required expertise to 
understand sharia reports and other disclosed sharia explanations, and also to question 
any doubtful sharia-compliance issues. This legal authority would, therefore, act on 
behalf of the stakeholders to ensure sharia-compliance. While such a role is played by 
other regulators in the market, it is more demanding in sharia governance. It was 
explained before that, unlike in the case of corporate governance, stakeholders other 
than shareholders are more likely to be the most interested group of stakeholders but 
the least protected ones. Also, the protective tools within corporate governance 
provided to shareholders, such as voice and exit, cannot work effectively to protect 
sharia stakeholders. In such a case, the regulatory authority would provide an effective 
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platform for the elements of accountability to be implemented in sharia governance 
along with the sharia expertise needed to protect sharia stakeholders.  
The regulatory authority would also implement the possibility of consequences as an 
element of accountability. In the context of stakeholder accountability, there might be 
some questions about certain elements of accountability. While reporting and probably 
explaining and questioning could be provided through the internet and other networks, 
the possibility of judgement and sanctioning is often lacking for stakeholders.972 Again, 
the protective tools provided to shareholders in corporate governance, as the main 
group of stakeholders, such as voting to hold directors accountable, would be 
unavailable to other stakeholders as a more superior group in sharia governance. 
Therefore, these stakeholders need a regulator to represent and protect their interests 
through its power to impose sanctions. Moreover, having a regulatory authority to 
impose traditional sanctions would foster public supervision via other mechanisms, such 
as social pressure (naming and shaming), and advocate consumers and groups, who 
would have the tools to exert political, economic, and legal pressure.973  
It might be useful to refer to the application of such elements of accountability in the 
accounting and auditing profession. In the US and Canada, regulatory authorities 
related to accounting conduct regular inspections of accounting firms, which involve 
reviewing a sample of the firm’s audit engagement and evaluating the firm’s quality 
control.974 This is also applied in other jurisdictions, such as the UK975 and Saudi 
Arabia.976 In many jurisdictions, the regulatory authority issues a critique of the 
performance of audit firms following these inspections.977 Some would allow even 
foreign regulators to conduct such inspections.978 In cases of non-compliance, the 
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authority can impose penalties, which include the suspension or loss of the licence to 
practise.979 The idea of auditing the auditor aims to check the quality of the auditor’s 
work and ensure it is sufficient to meet and protect the public objectives.980 
In sharia governance, there is a need to implement a similar authority to act as an 
enforcement of the law and impose sanctions and other consequences on sharia firms 
and IFIs. Such behaviour would increase the awareness of the level of sharia-
compliance and give the public and other stakeholders an effective supervisory role that 
they are currently lacking. The framework of sharia supervision lacks legal liability as far 
as SSB members are concerned; they should be held liable in cases of negligence.981 
The issue of liability in the case of non-compliance with sharia is ambiguous and vague. 
Insufficient sharia review, the non-reporting of sharia violations, and negligence of 
conducting sharia supervision are instances of negligence which might harm the 
reputation of the industry.982 Therefore, it is important to draw a framework whereby the 
wrongdoers, including sharia supervisors, could be held liable. 
Relevant to this discussion is the extent of monitoring and enforcement that the 
regulator should exercise and undertake; more specifically, whether regulators should 
only exercise ex-post scrutiny, such as imposing sanctions or there is a need for ex-
ante scrutiny as well. In fact, the former predominates.983 It should be noted that ex-ante 
does not substitute for ex-post.984 It only works as an additional form to enhance 
accountability. It includes official inspections, regulating activities and input prior to 
misconduct, and the efforts to prevent misconduct.985 It is argued that ex-ante provides 
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a prophylactic effect, which serves the purpose of accountability.986 The process of 
accountability should involve the prevention and anticipation of misconduct to adjust the 
norms when necessary.987 This would enable the regulatory body to exercise greater 
scrutiny over institutions to ensure a stronger form of accountability.988 Also, ex-ante 
may be helpful if the issue is highly complex, too costly to evaluate, or the 
consequences may appear too late.989 In such cases, ex-ante would help to lower non-
copliance instances.  
Ex-ante, however might involve some limitations. Regulators might be reluctant to 
exercise ex-ante. They might prefer not to exercise ex-ante in an attempt to avoid any 
responsibility for authorising certain actions that might lead to the accountor being held 
liable. Also, there is a concern that the accountor may use ex-ante to shift its 
accountability burden.990 In this case, it is suggested that sufficiently high ex-post 
punishments may deter the accountor from using ex-ante to escape liability and deviate 
from its duties.991 
Ex-ante accountability has several applications in the sharia governance framework 
in certain jurisdictions. For example, national SSBs in Indonesia, Pakistan, and 
Malaysia have a responsibility to approve products before they are offered on the 
market.992 As the practice of sharia supervision is developing, the desire for more ex-
ante might become persistent and more demanding. The practice needs more guidance 
from the regulator in order to properly conduct its duties. While the practice matures, the 
regulator may exercise less ex-ante accountability. 
                                            
986 Jerry L. Mashaw, 'Accountability and Institutional Design: Some Thoughts on the Grammar of 
Governance' in Michael D. Dowdle (ed), Public Accountability: Designs, Dilemmas and Experiences 
(Public Accountability: Designs, Dilemmas and Experiences, Cambridge University Press 2006) at 132 
987 Bovens, 'Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual Framework' (n 688) at 453 
988 Richard Mulgan, Holding Power to Account: Accountability in Modern Democracies (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2003) at 19-20 
989 Tamar Frankel, 'Accountability and Oversight of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and 
Numbers (ICANN)' (2002)  <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=333342> accessed 
11/1/2018 at 32 
990 Keay and Loughrey, 'The Framework for Board Accountability in Corporate Governance' (n 680) at 
276 
991 Kenneth A. Bamberger, 'Regulation as Delegation: Private Firms, Decisionmaking, and Accountability 
in the Administrative State' (2006) 56 Duke Law Journal 377 at 393 




To sum up, the weak position of sharia stakeholders demands an effective 
regulatory authority to fill the gap and create stronger accountability by enforcing more 
comprehensive sharia reports, and implementing explanatory and question stages of 
accountability. As a law enforcement agency, the regulator would implement 
consequences more effectively. The chance of preventing non-sharia compliant actions 
would increase due to having an accountability framework that demands more reporting 
requirements and imposes consequences for violations. Such a framework of 
accountability would provide better protection for the interests of sharia stakeholders.  
6.6.3 The Regulatory Authority and Hisba Institutions 
The concept of hisba was introduced previously as an ethical arrangement for 
ensuring sharia-compliance that serves, to some extent, the objectives of sharia 
governance in Islamic banks. The application of hisba is intended to cover many 
aspects, including financial transactions. Some view sharia auditors, such as SSBs, as 
a modern application of hisba in banks.993 This argument implies that the historical 
practice of hisba in the market, which involved the authority to withdraw the licences 
from violators of sharia, which sometimes extended to money exchange services, could 
be applicable to SSBs.994 The argument continues that SSBs have the capacity to act 
as muhtasib, the person who performs hisba and could be characterised as the Islamic 
version of an ombudsman, which involves: the authority to hear complaints inside or 
outside the corporation regarding the compliance status of its transactions; the authority 
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to investigate the matter and take adequate actions; and the authority to prohibit staff 
from engaging in non-sharia compliant transactions.995 
However, applying hisba to SSBs or sharia firms is somewhat inappropriate. While 
similarities exist, to some extent, between these two institutions, the source of authority 
in hisba is significantly different and inapplicable to private services such as SSBs or 
sharia firms. Hisba institutions are defined as “a public service paid by the government 
to perform the role of market supervision to ensure sharia compliance. It should have 
the power to rectify any sharia violation, enforce sharia rules and sanctioning 
violators”.996 Through hisba institutions, it is the aim of the Islamic state to exercise 
comprehensive control over economic and social practices.997 It is not necessary, 
however, for hisba institutions to be under the state authority as it could be an 
independent non-governmental organisation but the independence factor is crucial and 
Muhtasib is expected to be fully independent of the market, both in fact and in 
appearance.998 Therefore, hisba does not apply to the nature of SSBs, where the 
members are appointed and paid privately to ensure sharia-compliance.999 
Hisba institutions were mainly established to protect the religious interest of society 
as a whole from any deviance.1000 Therefore, implementing an independent regulator to 
ensure sharia-compliance would be a more accurate contemporary application of hisba 
in the field of Islamic finance. Under this authority, both the roles of hisba and its public 
authority, as an independent source of supervision, would be applicable. In fact, such 
an authority would be consistent with certain theoretical approaches that stress the 
importance of the political power to enforce desirable behaviour. Ibn Khaldoon, a well-
known sociologist (D. 1406), argues that, without the political will to implement laws 
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effectively, moral norms, including sharia, cannot be reflected in societies, which might 
lead to chaos.1001 Therefore, the political authority needs to be responsible for checking 
all morally objectionable behaviour, dishonesty, fraud, and unfairness that are harmful 
to socio-economic development.1002 Nowadays, this is reflected in the legal institutions, 
which play an important role in preventing undesirable behaviour, where individuals 
otherwise may behave in a way that undermines the foundations of the system, leading 
to social chaos and economic collapse.1003  
6.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the accountability framework for the auditing role of SSBs has been 
examined. Accountability is an important concept in corporate governance and it has 
received insufficient analysis within sharia governance. The analysis shows that the 
framework needs to be strengthened by employing sharia firms and a regulatory 
authority to facilitate better sharia supervision and auditing practice to reinforce the four 
elements of accountability and provide improved protection for sharia stakeholders. 
The nature of sharia interest has unique characteristics that may not be protected by 
the same traditional tools available within corporate governance. Sharia auditing might 
be the only tool to provide such protection. Currently, the practice of external sharia 
auditing, if conducted at all, is very weak and does not reflect its importance within 
sharia governance which, as argued, might exceed the importance of financial auditing. 
The accountability framework proposed in this chapter would promote better 
performance of sharia auditing as a protective tool.  
In this framework, the responsibility owed to the board of directors for ensuring 
sharia-compliance should be similar to that related to external auditing. The board 
should ensure that the appropriate governance mechanism is available to conduct an 
objective independent audit. Regarding sharia-compliance assurance, the task is 
usually entrusted to SSBs. However, the lack of independence with regard to auditing, 
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as illustrated in the chapter, is problematic. The chapter suggests that sharia firms 
would conduct sharia audit in a more professional and objective manner, and suit the 
role of gatekeepers better than SSBs in conducting the auditing role. 
In sharia governance, the protection of stakeholders need not be similar to that 
under corporate governance. The protective tools provided mainly to shareholders 
cannot effectively protect sharia interest. Moreover, unlike corporate governance, 
shareholders are usually less interested in sharia-compliance than other stakeholders. 
In this unique situation, it is essential to insert a regulatory authority into the 
accountability framework as an actor on behalf of the stakeholders. It would implement 
the four elements of accountability more effectively through its authoritative power and 
the necessary knowledge of sharia that would otherwise be difficult for the stakeholders 
to understand. Moreover, it would be a contemporary application of the hisba institution 












Chapter Seven: SSB-free Islamic Banks: Toward a More Efficient Sharia 
Governance Model 
7.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapters, the roles of the SSB have been discussed and analysed. 
Suggestions have been made regarding reassigning these roles to different institutions 
in order to ensure more objective and effective sharia supervision. This chapter 
describes how the combination of these institutions could form an SSB-free bank model 
as a new sharia governance framework which redefines and reassigns the roles of 
sharia supervision more professionally.     
The introduction of this model would provide some benefits beyond having effective 
sharia supervision. The lack of professional practice among sharia supervisors as well 
as the impractical application of this religious practice could be obstacles to the market. 
This chapter discusses how this new model would help to overcome such challenges. It 
should be noted that it is not the aim of the chapter to thoroughly address and analyse 
the issues of professionalisation and practicality in the industry. It is limited solely to how 
the proposed model might push the industry toward more professionalised and 
applicable practice.  
7.2 The Model Explained 
In the SSB-free model of sharia governance, the roles of the traditional SSB should 
be separated and assigned to different institutions and mechanisms which need to be 
established in the governance framework. This includes a Sharia Standard-setting 
Board, a regulatory authority, sharia firms, internal mechanisms within IFIs, and 
international agencies. Below is a brief description of the roles of each of these within 
the model. 
Hamid and Mishaal view SSB-free banks as the future of the Islamic finance industry 
when it achieves a satisfactory level of sharia governance.1004 This proposed model is 
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an attempt to create a comprehensive framework for sharia supervision that involves all 
the roles of SSBs and enhances the accountability and standardisation framework.  
Sharia Standard-setting Board 
A sharia Standard-setting Board needs to be established in this model to satisfy the 
standardisation need explained in Chapter Five. The main role of this board is to set 
sharia standards which are to be applied by IFIs. Its authority should be similar to that of 
the central SSBs, which exist in certain jurisdictions. However, to overcome the 
limitations related to standardisation within central SSBs, this board needs to be more 
comprehensive and eliminate any role of setting sharia standards which is done by 
internal bodies within IFIs. The board should be responsible for issuing a detailed set of 
the adopted opinions of sharia rules and principles regarding Islamic finance issues. 
Disclosure of the process of setting standards is very important to ensure objectivity and 
a degree of certainty. In accounting, the standard setters have been criticised for the 
volume of important work that has been conducted informally as unwritten procedures, 
which have negatively affected objectivity.1005 Therefore, it is also important to disclose 
the reasoning behind the adoption of these opinions, to increase transparency. This 
would provide clearer guidance and a better understanding of the objectives of the 
standards when they are applied to design or review sharia-compliant products. The 
board, based on regular assessments of the industry, should update the standards with 
any necessary additions or amendments.  
As discussed before, it is ideal to adopt the sharia standards set by international 
organisations such as AAOIFI to promote greater harmonisation globally. In this case, 
national boards would be important for assessing the applicability of the standards 
nationally and making any necessary amendments, if needed. 
In short, a Sharia Standard-setting Board offers an alternative to internal SSBs 
within IFIs for issuing fatwas and ensuring sharia standards. The board needs to be fully 
independent and, ideally, disassociated from governmental institutions such as central 
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banks. It may be associated with religious-based establishments, as that should not 
have an effect on its objectivity and independence. In Saudi Arabia, for example, such a 
board could be established and appointed by BSU, the highest religious authority in the 
country, whose members are appointed by the King. Its independent status and 
religious commitment would provide stakeholders with an assurance that the Sharia 
Standard-setting Board had been established objectively and would effectively protect 
their religious interests.   
The Regulator 
The need for a regulatory authority was justified in the previous chapter. The role of 
such an authority in the model is to complement the Sharia Standard-setting Board. 
While the board concerns sharia rulings, the regulator would be the law enforcement 
body and set the technical regulatory instruments. Therefore, the regulator, preferably, 
should be established as a governmental or semi-governmental authority and given 
legal authority to conduct its duties. Trebilcock categorises the regulatory instruments 
that should be employed by the regulator into either input or output regulations.1006 Input 
regulations include licensing, and mandatory continuing education and periodic 
requalification. Output regulations include civil liability, standard-setting and 
enforcement, and the disciplinary process. Applying these instruments, the regulator 
would have four main roles which aim to enhance the sharia governance and 
accountability framework as well as promote more professional practice. These roles 
are: 
1. Licensing sharia firms, sharia auditors, and other specialised practitioners in 
the industry. 
2. Promoting the profession of sharia auditors and other specialised practitioners 
by setting up the qualification and competence requirements for them, and grant 
certificates. Continuing education may be imposed on professionals and sharia 
firms by requiring a set of training hours for employees. 
                                            





3. Imposing legal rules in the industry, such as codes for governance, 
transparency, ethics, and accounting and auditing standards for sharia-compliant 
transactions. 
4. Adopting disciplinary schemes. 
 
With such a central supervision, the industry would be more regulated which could 
lead to a concern about competition being inhibited due to the greater regulation. 
Consequently, innovation would be affected.1007 However, less regulation could be a 
concern as well. Due to the lack of regulation, the current practice of the industry 
applies certain strategies that have negative effects on competition and innovation. For 
example, the multi-membership of SSBs constrains the designing of innovative 
products. Having the same members of SSBs to supervise the compliance of products 
in different IFIs would probably lead to the production of similar products. As a result, 
less innovative products would be launched. In regulated jurisdictions, however, multi-
membership is usually restricted, so regulation does not always limit competition. Yet, it 
is important to address the issue of competition when introducing a new regulatory 
framework in the industry. While traditional command-and-control regulations may be 
assumed to suppress competition, new, more flexible forms of regulation have been 
introduced recently to foster competition by adopting more engaged, coordinated, and 
intervening strategies.1008 These new forms should be considered by the regulator in the 
industry where innovation is essential for competition.  
Sharia Firms 
It has been argued that the structure of SSBs as an insider body is inconsistent with 
its gatekeeping role that verifies sharia-compliance within IFIs. Alternatively, sharia firms 
were suggested to conduct the sharia auditing and verification role. These firms may 
provide consultation and advisory services with some restrictions regarding the issue of 
conflict of interests. This includes, for example, restrictions on combining auditing and 
non-auditing services for the same client. For more efficient practice and an enhanced 
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model, it is important that the legal framework of sharia firms considers the ideal 
attributes of gatekeepers, which are described by Goergen as: 
1. Be independent from the companies they supervise. 
2. Have access to the information required to carry out their duties. 
3. Be free from conflict of interests. 
4. Have the necessary skills to carry out their duties. 
5. Have the correct incentives which may include reputation and legal liability. 
6. Have sufficient power to force companies to disclose the information required 
to fulfil their duties and prevent any wrongdoing. 
7. Provide meaningful, reliable third-party verification and certification for 
investors and other stakeholders or users to assess the quality of the 
corporation.1009  
 
An important issue, related to external sharia auditing in this model, is whether this 
task should be conducted by the audit firms due to their expertise in auditing or by the 
newly-formed sharia firms. There is a call to enable audit firms to conduct sharia 
auditing after acquiring the necessary knowledge about sharia, since they have already 
acquired the necessary accounting and auditing skills.1010 However, audit firms may not 
be the ideal choice for conducting sharia audit. The scope of sharia auditing is different, 
as it concerns sharia aspects.1011 While financial audit focuses on financial aspects and, 
more specifically, the accuracy of financial statements, sharia audit concern the sharia-
compliance of the organisation’s overall activities and operations.1012 This includes a 
wider scope to review, including the policies, processes and procedures, contracts and 
agreements, financial statements and reporting, human resource management, social 
activities and contributions, marketing and advertising, reports and circulars, zakat 
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calculation and payment, and IT systems.1013 It could be said that, instead of auditing 
only financial statements, sharia auditing covers the whole institution, including its 
objectives, processes, personnel, and financial and non-financial aspects,1014 so audit 
firms might not be equipped to conduct sharia audit effectively.1015 Moreover, sharia 
advisory services which require sharia expertise would be better offered by specialised 
sharia firms rather than audit firms. 
Sharia firms would provide a more specialised service in the market. It might be 
more practical at the beginning to get audit firms involved, to some extent, and benefit 
from their experience of auditing. However, separate sharia firms, as more specialised 
gatekeepers, are better for the industry. Tuch argues that, with multidisciplinary firms, 
misconduct would be less optimally deterred.1016 Instead, he continues, multiple 
gatekeepers, where services intersect, overlap, and complement each other due to their 
broken boundaries, would be more efficient. Consequently, a web of gatekeepers would 
be created, to cross-check each other. In light of this argument, separate sharia firms to 
conduct sharia audit along with the financial audit conducted by audit firms would 
enhance the multiple gatekeepers’ network and increase the efficiency of the auditing 
practice. 
Cost might be argued to be an issue to challenge the idea of sharia firms conducting 
external audit. The same argument has been employed to challenge the idea of 
gatekeepers. In fact, the concept of gatekeepers economically reduces the cost since 
they will build up greater knowledge of the transaction structures and standard forms 
which enable them to provide cheaper services than the corporation itself where the 
transactional flow is weaker.1017 Also, it is unfair to assess the cost from one 
perspective. Independent audit may be mainly regarded by managers as an additional 
cost but other stakeholders, on the other hand, find it justifiable and effective to protect 
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their interests.1018 From their perspective, the premium fees paid for the services 
provided by gatekeepers aim to provide trust and deter negligence and corruption.1019 
This also applies to independent regulators and Sharia Standard-setting Boards, whose 
benefits exceed their associated costs.  
In the specific case of sharia firms as gatekeepers, cost should not be a big issue. 
IFIs are already paying a high remuneration to their own SSB, so the cost is only made 
more efficient in protecting the interests of the stakeholders. In fact, sharia firms reduce 
the cost of internal audit and provide the benefit of exposure to a variety range of 
expertise.1020 Taking into consideration the role of the regulatory authority in regulating 
the profession and the official recognition of the practice, the cost of searching for 
Islamic finance experts would be reduced for IFIs as well, since there would be officially 
licensed experts from whom the IFIs can choose. Moreover, it is argued that the 
professional discipline, which this model aims to enhance, could reduce the cost 
associated with regulation.1021 
Internal Mechanisms within IFIs 
It has been argued that the ultimate responsibility for sharia-compliance within IFIs 
rests with the board of directors, which must ensure that the appropriate governance 
mechanisms are in place to assure the stakeholders of compliance. Among these 
mechanisms are the internal audit and the audit committee. While internal sharia audit 
is already in effect in IFIs, there is a need to consider sharia audit within the 
responsibility of audit committees. As stated before, experts in sharia auditing should 
preferably be appointed to the committee, whether they are independent directors or, 
where it is allowed, non-director members. 
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International Agencies in the Model 
International agencies play a key role in developing internationally acceptable 
standards and strengthening the industry structure; specifically, IDB, AAOIFI, IFSB, 
IIFM, and IIRA.1022  
These agencies cover different aspects and their roles may overlap. AAOIFI and 
IFSB complement each other in standard-setting for the industry globally. In addition to 
sharia and governance standards, AAOIFI attempts to design accounting and auditing 
standards suitable for IFIs’ operations to complement, rather than conflict with, the 
International Accounting Standards (IAS) and fill the gap regarding Islamic financial 
transactions.1023 IFSB serves as an international standard-setter to ensure a sound, 
stable industry that promotes a more transparent, developed sharia-compliant market in 
the fields of banking, capital market, and insurance.1024 While AAOIFI complements 
IAS, IFSB does the same with the Basel Committee.1025 The aim of IIFM is to ensure a 
sharia-compliant capital market.1026 While the main objective of IDB is to enhance the 
economic development and social progress of its members, the promotion of the Islamic 
financial industry and institutions is included among its objectives.1027 Similar to 
international rating agencies such as Fitch, Moody’s, and Standard & Poor’s, IIRA 
provides ratings regarding the solvency, sharia-compliance, and corporate governance 
of IFIs.1028 Since sharia-compliance does not lie within the scope of the international 
rating agencies, IIRA aims to fill this gap.1029 It is argued that international rating 
agencies may conduct inaccurate rating of IFIs due to a lack of understanding of Islamic 
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finance products, such as sukuk, which justifies the importance of a specialised rating 
agency.1030 
However, the effect of these international agencies remains limited, without formal 
adoption by national jurisdictions. For example, after more than two decades, AAOIFI 
standards are only adopted by a few jurisdictions compared to the large number of 
members.1031 In accounting, the predominant problem is not the lack of sound 
standards but the lack of enforcement of the principles underlying these standards.1032 
This underlines the need for an effective national authority for the enforcement of sharia 
governance. 
There are calls to improve these agencies so that they become more professional 
and effective. The limited effect of these agencies has been attributed to the lack of 
necessary skills; the lack of incentives for ensuring sharia-compliance; and the salient 
politically-driven effect of these agencies, which tend to be government-sponsored.1033 
The diagram below demonstrates the SSB-free model of sharia governance and 
illustrates the arrangement of these different institutions within the sharia governance 
framework. 
                                            
1030 Muhammad Taqi Usmani, 'Sukuk and its Contemporary Applications' (2007)  
<http://files.madarisweb.com/ktb/fiqh/sukook_taqi_usmani.pdf> accessed 26/1/2018 at 16 
1031 Najeeb and Ibrahim, 'Professionalizing the Role of Shari'ah Auditors: How Malaysia Can Generate 
Economic Benefits' (n 735) 101 
1032 Greuning and Iqbal, Risk Analysis for Islamic Banks (n 360) 211 
1033 Grais and Pellegrini, 'Corporate Governance and Shariah Compliance in Institutions Offering Islamic 




























Int. Standards set by Int. 
Agencies 
Guiding Sharia and Other 
Standards 
IFIs 
External Sharia Review and Audit 
Sharia Consultaion Services (not 
combined with audit) Sharia Firms and 
Sharia Auditors 
Int. Rating Agencies and 




7.3 The Effect of the Model on the Industry and Sharia Supervision as a 
Profession 
7.3.1 Competence and Professional Practice 
One of the main objectives of the SSB-free model is to regulate the supervision of 
the Islamic finance industry more efficiently. Promoting and regulating the profession 
are also issues considered in regulation.1034 Improving sharia supervision to become a 
well-regulated profession where sharia supervisors are sufficiently qualified would 
improve sharia governance.1035 In the model, the different roles would be separated, 
with clearer boundaries between them. The separation of standard-setting and sharia 
auditing should promote sharia supervision as an organised profession and contribute 
to greater efficiency and success.1036 This would rearrange and simplify the complex 
relationship between the management and sharia advisors. The management would 
have a responsibility for accurately implementing the sharia standards set by the Sharia 
Standard-setting Board. In addition to its advisory role in assisting IFIs to implement the 
standards, sharia firms would certify the accuracy of such implementation. The board of 
directors would be responsible for ensuring a better internal governance framework to 
ensure that the corporation’s transactions and operations are sharia-compliant.  
The introduction of sharia firms as a main player in the governance framework would 
be valuable in enhancing sharia supervision as a profession. In accounting, it has been 
argued that accounting firms have a substantial impact in constructing the professional 
attitude and identity of accountants.1037 Similarly, the greater involvement of sharia firms 
in the industry would push towards more professionalised practice of sharia supervision 
and eventually to recognise the practice as a profession. Parallel to audit firms, the 
practice of sharia auditing and supervision would be conducted more professionally by 
well-constructed firms, which would make a valuable contribution to promoting the 
identity of the profession.  
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The practice of sharia supervision would be significantly improved by having a well-
performing regulator, responsible for promoting and protecting the profession as well as 
overseeing it as one of its main duties. This would improve the profession due to the 
regulator’s authority to impose ethical standards which regulate the practice of firms. 
These standards play an important role in protecting ethics, competence, 
independence, and accountability.1038 The ethical codes within sharia audit is weak due 
to the lack of enforceable mechanisms and tools that measure the performance of the 
practice,1039 so it is essential to have a code of ethics for sharia auditors to push 
towards an institutional profession.1040  
Also, the regulator plays an important role in promoting the profession by 
representing the practitioners against others more effectively. The power and authority 
of the regulator would provide a greater protection for the profession. Professional 
bodies have played a key role in protecting the autonomy of their relevant 
professions.1041 Also, the professional bodies for lawyers and accountants were 
valuable and heavily involved in solving overlapping issues, such as taxation, which 
have been disputed between these two professions.1042  
Competence is one of the most important issues of the profession, which requires 
special consideration in sharia supervision. It is defined as the “human abilities to 
perform certain tasks in an organization as well as the capabilities of certain 
organizations to perform functions for sustainability purpose”.1043 Competence has been 
an issue in modern Islamic finance since its early formation in the 1970s.1044 In the 
investigation of the competence requirements for SSB membership across Islamic 
jurisdictions conducted by Grassa, it seems that many jurisdictions do not impose any 
                                            
1038 Austin Mitchell and Prem Sikka, 'Accountability of the Accountancy Bodies: The Peculiarities of a 
British Accountancy Body' (2004) 36 The British Accounting Review 395 at 398 
1039 Shafii, Abidin and Salleh, 'Integrated Internal-External Shariah Audit Model: A Proposal towards the 
Enahncement of Shariah Assurance Practices in Islamic Financial Institutions' (n 959) at 2 
1040 Umar, 'SSB's Roles between Individual Advisory and institutional Profession' (n 386) at 17 
1041 Coffee, Gatekeepers: The Professions and Corporate Governance (n 440) at 104 
1042 Cooper and Robson, 'Accounting, Professions and Regulation: Locating the Sites of 
Professionalization' (n 581) at 420 
1043 Nor Aishah Mohd Ali and others, 'Knowledge for Shari'ah Auditors Competency in Islamic Financial 
Institutions' (2016) 7 International Journal of Trade, Economics and Finance 113 at 115 
1044 Yaacob, 'Issues and Challenges of Shari'ah Audit in Islamic Financial Institutions: A Contemporary 




requirement. If mentioned, the requirements generally include expertise in Islamic law 
regarding financial transactions, an acceptable reputation, good character, and strong 
moral values.1045 These requirements are too general and hard to measure. Even the 
requirement of sharia expertise needs to be specified more clearly, since it is very broad 
and may be insufficient to supervise the complexity of Islamic finance operations. 
Sometimes, the requirement for an academic certificate in sharia, albeit general, is not 
specified. 
With the rapid development of the industry vertically, by developing more sharia-
compliant products and financial solutions, and horizontally, by the wider geographical 
spread, the industry is being challenged by the scarcity of experts and its inability to 
supply a sufficient number of qualified sharia supervisors.1046 The industry is not yet 
capable of producing a sufficient number of sharia experts with the required knowledge 
of banking and financial operations who are able to conduct a complex, technical 
transformation from conventional operations into a sharia-compliant system.1047 Sharia 
scholars might be abundant but may lack special expertise in Islamic finance, which 
might not be found even among distinguished sharia scholars.1048 Under this situation of 
a lack of competence, IFIs may take advantage of the commercial and financial 
ignorance of sharia scholars by failing to reveal certain necessary documents or by 
deceptive presentations relating to the matter.1049 
Therefore, a more specific identification of the required expertise of Islamic finance 
is required, and it is not enough to require only general expertise in sharia.1050 In fact, 
Islamic law needs to develop new theories regarding Islamic banking and finance in 
order to be able to instruct and supply the industry with professional experts.1051 While 
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there has been some high quality research in this field, religious education remains 
traditional and a more systematic approach is needed to integrate Islamic finance 
research into its curriculum.1052 There is a need to consider the specialised sharia 
knowledge applied in Islamic banking, as well as the necessary knowledge and 
understanding of accounting and auditing, law, and economics.1053 These groups of 
knowledge should be combined in order to form more applicable theories of Islamic 
finance on which professionals can rely in practice. Islamic finance is required to foster 
an educational environment that combines advanced higher education, research, and a 
peer-evaluation mechanism that earns confidence in a specialised profession and would 
be able to address real world problems.1054 
In addition to knowledge, skills need to be identified as an important requirement. 
Candidates need to develop skills and competencies regarding practical applications so 
they can become problem solvers rather than followers of instructions.1055 For example, 
auditing skills are essential for sharia auditors but the practice suggests that these skills 
are at a very low level.1056 Also, speaking a foreign language, specifically English, is 
sometimes an important skill for sharia members, which is rarely found among SSB 
members in Saudi Arabia.1057 English, as a universal language, is used intensively in 
the business worldwide so the ability to use English is deemed a substantial skill for 
anyone involved in commercial activities. Sharia decisions regarding these activities 
might fundamentally rely on understanding contracts and other legal documents written 
in English, where translation could constitute an additional cost and might not deliver 
the meaning accurately.   
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Due to the lack of expertise in these areas among sharia scholars and supervisors, 
some IFIs may rely on a combination of experts in different disciplines to overcome this 
problem. Some view interdisciplinary representation on an SSB as a useful strategy 
which reflects the needs of the industry.1058 However, this has been criticised that the 
combination of experts rather than expertise might challenge communication due to the 
different perspectives these experts might have.1059 Sharia supervision in Islamic 
finance, like other professions, needs to form its own competence which should be 
designed to include the necessary knowledge from different disciplines instead of 
combining experts from different specialties to be represented in the SSB. Competent 
experts should understand all of the necessary knowledge and skills related to the 
industry to be able to take decisions.   
In the SSB-free model, the practice of sharia supervision would be restructured in 
order to make it more competent. Currently, it is too difficult to find enough qualified 
scholars to set sharia standards in every IFI. Alternatively, having a single authority to 
standardise the industry would help to overcome the issue of the scarcity of experts 
since only a few are needed to set sharia standards for the whole jurisdiction. This 
would ensure that competent experts had spent sufficient time on issuing the standards 
instead of having members holding too many memberships. The model could 
accommodate more smoothly other expertise if needed in some complex cases. In the 
case of large audit firms, other experts may be called in to obtain more comprehensive 
perspectives.1060 Sharia Standard-setting Boards, regulators, and sharia firms could be 
structured to have other expertise that might be helpful to these institutions.  
The importance of the role of the regulator in promoting competence is obvious in 
this model. The industry lacks competence requirements compared to other finance 
professionals who are required by their respective professional bodies to undertake 
robust and transparent tests regarding their ability, credibility, and integrity.1061 Similarly, 
there is a need to adopt and recognise an international standardised charter for 
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performing sharia audit similar to those employed in the fields of accounting and 
finance.1062 AAOIFI could play a role similar to other international professional bodies in 
establishing a transparent set of standards and criteria to be qualified as a legitimate 
expert in the field.1063 This role would be ineffective without formal adoption by the 
national regulator in different jurisdictions. It is important for the industry to have certified 
sharia auditors to increase the professionalism within the practice.1064 Due to the lack of 
official standards for qualifying sharia practitioners, a number of scholars have gained 
prominence without undergoing substantive scrutiny, leaving the new entrants, who may 
have more meaningful education and training, challenged to be admitted as sharia 
supervisors.1065 Also, continuing educational programmes could be imposed on 
professionals. Some regulators require a specific number of hours annually that 
professionals must spend on continuing education.1066  
Recently, the educational needs of sharia auditors have received more attention in 
different institutions.1067 There are several diplomas and certificates available that 
attempt to provide qualified sharia auditors for the market. For example, AAOIFI, the 
International Center for Education in Islamic Finance (INICEF), the Chartered Institute 
of Management Accountants (CIMA), the London School of Business and Finance 
(LSBF), the Bahrain Institute of Banking and Finance (BIBF), and the Ethica Institute of 
Islamic finance are some of the institutions that provide training programmes and 
certificates for sharia auditors.1068  
Theoretically, these diploma and training programmes are important in developing 
the profession. However, these may add little value to the practice and supply the 
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industry with its actual need for professionals. Despite these programmes, there is a 
gap in the market for professional candidates who can efficiently provide sharia 
auditing.1069 This is not to suggest that these programmes are poorly designed or have 
inadequate modules. Islamic finance lacks a clear definition and scope of sharia 
auditing which creates a gap between the desired and the actual needs of sharia 
audit.1070 This is in contrast to the case of financial auditing, where there exists a clear 
scope and guidelines.1071 In order to supply the industry with more qualified 
practitioners, the current programmes need to be built on a clear set of competence 
requirements and clearer identification of the role and scope of sharia auditors, adopted 
formally by national regulators.  
7.3.2 Improving the Industry 
The SSB-free model would strengthen the industry with more sustainable institutions 
that would work consistently to improve and institutionalise the market. The industry 
would be served by more professional institutions which provide sophisticated services. 
Consequently, the market would not be influenced by a single group or individuals but 
rather there would be a plurality of decisions and diffusion of power, similar to the typical 
governance structure in auditing.1072 Sharia supervision would be more publicly oriented 
and would apply more transparent processes and procedures. Additional layers of 
governance would be created to enhance the trust given to sharia auditors, as they 
would act as gatekeepers and increase the confidence of the stakeholders regarding 
the accuracy of the reports that companies disclose. This would complicate any attempt 
to divert from sharia interest compared to the situation where individual SSBs set sharia 
standards and simultaneously certify sharia-compliance for their relevant IFIs. 
The value of formally adopting a regulatory authority for the industry includes:  
• Increasing the confidence in sharia auditing. 
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• Increasing the accountability and enhancing the corporate governance within 
IFIs. 
• Improving the legislative and regulatory activities to adopt a more applicable 
sharia-compliant system. 
• Setting and improving ethical standards. 
• Ensuring that sharia auditors possess a satisfactory level of qualification. 
• Protecting the rights and monitoring the integrity of professionals. 
• Increasing the awareness of the industry by organising and hosting 
conferences and workshops, and providing the public with valuable reports on 
the industry.1073 
 
In the model, national and international agencies would coordinate to improve the 
industry, as their roles would be complementary and balanced. In accounting, 
international agencies have been established due to the increasing finance, 
interconnection between economies, and the crucial role of financial flows.1074 However, 
cross-border dealing might pose a challenge for local IFIs due to the different standards 
applied in different jurisdictions. In such a situation, the national authorities play an 
important role in assessing the standards in different jurisdictions and setting guidelines 
for IFIs on how to deal in these jurisdictions in a way that ensure compliance. In the EU, 
this role is played by the European Group of Auditors’ Oversight Bodies (EGAOB) in 
auditing practice.1075 Also, the effects of certain international agencies go hand in hand 
with national ones. For example, the national agencies would ensure a transparent 
structure as well as a standardised practice and create a good environment for 
international rating agencies to provide their services. In return, the rating agencies 
would create a competitive environment between IFIs to ensure a higher level of sharia-
compliance within the jurisdiction.1076 They would, also, make a valuable contribution to 
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the level of transparency and disclosure beyond the mandatory ones.1077 As a result, 
the market discipline would increase which would reduce the burden on the national 
regulators.1078  
Sharia firms may play a role in enhancing the regulation and standardising the 
practice of the industry. By providing professional services in multinational jurisdictions, 
sharia firms would be exposed to different practices which might help the national 
regulator or Sharia Standard-setting Board to set better standards, procedures, and 
practices.  
The consistency of the practice is essential for the market. The SSB-free model is 
similar to that applied in auditing, which has been developed over time ideally to suit the 
market. It provides checks and balances between different decision-makers and 
enhances the credibility of the decisions made. Also, this similarity makes it easier and 
more suitable for the market to adopt. A consistent market would also enhance the 
public understanding of Islamic finance and therefore stakeholders would play a more 
effective role in the industry.1079 In return, people would be more educated and informed 
about Islamic finance which creates a marketing tool and potential greater demand for 
sharia-compliant products.1080 Moreover, consistency would facilitate more sustainability 
for other stakeholders, such as rating agencies, the stock markets, the financial media, 
and researchers.1081 The role of the latter is required to develop the industry. There is a 
call to enhance the relationship between the industry and academic institutions to 
ensure that the industry becomes more acceptable on a worldwide scale.1082 However, 
studying an inconsistent industry would only produce limited results. For a more 
generalised and accurate analysis, academia needs consistency and also more 
accessible data, which would be better provided through more transparent institutions in 
a well-oriented governance model. Hence, the model would facilitate more effective 
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research that would in turn contribute towards more improvements and to be applicable 
to the industry globally. 
7.4 Applicability of the Model: Opportunities and Challenges 
One of the challenges facing the developing industry of Islamic finance is the lack of 
legal recognition among the jurisdictions. This is mainly due to the lack of a standard 
model under which the industry is governed. Also, the current practice of Islamic finance 
depends on SSBs as the cornerstone of sharia governance. In addition to the 
governance issues surrounding their structure, the nature of SSBs as a religious board 
within IFIs could be an obstacle to its adoption in the worldwide secular jurisdictions. 
These jurisdictions might not understand and recognise the existence of such a 
powerful board as additioninal to the board of directors. 
Arguably, the SSB-free model would provide the industry with a standardised 
governance structure that is easier to apply globally. The industry would be governed 
globally by a similar accountability framework to that employed by other professions that 
already exist in the market, which makes it easier to adopt. Islamic finance would be 
practised and recognised internationally as a profession with known references. The 
peculiarity of the structure of SSBs as an internal board is substituted by well-known 
institutions, such as gatekeepers, standard-setting boards, and regulators. This would 
make the industry appear more oriented and professional. Currently, the market 
depends heavily on the reputation of certain well-known names who participate in 
various SSBs. However, the respect and reputation asset of sharia scholars is limited 
locally and may be insufficient to satisfy stakeholders in the global market.1083 
Alternatively, this model applies the governance structure of gatekeepers, specifically 
external auditors, as a more applicable model for enhancing reputation globally. The 
SSB-free model has a similar governance structure to the globally accepted corporate 
governance frameworks, which makes it more applicable.  
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However, the model might face political challenges in certain jurisdictions, such as 
secular ones. Legal recognition and a standardised framework are essential for drawing 
a clear scope of sharia auditing and legally enabling sharia firms to operate more 
effectively.1084 Without the political will, reforming sharia governance would be 
challenged. In this regard, a question of secularism might be raised: is sharia 
governance merely a religious matter?1085 Sharia governance should be perceived 
purely as a mechanism for ensuring that the sharia-compliance procedures are properly 
applied. There may be some religious aspects of this which could be left to Islamic 
scholars to determine, while the regulators focus on making the structure more efficient, 
trustworthy and solid. If a relegious-based action becomes an important component of 
the market that could threaten its stability, it is essential for the regulators to supervise 
this behaviour. This could be done without interfering in determining what this religious 
action should be but focusing on how to apply it  properly. 
The issue of regarding sharia governance as religious in nature also applies to 
Islamic and non-secular jurisdictions. Politically, government may hesitate to adopt 
changes in the current framework of sharia governance due to the sensitivity of the 
issue. In the case of Saudi Arabia, the political willingness to formally adopt a sharia 
governance framework is very low, as shown in Chapter Three. The country ignores the 
regulation of the Islamic banking industry because it considers such an issue a very 
subtle one that might have political consequences, so it prefers not to interfere or be 
involved in determining whether or not a particular bank or a transaction is Islamic, and 
leave the industry to follow informal, unwritten standards. 
In light of these political obstacles, the model might not have any regulatory authority 
and/or Sharia Standard-setting Board. In Chapter Five, possible solutions were 
suggested in respect of the issue of the lack of standardisation and the obstacles to 
establishing a Sharia Standard-setting Board in secular jurisdictions. Similarly, private 
self-regulatory agencies could be established in these jurisdictions, if applicable, as an 
alternative to the regulatory agency in order to provide a source of trust for the 
                                            
1084 Nathan Garas and Pierce, 'Shari'a Supervision of Islamic Financial Institutions' (n 315) at 393 




stakeholders and enhance the accountability framework. International agencies could 
play an important role in supporting and recognising self-regulatory agencies in their 
relevant jurisdictions. Also, IFIs in non-Islamic jurisdictions may rely on other possible 
mechanisms for effective enforcement. For example, international arbitration centres for 
Islamic finance disputes would be significant in removing many of the obstacles for the 
IFIs in these jurisdictions. In this regard, IICRA was established in Dubai as an 
international, independent, non-profit organisation to settle all financial and commercial 
disputes arising between financial and business institutions that choose to apply Islamic 
law and sharia principles.1086 Such a centre is valuable for the industry where IFIs from 
different jurisdictions may incorporate an arbitration clause in the agreements and refer 
to the centre to seek resolutions in the case of disputes.1087 IFIs in non-Islamic 
jurisdictions may refer to this centre as a tool of enforcement. 
The governance reform might be rejected by other players in the industry as well. 
Important stakeholders, such as IFIs and practitioners, have shown little interest in 
improving the auditing practice in the industry.1088 They may have an interest in 
retaining the status quo. Also, some sharia scholars might challenge and resist the 
SSB-free model. As highlighted in Chapter Five, standardisation might be resisted by 
more conservative scholars. Since the model restricts their influence in the industry and 
increases their accountability, scholars might challenge the model. Increasing 
accountability could be perceived as a way of showing less respect to sharia scholars or 
doubting their credibility.1089 Additionally, the religious institutions might oppose the 
reform and modernisation of sharia education. It is broadly accepted by many religious 
establishments that the fundamental issue has already been identified, so the necessity 
of adopting a new approach or perspective is minimal.1090 
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The application of an SSB-free model might be challenged by the absence of a 
market leader in the Islamic finance industry. It might be too hard to influence a specific 
sharia governance model as a standard model to be applied in the industry. The 
relatively advanced sharia governance models, such as the Malaysian model, have had 
only a limited effect in the market and have not become a standard model for sharia 
governance. As explained earlier, the AAOIFI sharia standards are only adopted by a 
few jurisdictions. Samra argues that, while many jurisdictions are now competing to 
become the market leader in the industry, such as Dubai and London, it is important for 
the industry to settle around a clear market leader location in order to stimulate 
governance standards.1091 Some analysis concludes that the industry is missing a 
strategic leader that could enforce a harmonised and standardised set of best 
practices.1092 In this regard, Saudi Arabia might have a good opportunity to influence the 
industry and overcome these challenges if there exists the political will to change its 
attitude towards the adoption of a legal framework. Jurisdictions that introduced 
legislation into the industry more recently could have the advantage of being able to 
build upon the experiences of other jurisdictions and the work of international 
organisations.1093 This is manifest in Oman, which recently adopted a relatively 
advanced sharia governance model. In Saudi Arabia, its recent, ambitious 2030 Vision 
aims to take advantage of its strengths as the heart of the Islamic and Arab world, an 
investment powerhouse, and a hub connecting three continents.1094 This provides a 
strong basis for adopting an advanced model of sharia governance. Due to its extensive 
sharia-compliant assets, operations, and other facilities, such as sharia scholars, Saudi 
Arabia could be a good candidate for becoming a successful hub for Islamic finance and 
take the lead in implementing an effective legal framework which could influence the 
industry globally. The data presented in the introduction shows that the country hosts 
the majority of the industry, as it possesses more than 1/5 of the market and its sharia-
compliant assets represent more than 50% of its total assets. This significant market 
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size could strongly influence its legal framework. In addition to the size of its market, the 
country hosts the IDB, which plays a key role in developing the market. Also, the 
country is considered a fundamental religious location, which also has an influence on 
the market. In addition to hosting the holiest Muslim sites, which might be of symbolic 
significance, a significant number of sharia scholars are based there, who are members 
of SSBs globally. Data from 2010 shows that Saudi universities supplied around half of 
all SSB members globally.1095 These advantages that the country possesses could be 
employed to achieve its vision, thereby making it the potential leader of the industry in a 
move towards a more standardised form of sharia governance. 
7.5 Conclusion 
The SSB-free model, along with more effective and recognised international Islamic 
finance organisations, would constitute a dynamic sharia governance model. 
Harmonised standards would be set by international agencies for a more consistent 
practice; a sharia Standard-setting Board and the regulatory authority would work to 
tailor and enforce national standards; the process of designing sharia-compliant 
products would be conducted by internal experts within IFIs as well as the advisory 
services provided by sharia firms; and internal sharia review units along with external 
sharia firms would be entrusted with sharia auditing and the issuing of statements 
regarding sharia-compliance. This process would be sustained by reputable agents, like 
rating agencies, the stock markets, the financial media, and researchers. Such a 
framework would also enhance the supply of professionals in the industry as well as the 
public understanding of the requirements of sharia, which provides a way for 
stakeholders to play a more effective role in sharia governance. 
The model could constitute a positive addition to the effort to professionalise the 
practice. There would be clearly assigned roles provided to professionals who would be 
adequately certified to act as practitioners. By creating a well-oriented environment, the 
model would contribute towards developing Islamic finance theories, which would help 
to improve the competence requirements of sharia practitioners in the industry to 
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become more practical. Such an environment would also help the market to thrive and 
become more sustainable and competitive. Globally, the model would become more 
applicable, especially in the secular jurisdiction, due to its similarity to other governance 
models applied by other professions, such as auditing. Sharia supervision would be 
perceived as a well-defined profession rather than merely a religious practice. However, 
adopting a globally standardised model might be challenged politically and by some of 
the other important players in the industry. While these challenges apply to Saudi 
Arabia, the country has a strong potential to influence the industry towards achieving 


















Chapter Eight: Conclusion 
In this thesis, the role of sharia supervision performed by the SSB has been 
examined. The main issue explored in the thesis was how the SSB should be 
restructured to be more effective, independent and impartial for sharia-compliance 
stakeholders in IFIs. For this analysis, the SSB structure, position, and roles have been 
critically analysed in light of corporate governance principles. The research highlighted 
the legal issues surrounding the body of the SSB and the problems related to the lack of 
legal consideration, independence, and consistency of sharia governance. Throughout 
the research, suggestions have been made regarding restructuring the governance 
model for sharia supervision in order to strengthen the sharia governance framework. 
The research proposes an SSB-free model which aims to provide a stronger 
governance and accountability framework for protecting the sharia interests of its 
stakeholders. 
As explained in Chapter One, the discussion undertaken in the thesis was mainly 
theoretical in nature in order to critically analyse the current SSB model and how it 
might be restructured to fit within companies’ structures and better serve its sharia-
compliance objective. While such a discussion is generally applicable to the whole 
industry and not specific to any particular jurisdiction, the situation in Saudi Arabia has 
been highlighted in order to clarify several important points, and the jurisdiction was 
employed to bring out several issues for discussion and to provide case studies. 
Several other leading jurisdictions have also been discussed in order to compare the 
sharia supervision practices. The main findings of the research is summarised below. 
The Need for Legal Recognition of Islamic Banking 
Chapter Two described how the attitude of Islamic law toward interest, which 
challenges modern banking, has contributed to the emergence of Islamic banking. This 
type of banking complies with the Islamic principles and employs sharia-compliant 
financial instruments. The introduction of Islamic banking into the market has brought 
discussion of the Islamic perspective and especially in relation to several corporate 




chapter argued that Islamic values could be consistent with some of the views proposed 
in corporate governance theories, such as stakeholder and stewardship theories. 
However, IFIs need an additional governance framework to supervise sharia-
compliance. This has resulted in sharia governance, where the SSB is an important 
aspect of it. 
Chapter Three argues that in addition to that Islamic banking shares with 
conventional ones the same rationales that justify a separate legal system, it has unique 
requirements that demand special regulations for the industry that cater for its services 
and operations. Since many well-known sharia-compliant products are commonly 
restricted in banking regulations, the objectives of Islamic finance would be better 
served by a separate legal system or, at least, by applying certain exceptions regarding 
its operations. Special regulations offer many advantages, including: increasing the 
understanding of the industry for more effective supervision; addressing more effectively 
the special types of risk to which the industry is exposed; and addressing the special 
prudential requirements of the industry. 
Islamic banks need the special legal recognition to provide its unique banking 
services free of challenges. In the case of Saudi Arabia, a conservative Islamic state, 
Islamic banks face legal challenges due to the lack of legal recognition of the industry. 
Despite the fact that its culture and legal system have strong Islamic roots that 
challenge, to some extent, conventional banking, Islamic banking, also, has 
encountered legal challenges. In the past, Islamic banking had to fight to exist. Also, the 
current banking system does not recognise the unique requirements of Islamic banking. 
Such a paradox makes analysing the attitude of Saudi Arabia toward Islamic banking an 
interesting case. 
Rethinking the SSB Role toward Gatekeeping  
SSBs, as the most important tool in sharia governance requirements, demand 
special legal attention which is highlighted in Chapter Four. Due to the development and 
complexity of Islamic finance operations, sharia supervision and religious expertise are 




of sharia-compliance, which in turn provides economic and ethical values to IFIs. While 
some tools of sharia supervision could be inserted smoothly into the corporate 
governance structure, the SSB is not a well-known body in such a structure, and so is 
not easily adopted. In order to accommodate the SSB within the structure of the 
corporation, the nature of its roles should be examined regardless of its structure. The 
analysis in this chapter showed that the SSB performs three main roles: setting sharia 
standards (or legislation as sometimes used in the thesis), sharia advice, and sharia 
auditing.   
Assigning all these roles to the SSB, the chapter argues, is impractical and 
ineffective. While these roles are essential within the sharia governance structure, 
combining them into a single body within the corporation creates confusion and 
negatively affects the enforceability of the SSBs’ decisions from a legal perspective, 
which might result in a meaningless sharia-compliant system. The roles of sharia-
standard setting and sharia auditing require a high level of independence which is 
insufficiently provided by the different sharia governance frameworks. There are 
significant variations in the level of legal recognition of SSBs by different jurisdictions. 
Such a lack of legal recognition of the SSB does not reflect its importance in sharia 
governance. There is a need to have a standardised model that lays down the clear 
scope of the roles and responsibilities of sharia supervision that can be easily 
incorporated into the structure of the corporation. Such a model is required to enable 
more effective regulatory supervision and increase the confidence of the stakeholders of 
sharia-compliance, which would eventually help the industry to thrive.  
To incorporate the roles of SSBs more effectively within the structure of 
corporations, the chapter compared and analysed the link between SSBs and similar 
potential mechanisms; more specifically, the board of directors and the gatekeepers. 
The structure of the SSB as an internal, powerful body may have led some researchers 
to draw a link between it and the board of directors. However, their objectives and 
functions are not common. While the board of directors guides the company and acts as 
a balance between the different interests and players within it, SSBs are supposed to 




negotiated in favour of other interests, since it could only be satisfied by a pass-or-fail 
test, and could not be satisfied by voting representation or negotiation. Not only the 
objectives but also the roles differ significantly between the two bodies. If SSBs perform 
a similar role to that of the board of directors, it does so only on a very limited scale that 
does not qualify the SSB to be considered as a board of directors. Structure-wise, the 
SSB could not be considered a board of directors unless a two-tier board system is 
considered, as is the case in some of the literature. However, the SSB is inconsistent 
with the objectives of the two-tier board system, which is mainly to provide a clearer 
separation between supervision and management. Therefore, the two-tier board system 
is designed to promote more effective management, which is not the objective of the 
existence of the SSB as it simply is not its role. In fact, the SSB faces structural as well 
as legal challenges if it is to be considered as a board, not only in the unitary system but 
also in the two-tier one. Even IFIs operating under the two-tier board system do not 
consider the SSB a second board. Thus, regarding the SSB as a board would not result 
in a two-tier system but in a totally different model that is new to corporate governance. 
The idea of regarding the SSB as an audit committee within the board was also raised 
and disputed. Audit committees are still part of the board of directors which, as stated, 
has different roles and objectives to the SSB. In addition to the different nature of these 
roles, the SSB demands a more independent position from the board of directors and 
less interference over internal auditing compared to the position of the audit committee. 
In fact, the SSBs’ objectives and roles fit within the function of gatekeeping more 
suitably. Although the reputational capital of SSBs is merely religious and inconsistent 
with the professional reputation required for gatekeepers, which is part of the structural 
issue with which this thesis deals, SSBs’ roles satisfy the less common view of 
gatekeepers, which considers the veto power assigned to them. More specifically, the 
objectives of SSBs under sharia governance is parallel to the roles played by external 
auditors within corporate governance in assuring stakeholders of the credibility of the 
company by exercising its veto power and withholding support if any misconduct or 
violations are found. However, the view of SSBs as a gatekeeper might be unclear due 
to their lack of clear structure and professional practice. SSBs combine different roles 




profession. Therefore, the issue of sharia supervision requires more regulatory attention 
to effectively reflect its gatekeeping role and for it to be regulated as such. The 
regulatory structure of auditing, as a well-oriented profession, could be taken as the 
ideal model that will serve sharia supervision more efficiently. The components of 
regulation are well-recognised within the audit regulatory authorities, where both ex-
ante and ex-post scrutiny is performed to supervise the practice and promote the 
profession. In the case of sharia supervision within IFIs, each institution establishes its 
own regulatory authority, an SSB, and this might undermine the industry from being 
standardised and well-protected. 
Fatwa and the Process of Setting Sharia Standards Should be Independent from 
IFIs 
The need for fatwa, as a main role assigned to SSBs, to be effectively standardised 
in the industry was discussed in Chapter Five. Modernity requires legal codification of 
the Islamic principles. Non-codification, especially in commercial aspects, may result in 
economic disruption which makes codification politically desirable and provides a basis 
for the economic justification of standardisation within the Islamic finance industry. 
Today, there is a tendency to move toward more codification where many Islamic 
jurisdictions adopt a codified set of Islamic law in some areas, mostly family law. This 
practice, however, is controversial in the case in Saudi Arabia which constitutes a 
challenge toward standardisation in Islamic finance. 
The assessment of the standardisation process within the sharia governance 
framework undertaken in the chapter showed that the current structure of SSBs 
contains many factors that compromise its independence to legislate. Conflict of 
interests exists in the perceived employment relationship between SSB members and 
IFIs as well as the combination of the roles of legislation with auditing within SSBs. The 
management, due to their powerful position, may exercise some influence over SSB 
members and put them under pressure to engage in so-called “fatwa shopping” to 
satisfy the management. While the legislation role was assigned historically to SSBs 
due to the relatively simple operations and lack of a governing Islamic code for the 




and assigned to a national SSB. Although this step has been taken by some 
jurisdictions, the current practice of central standardisation, where it exists, suffers from 
several limitations, which allow internal SSBs a wide space in which to perform, to 
different extents, the role of legislation. The review of some of the most advanced 
practices of central standardisation, such as those in Malaysia and Indonesia, showed 
that SSBs are still exposed to conflict of interests where they can perform a legislative 
role as part of their overall role. For greater independence, the legal framework of sharia 
standard-setting should be totally assigned to an independent national board without 
any involvement of the internal SSBs. 
It might be argued, however, that this approach is impractical, as central 
standardisation might inhibit innovation and flexibility, which is required for the 
development of the industry. Some suggest a semi-standardised model as a 
compromise between a standardised and non-standardised industry. However, central 
standardisation could be achieved without compromising the flexibility and innovation 
that the industry needs, as is the case with other standardised practices. Moreover, it 
would provide the industry with the discipline which is essential in order to avoid chaos. 
Absolute standardisation, however, may not be preferred nor achievable. It should be at 
a sufficient level to provide the industry with the harmony and discipline it needs. In fact, 
central standardisation could preserve, or even, promote flexibility and innovation if an 
effective governance process of standardisation is applied. In this process, it is 
important to preclude the regulated, such as IFIs, from exercising any regulatory 
authority. 
More efficient and independent standard-setting process would supply the market 
with more confident stakeholders who would not lose their trust in the market very 
easily. Also, central standardisation provides the advantage of making the industry more 
acceptable and marketable to investors. Moreover, supervision would be more effective 
and practical as well as less costly. Central standardisation is also better equipped and 
more credible to deal with new, complex issues by setting more suitable standards for 




try to apply some standardisation strategies which, however, could undermine the 
SSBs’ independence if not administered by a central authority. 
The importance of standardisation was reflected in the case of the IPO of NCB 
discussed in the chapter. It showed that in the absence of standardisation, the 
independence of the SSB is questioned. Also, disagreements between sharia experts 
regarding whether or not a specific product or bank is Islamic may have negative 
economic effects.  
Standardisation is not only essential nationally. International harmonisation has 
become a trend in different disciplines, especially accounting and auditing fields, due to 
globalisation. In addition to the economic advantages, which also exist within the 
industry of Islamic finance, that led these disciplines to embrace international 
harmonisation, there are other justifications for international standardisation that 
promote the industry globally even in non-Islamic jurisdictions. Examples of international 
efforts toward standardisation were reviewed in the chapter and the lack of national 
enforcement mechanisms was identified as the main limitation on these efforts. 
Standardisation, however, is not free from challenges. The political attitude in 
secular jurisdictions and even in some Islamic ones such as Saudi Arabia, which prefers 
not to interfere in such a legal arrangement, could be an obstacle to enforcing a set of 
sharia standards in the industry. International organisations and non-governmental 
institutions could be solutions. Another obstacle identified in the chapter was the attitude 
of certain conservative religious establishments and schools toward standardisation.  
Addressing the Accountability Framework in the Role of Auditing in the SSB 
The auditing role of SSBs was analysed in Chapter Six. The accountability 
framework of this practice within sharia governance is weak and has received little 
attention. For a proper framework, accountability needs to be addressed within its 
context, sharia governance in this case. Accountability, as a mechanism consisting of 
four stages (reporting, explaining and justifying, questioning, and the possibility of the 




of the analysis. This included examining important questions regarding accountability for 
sharia-compliance within sharia governance: why, who, for what, to whom, and how. 
The rationales for accountability in sharia-compliance rest upon the need for 
independent sharia auditing with a strong and efficient accountability framework to 
protect sharia interest more reliably. While accountability is essential in financial audit, 
sharia auditing is deemed more important within sharia governance for several reasons 
highlighted in the chapter which generally concern the nature of sharia interest and the 
weak position of its stakeholders. This requires greater attention to be paid to the 
accountability framework for sharia auditors. Legitimacy, power, and public interest are 
also justifications for having an efficient accountability framework within sharia 
governance. 
Regarding identification of the accountors for sharia-compliance, the board of 
directors, as the body that is ultimately responsible for the operations of its company, 
was identified as the main accountor. Its responsibility should be similar to that which it 
has in financial auditing, which is to ensure that an appropriate mechanism has been 
effectively implemented to protect the interest of stakeholders. In this regard, some tend 
to prefer the appointment of sharia experts as representatives of the sharia interest. 
However, such an approach would not serve the interest of sharia effectively.  
The current framework of sharia supervision identifies SSBs among the main 
accountors of sharia-compliance. The lack of independence in SSBs, however, limits 
and restricts them from being an effective tool for sharia auditing. Many issues of 
conflict of interests can arise within this structure and negatively affect the SSB’s 
independent status as an important feature of auditing. Issues of conflict of interests 
surrounding SSBs include appointments, remuneration, combining audit with legislation 
and consultation, ownership and other financial interests of sharia members in the 
institutions, and confidentiality. These issues, although important in protecting sharia-
compliance interest, are weakly addressed in the regulations concerning SSBs. 
Alternatively, sharia firms could be a more effective tool to provide sharia auditing. In 
fact, the historical review of the development stages of financial audit showed that 




developed from being totally dependent and internal to being independent and external. 
Recently, sharia firms have become more recognised as an independent gatekeeper 
within the sharia audit framework. Although the issues of conflict of interests 
surrounding the SSB structure could be addressed in the legislation, sharia firms would 
be more effective in enhancing the independent status of sharia auditors in order to 
better: satisfy their gatekeeping roles; promote sharia auditing as a profession; and 
bring more collective efforts rather than individuality of practice. The movement toward 
sharia firms should then minimise the instances of conflict of interests within the SSB 
structure.  
The subject of accountability, or the question of “accountability for what?” has been 
identified to be God’s will or Islam, as perceived by credible scholars. This question is 
usually mixed with the question “accountability to whom?” where God’s will is, 
inaccurately, considered as a stakeholder instead of being the subject of accountability. 
The question of “accountability to whom?” involved identifying the stakeholders of 
sharia-compliance. The stakeholders’ weight in corporate governance should be 
reconsidered in sharia governance. Unlike the case with corporate governance, 
investors might not be the strongest stakeholders. Also, customers are more likely to 
have more interest in sharia-compliance. The case with employees, suppliers, and 
society as a whole is similar, where they have a stronger interest in sharia governance 
than do their counterparts within corporate governance. Therefore, stakeholders in 
sharia governance need to be assessed differently in order to reflect their importance 
and ensure there exists the proper protective tool for their sharia interest. While many 
studies focus on how to protect the financial interests of the unique group of IFIs’ 
stakeholders, IAHs, the protection of sharia interest is not well-recognised. Since sharia 
governance has different priorities for its stakeholders compared with corporate 
governance, the protective tools set under corporate governance might not serve well in 
relation to sharia governance. Voice and exit strategies, for example, are inconsistent 
with the nature of sharia interest. Therefore, implementing a regulatory authority to 
effectively protect sharia-compliance was suggested in order to conduct the required 




framework by having legal accountability as an additional form of accountability. The 
regulatory authority would act as a powerful representative of the stakeholders of sharia 
interest, who lack the necessary protective tools. With the regulator, the four 
accountability elements would be enforced more effectively: transparency, which is a 
very weak practice in the industry, would be imposed with more effective regulations; 
supervision would be undertaken by those who are more knowledgeable and this would 
reflect the complex nature of Islamic finance rulings and make it possible to conduct the 
questioning stage of accountability more effectively; the power to impose consequences 
would also be satisfied by such a regulator. Within the accounting and auditing fields, 
the regulatory authorities have positively contributed to the accountability framework 
and also help to implement the elements of accountability. In addition to its ex-post role 
of reviewing, the role of the regulator might involve some ex-ante role, which could help 
to prevent misconduct. 
The regulatory authority would also satisfy the role of the hisba institution, which is 
historically practised in Islamic states, more effectively than the SSB does. In fact, the 
SSB is not eligible to be regarded as a hisba intitution, since it is a private rather than a 
public institution. The regulator would also be in a better position to protect the public as 
an essential group of sharia-compliance stakeholders in sharia governance. 
The Proposal of an SSB-free Model  
Chapter Seven concludes the thesis by proposing an SSB-free model of sharia 
supervision. As an effective tool that fits with the corporate governance principles, the 
structure of auditing was suggested for sharia supervision. Following the audit model, 
this requires the separation of the roles of SSBs. The SSB-free model redefines the 
SSB’s roles, separates them, and assigns them to new collaborating institutions, which 
legislate, supervise, audit, and provide non-audit services. These institutions include a 
national Sharia Standard-setting Board to set sharia standards; a national regulator to 
supervise, legislate, and enforce the regulations for the industry as well as the 
profession; and sharia firms to conduct independent external audit and non-audit 
services and satisfy the requirements of the gatekeeping role within sharia governance. 




and deal with sharia auditing in a similar way to financial auditing. These arrangements 
would facilitate the work of the international institutions in the industry which in return 
would provide benefits for the local markets. 
This model would improve the practice of sharia supervision. Sharia firms and 
effective regulators would develop the practice of sharia supervision to become more 
professional. Also, competence requirements would be defined and developed more 
clearly to supply the industry with more qualified professionals and help to develop 
theories, skills, and practice in Islamic finance and sharia supervision. 
In addition, the SSB-free model would improve the industry and introduce more 
sophisticated institutions to the practice. Therefore, the industry would be more 
transparent, trustworthy, consistent, and attractive for investment. This new model 
would, also, be more relevant to the market. Rather than acting as an internal religious 
body, SSBs would be replaced with well-known institutions, which are already familiar to 
corporate governance. This would mitigate the perception of sharia governance as a 
religious matter and help it to become perceived as a governance mechanism. 
Despite its applicability, the model might face several potential challenges. It might 
be challenged by the lack of political will to adopt this governance model in secular or, 
even in some Islamic jurisdictions, where government interference in the Islamic finance 
industry might be deemed problematic. In these jurisdictions, international agencies, 
private self-regulatory agencies, and arbitration might be sought as alternatives to any 
missing institution within the model. In addition to the political challenge, some important 
players in the industry, such as the IFIs and sharia scholars might reject the SSB-free 
model, since it restricts their powerful position within the industry.  
Arguably, the model needs an economically strong jurisdiction that could influence 
the industry to make this model the standard governance model for IFIs and achieve its 
advantages. Saudi Arabia has economic and political factors to be a good candidate for 
legally influencing the market if the political will exists to recognise sharia governance. 




policymakers in Saudi Arabia might reach a conclusion that legislation in the industry is 
inevitable and should not be neglected. 
Suggestions for Further Research 
Overall, the discussions in this thesis brought forth some new thoughts and analysis 
in relation to the sharia supervision framework which resulted in the proposal for SSB-
free banks. It provides the ground for further analysis and assessment in this area. For 
example, sharia firms, as newly-emerging institutions, could be further highlighted to 
examine how they should contribute to sharia supervision as independent gatekeepers. 
Additionally, the accountability framework analysed in this thesis could be further 
assessed within sharia governance to reflect IFIs other than Islamic banks. While the 
analysis of accountability in this research focused on Islamic banking, other IFIs, such 
as insurance or investment companies in the capital markets, might need a slightly 
different analysis, especially with regard to their stakeholders. Such analysis would 
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